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ABSTRACT
The subject of the thesis is the attempt to control
communist influence by the British within the wider 
history of decolonization and the transfer of power in 
West Africa. It concerns the evolution and implementation 
of anti-communist policies in the colonies with special 
reference to Nigeria. It analyses British policy in 
Nigeria within the context of the Cold War and the
efforts of the Western powers to secure the good-will of 
Nigerian leaders after independence. It suggests that the 
success of the various anti-communist measures marked the 
beginning of the special relationship between Britain and 
the emergent Nigerian elite which took the country into 
independence in 1960. The study reviews the role of the 
Nigerian Left in the light of new evidence and concludes 
that communism was of considerable significance during 
the terminal colonial history of Nigeria. It shows that 
decolonisation and the transfer of power consisted of 
more than constitution-making, economic and development 
planning, the Nigerianisation of the civil service and 
the institutionalisation of a parliamentary system and 
federalism. The study is an analysis of the transition 
from colonialism to independence which emphasises the
involvement of the out-going colonial power in the
development of Nigerian domestic politics in the 1950s.
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CHAPTER ONE 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION
This study is concerned with analyses of transfer of 
power in Nigeria within the context of anti-communism. 
Hitherto the transfer of power has been examined within 
the framework of constitution-making, nationalist 
politics, development and economic planning. As the 
literature review will show there are many 
autobiographies and biographies of most nationalists and 
labour leaders in Nigeria. Yet communist penetration and 
anti-communism as aspects of transfer of power in 
Nigeria, remain to be fully discussed.
This study is therefore not about constitution- 
making, the colonial economy and development. Neither is 
it about nationalist politics in the way it has been 
presented before. But it is about nationalist and labour 
movements as they relate to communist infiltration of the 
colonies after World War II. Nationalism, constitution- 
making and the colonial economy are discussed only in 
relation to communism and anti-communism.
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Suffice it to say that this study is about attempts 
to develop a Marxist-Leninist movement in Nigeria during 
the 1940s and 1950s, and the colonial governments' (both 
Central and Regional) attitudes towards it. The Colonial 
State did not allow what it referred to as the long term 
furthering of Cominform through its satellites such as 
the CPGB, in her most populated colony and protectorates 
of Nigeria. I should mention, however, that my analyses 
are restricted mainly to Nigeria excluding the mandated 
territory of Cameroon (except where some references are 
important to events in Nigeria).1
(1.1) DISORDER AND THE IDEA OF CONTROL AND PERSUASION :
Colonial territories were not insulated from world 
politics before and after World War II. Events in the 
colonies were directly and indirectly influenced by the 
external politics of Cold War. By 1948 communist 
uprisings had emerged in Malaya, Indonesia, the 
Philippines, Burma and Indo-China. In West Africa, the 
Accra riots of February 1948 and the Zikists' "A Call 
for Revolution" in October 1948, jolted officials from 
their slumber.2
While India, Pakistan, Burma and Ceylon were granted 
independence in succession, multi-racial Malaya's 
independence was delayed partly because of the activities
14
of the Malayan Communist Party. By 1953 British forces, 
assisted by troops from other Commonwealth countries, had 
suppressed the Malayan Communist Party insurgency.' In 
Egypt, however, the British and the French lost their 
investment in the Suez Canal due to its nationalisation 
in 1956 by Nasser.4 Although Nasser was mostly seen as a 
nationalist (he was never a card carrying member of the 
Communist Party, neither did he profess communism), his 
acceptance of aid from the Soviet Union and the 
leadership of the Muslim world was however viewed with 
some anxiety by officials. Both British and American 
officials were concerned about his actions in World 
politics, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa.5
That aside, some of the colonies were characterised 
by what Frank Furedi called 'disorder and the communist 
threat'.6 From Malaya, Cyprus, British Guiana, the Gold 
Coast, Nigeria and Kenya, States of Emergency were 
declared to curtail disorder. While the British were 
willing to carry out reforms within the colonies, they 
were at the same time unwilling to lose control.7 
However, control was not usually characterised by the use 
of force. There was also the use of persuasion which 
largely explains cooperation between British officials 
and leading nationalists and unionists in Nigeria during 
the period."
15
Hence, Porter and Stockwell are right when they
state that "Imperial control has always depended on a
measure of co-operation or collaboration between colonial
rulers and influential local interest groups".9 Britain
was not willing to ignore African agitators, nor was she
prepared to drive them into the open arms of world-wide
Bolshevism. And as Sir Bryan Sherwood Smith notes:
... it was not communism as a 
doctrine that we feared. The 
danger lay in the covert fostering 
by organised communism of any 
individual or group seeking to 
overthrow established authority for 
political ends.11
(1.2) THE CONTEXT:
This study is sited within the context of the Cold 
War, nationalism and disorder and the politics of 
decolonisation in Nigeria between the 1945 and 1960. The 
Cold War between the East and the West affected the 
colonies as they were under the control of the Western 
Allies. The Eastern bloc was always at the forefront of 
anticolonial campaigns in the United Nations.
Thomas Hodgkin narrated African party ideologies 
during the colonial period. He argued that African party 
ideologies seem to be roughly grouped around two poles -
16
'radical' and 'conservative'. As he put it: "Ideologies
of the former type emphasize the need for a rapid 
transfer of political power from the colonizers to the 
colonized". He maintained that, "ideologies of the 
'conservative' type while in general assuming the 
inevitability of a transfer of power, argue that it 
should be orderly and gradual; and that, after 
independence, ties with the former colonial state should, 
as far as possible, be retained".12
Nationalism, for its part, became militant partly 
because of support from the Communist International (from 
September 1947 Cominform) and its satellites in Europe. 
Records, however, show that attempts at forming a 
centralised Marxist-Leninist movement in Nigeria in the 
1940s and 1950s was not only episodic, but unorganised.1J 
Differences in tactics and personality clashes paved the 
way for un-coordinated and pseudo-Marxist organisations 
mostly in the southern part of the country.14
While some believed that a mass and nation-wide 
political party such as the NCNC could serve their 
purpose (Eze's group), others were of the opinion that a 
Marxist party should be formed so that the bourgeoisie 
would not hijack the revolution (Ikoku's group). The 
latter were of the view that a Marxist party would
17
metamorphose into a Communist Party of Nigeria in the 
near future. These differences partly explain the absence 
of a nation-wide Marxist movement and the failure of 
Communism in post-World War II Nigeria. What emerged was 
a cluster of pseudo-Marxist groups with different tactics 
towards achieving their aim i.e. a Socialist state that 
would metamorphose into a communist state in Nigeria. 
Their common ground was reliance upon directives and 
support from the CPGB and WFTU; although as the evidence 
show, such directives were not strictly followed. 15
This leads to the often asked question concerning 
the meaning of Communism to Nigerians during the period. 
While one cannot deny the fact that nationalists were 
adequately informed about the ideology of Communism, they 
(like their British compatriots for instance)10 not only 
understood the strains in adapting it to their situation, 
but created a distinctive meaning and application of the 
ideology. They understood the role of the working class 
and the peasants; the inevitability of the class 
struggle; the need for a momentary cooperation with the 
bourgeoisie; the aim of the Socialist state as a 
transition to a Communist state; and of course, the need 
for tactical adaptation of the process in relation to 
their colonial situation. In fact, Lenin once noted that 
"all nations will arrive at socialism... but not the same
18
way".1'
Agunbiade-Bamishe is quite representative of their
view. According to him: "I am a Communist on the
conviction that a political ideology which is based on
the philosophy of Marx-Lenin-Stalinism is the only
political ideology that can best serve the interests of
the Nigerian people".1" One can say that Communism made
in-roads among these Nigerians because it addressed the
plight of the working class and the peasantry under
colonialism. Samuel Ikoku in one of his editorials in the
Nigerian Socialist Review (successor to Labour Champion.
of which he was a co-editor) exemplified the thinking and
goal of the more radical Nigerian Marxists during the
'50s. As he notes:
We must start a Party... the 
party of the Working class in 
alliance with the poor peasantry.
It must be guided by the tested 
theory of the struggles of the 
working classes the world over - 
the theory of Marxism-Leninism. It 
must adopt the road of open and 
determined revolutionary struggle 
against imperialism and against 
all forces of exploitation and 
oppression. 19
To most 'men-on-the-spot' such Marxist ideas could 
not be treated lightly. Thus, anxiety about communism was 
invariably tied with decolonisation and the transfer of 
power. As one might have expected, Britain as a leading
19
Western power took measures aimed at preventing 
Communists from becoming involved in the decolonisation 
process.
The idea was to create colonies supportive of the 
Western bloc in the struggle with the Soviet Union and 
its allies. It was generally believed that unless Western 
European nations, and the United States, secured the 
goodwill of the colonies at independence, they might 
become aligned with the USSR. As Walker put it: "The
enemy is the communist system itself - implacable, 
insatiable, unceasing in its drive for world 
domination" .2u
Anti-communism was thus conceptualized both as an 
hostility toward Soviet (its satellites inclusive) 
influence and leftist notions of political development in 
Nigeria as elsewhere in the British colonies. Herein lies 
the basis of anti-communist measures as an aspect of 
transfers of power in British colonies after 1945.
British anti-communism, therefore, was an attempt to 
maintain vital interests in various parts of the World, 
which the government believed were threatened by the Cold 
War tactics of the Soviet Union and her satellites. It 
also aimed at satisfying its Western Allies,
20
particularly, the United States. Hence, reasonable 
provision for the security of the United Kingdom and her 
allies was partly based on the success of anti-communist 
measures within her large colonial empire during the 
post-1945 era.
(1.3) LITERATURE REVIEW:
While there are many studies of nationalism and 
decolonisation in Nigeria, not much has been written 
about official and un-official attitudes towards marxist 
labour and nationalist leaders in the post-1945 era. 
Communism and anti-communism have been given only slight 
attention by scholars of the transfer of power in 
Nigeria. In this category are the works of Olusanya, 
Coleman and Sklar.21
Ahmadu Bello, Awolowo, Anthony Enahoro and Sir Bryan 
Sherwood Smith mention it in passing in their 
autobiographies.2*' Amechi, Davies, Foot, Mbadiwe, Nzimiro 
and Osita did not give in depth accounts of the role of 
Communist International in their memoirs, but emphasised 
the evolution and ideals of Zikism.2' Azikiwe on the 
other hand gave a general description of communism and 
the state. He emphasised the role of the few notable 
communists in post-independence Nigeria. His conclusion
21
however is that 'communism is suitable for adaptation but 
not for adoption in Nigeria'.^4 Lawal on the other hand 
identify the significance of anti-communism in British 
devolution policies, but was unable to unearth official 
and unofficial documents beyond 1951. 25
In contemporary world politics, Communism has evoked 
an enormous outpouring of literature, both academic and 
propagandist. These studies could be classified under: 
country studies, comparative studies, and a critique of 
the ideology and practices of Communism as a 
revolutionary movement, especially in the Western World. 
I must add that most books about comparative Communism 
are ordinarily collections of articles dealing with the 
various Communist States. 2b
Albright, Coker, Dunbabin, Klinghoffer, Mckay and 
Schatten on the other hand are not particularly 
interested in Nigeria, but in the communist threat in 
Africa and Asia generally. They are also concerned with 
how such were contained by the colonial powers and their 
Western Allies before power was transferred to the 
colonies.2
Russian interest in enjoying some sympathy among 
black Africans before World War II is analyzed by Wilson.
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He argued that: "Russian involvement had begun in Africa
long before the Second World War and had strong 
historical roots". In this pioneering study, he
maintained that: "Having failed to establish colonies of
her own, Russia adopted a policy of preventive
imperialism, attempting to deny other powers what she 
herself could not have".^
Abdul Raheem and Olukoshi, Falola and Adebayo, Eze, 
Okoye, and Uyilawa also present a narrative of the Left- 
wing and socialist struggle in Nigeria."1' Falola in 
another study, however, gave an in-depth account of
colonial development planning and decolonization in 
Nigeria. His account remains a vital source towards 
understanding anti-socialist measures in colonial 
developmental plans.30
The extent to which ideology influenced nationalist 
and labour leaders has been the subject of some studies 
in recent time. An account of the significant role of the 
Zikist Movement in the nationalist struggle in Nigeria is 
the work of Iweriebor. He concludes that: "under Eze and
Okoye, the movement's political orientation and discourse 
had acquired a definite socialist inflection". 31
Alade, Ikoku, Madunagu, Osoba, Waterman and
23
Zachernuk discuss the communist threat in their studies 
but do not highlight official anti-communist measures.3' 
Narasingha on the other hand compared the role of the 
Left during the colonial and post-colonial period and 
concludes that "socialism holds an uncertain prospect 
for the future of Nigeria"."' Frank in "Ideological 
Competition in Nigeria: Urban Populism versus Elite
Nationalism", analyses the nature of ideology in Nigeria 
and relates ideological competition to conflict between 
Federal and local interests.1" Interestingly, none of 
these scholarly works benefits from materials at the CPGB 
and TUC archives in Manchester and Warwick respectively.
Arikpo traces the history of Nigeria from the first 
contact with the Europeans. He emphasises Nigeria's 
constitutional evolution from 1914 to 1963, the emergence 
of nationalism and the problem of Federalism. Crowder in 
his The Story of Nigeria, was interested in a general 
history of the country. He emphasised the impact of 
western values, the emergence of indigenous elites and 
internal political conflict.13
Awa in his Federal Government in Nigeria, narrates 
the political history of the country by examining various 
constitutions and the workings of the government. In
24
another study, he focuses on the place of ideology in 
Nigerian politics. Three strands of ideology were 
identified: nationalism, capitalism and socialism. On
nationalism, Awa concludes that "although the nationalist 
movement increased the momentum of the agitation for 
independence, it did not evolve any ideas that could help 
develop consensus in the country".
"Most leaders in Nigeria", according to Awa, 
"favoured capitalism to socialism". To him, "socialism 
has not made a great impact on the society in practical 
terms because, there are many strands to the ideology. 
Its votaries have tended to dissipate energy fighting one 
another and not the primary adversary, namely, poverty, 
and those who perpetuate it". Another reason he gave is 
that "principal spokesmen for socialism at one time or 
the other abandoned the cause and either went over to the 
capitalist camp or remained neutral in the ideological 
debate" .36
Aluko, Kirk-Greene and Phillips in their separate 
studies have given insights into the evolution and 
development of the foreign service and foreign policy in 
Nigeria. Aluko and Kirk-Greene agreed that the evolution 
of foreign service should be dated back to 1950 when the 
process of Af ricanisat ion was in full gear. Both,
25
however, failed to identify ideological undertones in the 
evolution and development of the Nigerian foreign service 
during the period. The emergence of a non-neutralist 
foreign policy on the eve of independence is narrated by 
Phillips. He discussed the place of ideology and the 
East-West politics as a campaign issue during the 1959 
general elections. The implications of an anti-communist 
foreign policy on domestic politics after independence is 
also analyzed.J
Apthorpe, Bhambri, Dudley, Omer-Cooper and Post are 
concerned about the progress and prospects of marxism in 
Nigeria. In July 1964 a symposium was held at Ibadan 
where scholars discussed marxian ideas and social 
progress in Nigeria. Some of the papers presented were 
later published in The Nigerian Journal of Economic and 
Social Studies. Apthorpe focused on marxism and law in 
Nigeria. He concluded that the Marxian ideas do not fit 
into Nigerian law, nor is it wholly applicable. Bhambri 
in "Marxist Economic Doctrines and their Relevance to 
Problems of Economic Development of Nigeria", maintained 
that Nigeria could not afford to be aligned with the 
Eastern bloc. As he put it, "dependency on the communist 
countries is likely to expose the Nigerian economy to 
more dangerous forms of instability".3h
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Dudley in "Marxism and Political Change in Nigeria", 
concluded that marxism only succeeded, so far as the 
marxists were willing to cooperate with the bourgeoisie. 
"That is why", according to him, "independent Nigeria 
emerged with a ruling governing class recruited mainly 
from the intelligentsia and the bourgeoisie". Omer-Cooper 
in his "Nigeria, Marxism and Social Progress", concluded 
that, "if taken ... as a scheme to be applied 
dogmatically to circumstances so different from those 
which inspired its authors - it could only lead to 
illusion and conceal the real problems of social progress 
in Nigeria " . 39
The use of the media, particularly the BBC, in 
propaganda is best analyzed by John Mackenzie and Charles 
Armour in their separate studies. Mackenzie in "'In Touch 
with the Infinite': The BBC and the Empire, 1923 - 1953", 
highlights history of the BBC stations, and concludes 
that "at the very least they contributed to a political 
climate in which the British public would not tolerate 
any party which was anti-monarchical or which seemed to 
attack Britain's complacent sense of superiority".
Charles Armour is interested in the development of 
broadcasting and information in British colonial Africa. 
In his article, "The BBC and the Development of
27
Broadcasting in British Colonial Africa 1946-1956", he 
analyzed post-war interest in broadcasting in the context 
of the Cold War and African nationalism. He concludes 
that the development of broadcasting in post-war British 
Africa generally, and in Nigeria in particular, was a 
matter of urgency to make colonial government policies 
more readily available to the public in order to stem 
radical and communist propaganda. Educating colonial 
peoples, it seems, was seen in the Colonial Office as one 
of many safety valves against unrest in the colonies. 
This function, according to Armour, was performed by the 
BBC in cooperation with the Public Relation Offices in 
the colonies . 40
Ajala, Esedebe, Langley, Legum and Padmore were 
interested in general Pan-African use of some of the 
ideals of communism as the basis of nationalist struggle 
in Africa.41 Rupert Emerson's Africa and United States 
Policy(1967) remains a useful antidote to the views of 
those who claim that decolonisation was largely forced on 
the colonial powers by the Americans, but his argument 
that Washington was not interested in the communist 
threat as it related to Africa is incorrect.4~
Ananaba, Akpala, Cohen, Cowan, Otobo, Egboh, 
Tokunboh and Yesufu have given leads in their studies
28
about Nigerian trade union movements. Ananaba in The 
Trade Union Movement in Nigeria (1969) gave a lucid 
account of labour politics in colonial and post-colonial 
Nigeria. Also in The Trade Union Movement in Africa 
(1979), he provides insights into the evolution of labour 
movements in Africa generally. Akpala emphasises the 
evolution of trade union movements in Nigeria and 
attempts after 1945, to institute educational programmes 
for unionists afterwards. Cohen in his Labour and 
Politics in Nigeria (1981), discussed the history of 
labour movements in Nigeria emphasizing the role of 
international labour politics in the split of union 
leaders.
Cowan traces the history of trade union worldwide, 
highlighting its role in nationalism. Egboh's studies are 
mainly about the origin of trade unionism and its 
problems and prospects during the colonial period. Otobo 
in his various studies on labour relations and trade 
unions in Nigeria provides us with information in this 
regard. In Foreign Interest and Labour Unions in Nigeria 
(1986) and State and Industrial Relations in Nigeria 
(1988), he gave a clear account of the origin and growth 
of the labour movement in Nigeria with only passing 
reference to the Communist International's support for 
labour movements. He, like previous authorities, did not
29
adequately address the communist threat as it related to 
decolonisation, nor did he discuss various anti-communist 
measures taken by British officials and leading 
nationalists in Nigeria as part of an effort to establish 
pro-Western labour organisations in colonial and 
post-colonial Nigeria. Tokunboh's Labour Movements in 
Nigeria: Past and Present (1985), also provides a lucid 
account of the emergence and development of trade unions 
in Nigeria. To Yesufu, modern industrial relations in 
Nigeria cannot be divorced from trade union agitations 
since the colonial period.""
Marjorie Nicholson's study of the Trade Union 
Congress (British) and Keith Laybourn's A History of 
British Trade Unionism, are in depth accounts of the 
development and growth of the trade union movement in 
modern Britain. While Laybourn traces the history of 
trade unions from 1770 to the present, Nicholson 
emphasised TUC internal and external dynamics and its 
influence and support in colonial labour relations. Its 
relationship with other world labour organisations are 
also detailed. As it relates to the colonies, Nicholson 
analyzed the cordiality between the Colonial Office and 
the TUC in relation to the activities of the Colonial 
Advisory Committee set up in 1937. Her emphasis is, 
however, about India and the West Indies with cursory
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mention of other colonies.44
Some scholars and government functionaries have 
carried out researches about Communist infiltration of 
the trade union movements in the colonies generally. 
Although some of them might have been influenced by their 
ideological orientation, they nonetheless provide useful 
accounts about the role of Communism, Socialism and the 
Cominform in metropolitan and colonial trade unionism. In 
this category are the works of: Friedland, Gonidec,
Laybourn, Lichtblau, Nelkin, Roberts, Zakharia and 
Magigwana.40
Killingray in his article "The Maintenance of Law 
and Order in British Colonial Africa" (1986), discusses 
the promulgation of law and the maintenance of order in 
British Africa between 1885 and 1960. Although not 
necessarily concerning himself with the problem of 
communism and anti-communism, he nonetheless provides a 
lead in our understanding of the institutionalisation of 
coercive institutions, such as the Police, Special Branch 
and the Army in British efforts at organising firm 
colonial security against emergencies and disorders.40
Killingray and Anderson in "An Orderly Retreat?" 
conclude that "the colonial police were ... a ubiquitous
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presence in the story of decolonisation". They assert 
that "when the legitimacy of colonial rule was barely 
questioned, policing was modest: as legitimacy was
increasingly challenged and political instability grew, 
so the operational role and intensity of policing was 
extended" .47
The local context is analyzed by Tamuno, Rotimi and 
Ahire in their separate studies of the Nigerian police. 
Tamuno in The Police in Modern Nigeria, 1861 - 1965,
gives a full treatment of the origins, development and 
roles of the Nigerian police. His focus is on the 
important issue of law and order, crime control and the 
general constitutional role of the police. His account of 
the Native Administration police is complemented by 
Rotimi in his study. Rotimi emphasises the role of the 
Native Administrations in maintaining law and order. 
Ahire on the other hand, uses political economy as a tool 
in analysing British imperialism and policing in colonial 
Nigeria. He concludes that "in colonial Nigeria, 
militaristic policing was the commonest form of police 
intervention". This is because the state needed to 
maintain some level of acceptance in order to minimize 
resistance from the colonized.4"
Richard Rathbone in his "Political Intelligence and
Policing in Ghana in the late 1940s and 1950s" (1992),
concludes that "anti-communism is a factor of 
considerable significance in the late colonial 
h i s t o r y 49 This is elucidated in the two volumes he 
edited in the British Documents on the end of empire. 
Here, he discussed Colonial Office's high policies with 
emphasis on Ghana. For the first time we now know that 
the success of anti-communism was important in the 
granting of independence to the Gold Coast (Ghana) in 
1957 .50
Hakim Adi and Stephen Howe have individually 
analyzed the role of the British Left in colonial 
politics. Adi in "West Africans and the Communist Party 
in the 1950s", highlights the relationship between 
Nigerian students in Britain during the 1950s and the 
leadership of the Communist Party of Great Britain. This 
is further expanded in his doctoral thesis "West African 
Students and West African Nationalism in Britain,1900- 
1960". Stephen Howe in his Anticolonialism in British 
Politics: The Left and the End of Empire. 1918 - 1964 
(1993), analyzed the role of the Left with emphasis on 
the Communist Party of Great Britain, the Labour 
Governments, and the Movement for Colonial Freedom, 
within the context of colonial politics.51
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Ronald Hyam's documentation of the Labour 
Governments and the end of the British empire is another 
useful lead. He suggests that between August 1945 (after 
VJ-Day) and September 1951 (before handing over to the 
Conservative Party) the issue of containing communism was 
paramount in Labour's international relations policy. The 
Labour governments' high policies are discussed in 
detail. Despite some Left-wingers in the Labour Party, 
the government was not tolerant of the Marxist-Leninist 
ideals in its policy formulation. In fact, Hyam has 
documented and shown that the foundation of an anti­
communist policy in British strategy was the product of 
the two post-World War II Labour Governments.52
David Goldsworthy in his volumes on the Conservative 
Governments notes that "Africa South of the Sahara was
far from un-important" in Cold War politics. He notes
that the Conservative Governments like their Labour 
predecessors, were concerned about the growing influence 
of Nasser's Egypt, and with it, Soviet influence in 
spreading communism in Africa.5" He also notes that the 
United States of America was concerned about the menace 
which led to its floating of a "committee of American, 
British, French, and perhaps Belgian officials to
consider how best to combat Soviet subversion in
Africa" .54
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Both Stephen Ashton and Sarah Stockwell are 
concerned with colonial policies and practice in the 
colonies generally.55 On the other hand, British strategy 
as a background to Cold War politics is narrated by John 
Kent. To him, the whole idea was to ensure continuous 
British interests in Europe and in her colonies 
generally. 56
A review of relevant literature could not be 
complete without Trevor Clark's monumental narrative of 
Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, and Epelle's synthesis of 
Balewa's speeches. Balewa was one of the leading 
nationalists of the period and of course the person 
upon whom the governance of Nigeria was entrusted on 
October 1st 1960. Clark narrates his role first as the 
Leader of Government Business, and later Prime Minister 
of the Federation of Nigeria. In relation to this 
study, Clark and Epelle have separately discussed the 
role of Balewa in nationalist politics as well as his 
role in the decolonization era.57 Like Nkrumah in the 
Gold Coast and Tunku Abdul Rahman in Malaya, Balewa was 
an anti-communist and was prepared to collaborate with 
British administrators on this matter.
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(1.4) IMPORTANCE OF THE STUDY :
The significance of this study is four-fold. 
Firstly, it attempts to remove anti-communism from the 
footnotes of Nigerian political history. It has been 
wrongly assumed by some scholars that communism was of 
no significance in Nigeria during the devolution years, 
and as such anti-communism deserves little attention. 30
Hitherto, decolonisation in Nigeria has been 
discussed within the context of constitutionalism, 
socio-economic policies, administrative change and the 
Africanisation of the civil service and the armed 
forces, and the incorporation of the emergent nation 
into the Commonwealth.59 This study complements these 
perspectives, but suggests that other aspects like 
anti-communism needs to be explained in order to 
improve our general understanding of British transfers 
of power.
Secondly, a study of anti-communism in Nigeria 
between the 1940s and late 1950s sites Nigerian 
politics within recent world history. These events 
occurred at the height of the Cold War when the world 
was divided between the Eastern and Western blocs.
There was a general belief amongst policy makers that,
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the survival of the West, depended in part, on the 
degree of the success of its anti-communist measures in 
the colonies, particularly by the colonial powers. 60
Hence, a study of anti-communism contributes to a 
general understanding of radical nationalism, the 
communist threat and the end of the British Empire.
Some scholars would argue that communism did not lead 
to the end of Empire. However, the thesis suggests that 
its threat was a considerable concern within the 
Colonial, Foreign, and Commonwealth Relations Offices. 
Records from the Communist Party of Great Britain and 
the British Trade Union Congress respectively, have 
pointed to the fact that Nigerians were interested in 
Marxist-Leninist ideology. There were also attempts by 
some Nigerians to evolve a Communist Party during the 
1950s as part of their critique of British colonial 
rule and the need for freedom. And, as Hyam rightly
notes: "the danger of communism was thought to lie not
in its political theory, nor even in its anti­
capitalism, but in its critique of colonialism". 61
The third element of this study therefore is its 
explanation about anti-communist measures during the 
period. Government as it should be expected was not all
alone in the game. It was supported by "The Third
Force" in its anti-communist crusades in the colonies. 
Such "Third Force" or agents of anti-communism 
includes: the British TUC, Moral Re-armament Movement, 
International Confederation of Trade Unions, the 
British Council, the United States Information Service 
etc. These organisations worked closely with the Public 
Relations Department and the Chief Secretary's Office 
in Lagos, in order to execute the many measures against 
Communists and their sympathizers. Lastly, the study 
discusses the success of anti-communism as one of the 
official steps before power was transferred to the 
nationalists . 62
(1.5) SOURCES AND APPROACH:
While the approach is basically historical, the 
study is largely based on official documents, newspaper 
reports and some private papers obtained from archives 
and libraries in England, the United States of America 
and Nigeria. Events and issues are analyzed in sequence 
and in line with available data. Issues and events are 
related to other colonies as my sources permit.
I must admit that there are methodological 
difficulties in writing this thesis. First is the
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yardstick in measuring distinction between radical 
nationalism and communist inspired nationalism. While 
agreeing that the two are seperable and distinct, one 
should note that official position is that radicalism 
was inspired by ideology of the left.
Also, while it is difficult to ascertain the 
credibility of some sources, one has relied upon the 
fact that there are certainly some truth in official 
reports. Of particular interest is the subjective 
reference to some nationalists i.e. H.O. Davies, 
Funmilayo Ransome-Kuti etc as communists. Their memoirs 
show that although they were at one point (in the case 
of Davies) close to the Communist Party of Great 
Britain and other satellites (in the case of 
Funmilayo), they only perceived Communism as a means to 
an end (only in the case of Funmilayo). In fact, 
Funmilayo maintained that she was never a member of any 
Communist Party. I must say that within the colonial 
context however, one only needs to show sympathy for 
the other bloc (East) in the ideological division to be 
labelled a communist or fellow-traveller.
While records point to the fact that, 
personalities such as, Agunbiade-Bamishe, Dodiye, Eze, 
Bassey, Folarin (before 1953), Ikoru, Idise Dafe,
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Ugokwe etc were communists, it is difficult to 
ascertain the magnitude of their relationship with 
Soviet communism, although their links with the CPGB 
and other satellites in Eastern Europe, is undeniable. 
Some were socialists (not Fabian type) and interested 
in the adaptation of communism during the period i.e. 
Aniedobe, Agwuna, Ikoku, Okoye and Uche Omo etc, while 
some professed to be Titoist i.e. Ayo Ogunsheye, Akpata 
and Obahiagbon.
If newspaper reports are not subjective, and can 
be regarded as important sources, then they seems to 
have provided solution to some of the problems in this 
study. The reconstruction of the Zikists' ideological 
orientation, activities of the Special Branch and the 
police for instance, relied upon newspapers, a few 
available memoirs and some intelligence reports. Papers 
from the CPGB and TUC have given credence to newspaper 
reports and some official intelligence reports, 
concerning the presence of some Nigerian Communists and 
their orientation towards the CPGB "British Road to 
Socialism". The CPGB files also confirmed colonial and 
nationalist governments anxiety about the activities of 
these men who tried to form a nation-wide Marxist- 
Leninist movement in the 1950s.
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Anti-communism however remained an important 
policy pursued to satisfy Britain's allies in the 
Western bloc, to deny the colonies to the East, to 
ensure the security of Britain and her allies against 
the East in the event of a war, and to consolidate the 
rule and dominance of her collaborators against the 
communists and their sympathizers before independence. 
British officials, and their Western allies, were 
concerned about "national liberation movements 
considered as furthering the long-term aims of 
Communism".t: This is the basis of anti-communism as an 
aspect of the transfer of power in Nigeria as elsewhere 
in British colonies during the post-war era.
In the Public Record Office, London, the files of 
the Cabinet and its committees, Colonial and Foreign 
Offices remained the main source of information. These 
are complemented by records from the US National 
Archives and Record Administration, Maryland. In 
Nigeria, the regional archives in Ibadan and Enugu 
provided information concerning British administrators 
and their Nigerian counterparts during the period.
Here, chief secretary's file, divisional records, 
intelligence reports by field officers are scrutinized 
along with those from the Public Record Office, London. 
Various government reports and annual reports of some
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departments (Labour, Information and Research, and the 
Police) have been quite useful.
I should note that materials from the Moral Re­
armament Archives, Cheshire and Victoria; British Trade 
Union Congress Collections, University of North 
London; British TUC Registry Files at the Modern Record 
Centre, the University of Warwick; as well as the 
Communist Party of Great Britain Papers at the National 
Museum of Labour History Archive Centre, Manchester, 
have assisted in filling-in many gaps in official 
materials. These sources have also given insight into 
emergent 'Left-Wing' organisations in the 1950s, most 
of which existed in secrecy because of government 
measures.
Also, government publications such as Notices, 
Gazettes, Council of Ministers' Minutes and 
Parliamentary Debates also provided useful information. 
Lastly, a few private papers (Solanke and Funmilayo 
Ransome-Kuti), oral interviews, newspaper reports and 
the memoirs of most nationalists have been useful in 
this endeavour. These are scrutinized along with the 
archival records and published works.
One should mention the many Government
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publications in the UK. Perhaps the most significant of 
all was His (later Her) Majesty's Stationery Office 
Publications titled: Colonial Annual Reports . The
series on Nigeria titled, Nigeria: Colonial Annual 
Reports, covered the 1920s to 1960. This study 
benefitted from the series covering the 1930s to 1960.
(1.6) OUTLINE OF CHAPTERS:
This study is organised into eight chapters. 
Chapter one is a general introduction with an emphasis 
on the inadequacies of existing literature about the 
politics of decolonisation, as well as the importance 
of a study of anti-communism. Chapter two is a review 
of Communism as an ideology and the role of the Soviet 
Union and her satellites in its expansion. It reviews 
the various Communist Congresses since 1919 as it 
relates to "Negro" and colonial questions. The efforts 
of the Communist Party of Great Britain among West 
African colonial students in England is also analyzed. 
It also identified reasons for the attractiveness and 
unattractiveness of the ideology to Africans.
In chapter three, I focus on British colonial 
policies, Cold War politics and the Western allies.
Here, a review of "British High Policies" and attempts
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at reform in the colonies are analyzed. The Cold War 
and the attitudes of Britain's allies, notably the 
United States and France, are reviewed. Chapters four 
and five are about "communism within", emphasizing the 
role of marxists and their sympathizers in nationalist 
movements and labour unionism. It is an account of 
attempts to form a Marxist Party in Nigeria during the 
late 1940s and 1950s, as well as a critique of the role 
of identifiable individuals. Official CPGB perception 
of their activities is also detailed.
Chapter six, on the other hand, is about the 
evolution, politics and implementation of anti­
communist measures from the 1940s to 1960. Both 
official and un-official measures are discussed in 
order to show the level of collaboration between the 
State and business community. Some comparativist 
analyses are drawn from the metropole and other 
colonies i.e. the Gold Coast, in analysing measures 
against Communism during the 1940s and the late 1950s. 
In chapter seven, I reflect on attempts at a 
sustainable anti-communism by both British officials 
and emergent Nigerian leaders on the eve of the 
transfer of power. Plausible local reasons for the 
success of anti-communism is explored in chapter eight.
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In summary, this study is about the history of 
anti-communism in Nigeria during the colonial period. 
An understanding of this aspect of decolonisation will 
illuminate our reflections on how and why, the 
aspirations of Marxists (or their sympathizers) 
remained elusive in Nigeria since independence in 1960.
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CHAPTER TWO 
BACKGROUND TO ANTI-COMMUNISM: COMMUNISM,
SOVIET UNION AND THE SATELLITES .
(2.1) INTRODUCTION:
Communism as an ideology is well analyzed by many 
scholars and deserves little elaboration here. The term, 
Communism, can be broadly defined as a theory or system 
of social organization based on the holding of property 
in common. In its modern form, it denotes the 
revolutionary movement aimed at abolishing capitalism, 
and ultimately establishing a society in which all goods 
will be socially owned and all economic activities 
socially planned and controlled. The dictum in a 
Communist State is: "from each according to his capacity, 
to each according to his need".
It has, however, grown beyond the ideas of Marx and 
Engels over the years to incorporate ideas of some of 
their notable followers. While many scholars have 
adequately addressed the divisions amongst its adherents, 
I should note that they includes Marxist-Leninist,
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Stalinist, Trotskist, Fabian-Socialist, Titoist, Maoist 
etc viewpoints.1
Under the conditions of 19th century industrialism 
in Europe, Marx and Engels synthesized previous writings 
of Hegel (historic evolution and dialectical process); 
Ricardo (labour theory of value); Blanqui (workers 
revolutionary theory) etc, to form a general theory of 
historical evolution and the development of capitalism. 
In The Communist Manifesto (1848) they maintained that, 
the objective of Communism is "the forcible overthrow of 
all existing social conditions".2 The basis of this 
hypothesis is Marx's economic determinism and historical 
materialism which makes room for class consciousness and 
the inevitability of the class struggle in society. As 
Palme Dutt put it: "In the completed communist society,
with the final abolition of class distinctions, the State 
as an instrument of coercion for the suppression of a 
subject class and the forcible overcoming of social 
contradictions disappears". He concluded that the 
"principle of fully completed communist society is from 
each according to his abilities, to each according to his 
needs".3
Communism is, however, distinguished from socialism 
by its revolutionary means. Socialism aims at changes
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through constitutional and democratic methods; the 
nationalization of essential means of production and 
organized distribution on the basis of a just reward to 
each person for the amount and quality of his or her 
work.
The withering away of the state is, perhaps, one of 
the central difficulties in grasping the ideology of 
Communism, as indeed its distinction from socialism. 
Cyril Black has noted that the "withering away of the 
state has been the subject of a good deal of irony and 
wit on the part of critics of Communism, especially in 
the light of developments in the U.S.S.R"4 with much of 
the criticism been misplaced. "Marxists" according to 
him, "use the term "State" in a very special sense". "By 
"State" they mean not the entire administrative 
apparatus, but the State as an instrument of the 
oppression of one class by another".5
Nove identified general feature of communism. To 
him, "the declared objective of the Soviet leadership is 
to build communism". He concludes that "full-fledged 
socialism, or communism, would be a state of affairs in 
which scarcity would have been overcome, and production 
would be for use and not for exchange, socially planned 
for the benefit of the educated and participating working
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classes".6
Communism could be conceived therefore as a socio­
political ideology which seeks the establishment of a 
"stateless" society where governmental institutions are 
non-existence (because they are no longer a 
superstructure) and where all the resources of the 
society are commonly owned and equally shared. It is 
however recognised that full-fledged Communism would only 
be achieved after Socialism. This is the transitory stage 
to Communism i.e. the means to an end. The distinction 
between the two is that Socialism does not encourage 
violent overthrow of the existing order. The socialists 
however emphasised the dominance of the working class and 
the centrality of government structures. They also 
believed in the 'Socialist vision'- that is the 
termination of private ownership of the means of 
production and exchange for general collectivisation. 7
I should note that the ideology of Communism since 
Marx, has undergone different modifications (although 
communists are united in common detestation of the 
"infidel" bourgeoisie). It is not my objective to study 
these modifications. This has been adequately covered by 
existing studies about Communism and world politics. A 
fairly representative view is that of Andrew Janos. Janos 
identifies four distinctions in explaining modifications
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of Communist ideology: "(1) Marxism; (2) Orthodox
Marxism; (3) Revisionist Marxism; and (4) Marxism- 
Leninism".'' The first is meant to refer to the doctrine 
that emerged from the collaboration of Marx and Engels; 
the second to the interpretation of the doctrine by some 
of Marx's younger contemporaries like Kautsky and 
Plekhanov; the third to the revision of Marxism by 
Bernstein and the European socialists; the last to the 
revision of Marxism by Lenin and his followers.9 In 
brief, he summed up the ideology of Communism as 
"Marxism-Leninism, a particular form of Marxism".10
There is no doubt that the most notable modification 
to the ideas of Engels and Marx is contained in numerous 
works of Lenin, the Soviet leader after the October 
Revolution in 1917.11 It was at the Second Congress of 
the Communist International in the summer of 1920 that 
"the colonial question" was first mentioned.12 The 
participants discussed in principle the possibility of a 
link between Africa and the Communist International, 
within the framework of world-revolutionary ideas and 
Moscow's aims. However, knowledge about black Africa was 
inadequate (although this was surmounted years later) to 
put into immediate effect, Lenin's "Theses on the 
National and Colonial Questions".
Interest about African affairs was stated during
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subsequent Congresses.1' In fact, Lenin's "Theses on the 
National and Colonial Questions" written in 1920, 
remained a useful guide. The tactics recommended by 
Lenin, and indeed, the Comintern, was "tactical co­
operation with the national revolutionary movements". "4 
At the Third Congress in 1921, communists were enjoined 
to "dedicate themselves to the active support of colonial 
emancipation" . 15
Wilson however noted that: "the real beginning of an
active Comintern policy towards the 'Negro' question can 
be traced to the fourth Comintern Congress, held in 
Moscow in November and December 1922 " .lD He concluded 
that: "not only did the fourth Comintern Congress launch
the first concrete program directed toward the 'Negro' 
race, but in effect it initiated active Comintern 
interest in the politics of sub-Saharan Africa" . 17
I should add that, sub-Saharan Africa did not only
enter into the purview of Comintern and the Communist
International because of the 'Negro' question, but 
because it fits into communist ideas of "colonial
exploitation".1" Colonial exploitation became a theme in 
Communism because of Western European powers insatiable 
quest for natural resources and markets for their 
capitalist products. To the Communists, this is the
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genesis of European imperialism in Asia and Africa, and 
the institutionalisation of colonialism.
The central theme during the Stalin era (1924-1953) 
was that: "the national bourgeoisie of the colonial and
semi-colonial countries... can never lead the national- 
revolutionary movement to victory".19 The Fifth Congress 
resolution (1924) that victory could only be achieved 
under the leadership of the workers and peasants was 
modified during the Sixth Congress in 1928 to include the 
petty bourgeoisie.'"'
Having realised the important position of the 
nationalist bourgeoisie, which even became more 
pronounced after World War II, the Comintern declared 
that: "... As far as the national bourgeoisie is
concerned, the achievement of national independence is 
its ultimate aim, and it consists in the establishment of 
their undivided rule in a sovereign state".21 The idea 
was to make the working class realise the stage as "a 
necessary pre-condition for social transformations and 
for the subsequent development of the national and 
colonial revolution into a socialist revolution". 22
It was also at the Fifth Congress that the important 
role of European Communist parties was emphasised in the
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"battle" for the hearts of the colonial peoples of Asia 
and Africa. While emphasising that much still has to be 
done, the Congress noted the role of the French Communist 
Party and the Communist Party of Great Britain.23 The 
CPGB like its French counterpart, declared its commitment 
to assisting colonial peoples in British Africa in their 
goal towards self-government. I shall return to this
shortly.
It was Khrushchev who pushed further Soviet
communism in Africa. He was, however, different from
Stalin in his approach and method. Schatten has stated 
that: "the admission of Khrushchev that there was 'an
extensive zone of peace' in Asia and Africa, marks the 
re-opening of a protracted inter-Marxist discussion on 
the necessity, usefulness, and objectives of a communist 
policy of alliance with the national forces of the 
colonial and former colonial countries - on both an
international and local level".24
Marxist theoretical studies and analyses were 
boosted by Soviet government support towards achieving 
this goal. Scholars such as Olderogee, Gafur and Potekhin 
carried out studies where they "attempted to fit Africa 
into the overall theoretical pattern of non-communist 
Asian countries...". ~5 Klinghoffer has maintained that
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"Soviet writers have shed many of their previous 
misconceptions about Africa... The preoccupation with 
rigid class differentiations has given way to the 
recognition of new, flexible, more realistic, and almost 
trans-class categories such as 'revolutionary democrats' 
and progressive intelligentsia". 26
Specialists deliberations about the national 
bourgeoisie led to Moscow conferences between 1957 and 
1960. The result of one of these meetings was that: "the
national bourgeoisie was rehabilitated and declared 
worthy of being an allay of the communists" /' Simply 
put, the idea that only the proletariat can secure 
complete independence and build socialism was replaced by 
a new analysis which recognises the significance of the 
national bourgeoisie. The national bourgeoisie in Nigeria 
during the period under study did not, however, find 
Communism attractive enough.2e
(2.2) A REVIEW OF SOVIET PERCEPTIONS OF AFRICA AND THE 
PROSPECTS OF COMMUNISM:
Gorman and Morison have concluded that, Soviet 
interest in Africa was to prospect for the emergence of 
socialist states, which would establish Communism, at a
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later stage.29 To Aidan Crawley, Soviet interest in
African colonies after World War II was based on three
propositions. As he put it:
First, it accepted what was called 
African nationalism, the emergence of 
states freed from Western colonialism, as 
a stage in the development of Africa 
towards communism; second, the Russian 
campaign of penetration was to split the 
trade union movement in every African 
country where they could do so; third, 
the Russian campaign involved the 
attraction of students to Iron Curtain 
countries, and to Moscow in particular.3'
Nogee and Donaldson identified 1947 as the turning 
point in the Soviet Union's African policy. They note 
that "only in 1947, with the Cold War clearly under way, 
did the Soviets direct their attention to what Zhadnov 
proclaimed as 'the crisis of the colonial system'".31 
Soviet strategy toward Africa during the period under 
study incorporated the Bolshevik distinction between what 
was referred to as 'maximum and minimum objectives'.
To Alexander Dallin, "the maximum objective-control 
of the African continent, with its manpower and resources 
- is axiomatic to faith in the world-wide triumph of 
communism and yet vague enough to prevent specific 
elaboration"."2 This goal was postponed indefinitely 
because it was impracticable within the colonial
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context.'3 The minimum objective was based on the belief 
that at independence, African states would pursue a 
"positive neutrality" in the Cold War and cultivate 
increasingly close economic, political and cultural ties 
with the Soviet bloc.
The Soviet Union thus pursued the minimum objective 
throughout the later colonial era. Some of the methods 
devised were covert support of nationalist and labour 
movements in the colonies, as well as the sponsoring of 
colonial issues in the United Nations' meetings. The 
Soviet Union regarded trade unions as useful links with 
the masses because it was presumed that they formed an 
important arena for recruiting potential communists in 
the colonies. Soviet policy was aimed at "winning the 
uncommitted elements in the African labour movements 
through funds and sponsorship of their programmes". 34
Colonial students were also targeted. Mckay notes 
that: "At the Sixth Congress of the Communist
International in 192 8 it was affirmed that an important 
if not predominant part of the party ranks in the first 
stage of the movement is recruited from the petty 
bourgeoisie, very frequently students". He further notes 
that "the communist controlled World Federation of 
Democratic Youth (WFDY) in Budapest and the International
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Union of Students (IUS) in Prague were significant 
channels of communist propaganda aimed at youth and 
students" . “ In 1947 the IUS in collaboration with the 
WFDY and WFTU instituted a bi-annual World Festival of 
Youth in Prague for colonial students. It also organised 
visits, scholarships and medical treatment for colonial 
students. By late 1947 it had established a monthly 
bulletin and a bureau of colonial students against 
colonialism in Prague. 3c
(2.3) THE SATELLITE - CPGB CONNECTION :
The CPGB was the main communist satellite in the UK 
which engaged in ideological education and the 
distribution of pamphlets and newsletters to colonial 
students and the public. Three stages were taken in 
recruiting colonial people in the UK (i.e. students and 
other immigrants). Firstly, there was an intensification 
of educational ideological schools, like the one at Karl 
Marx House.37 Secondly, there was the encouragement and 
support of the Co-ordinating Council for Colonial 
Students Affairs; and thirdly, they exploited 'bread- 
and-butter' issues such as the inadequacy of hostel 
accommodation.
In fact, a number of party members and sympathizers
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were prepared to take in black lodgers (students and 
seamen) and to allow their premises to be used for 
classes in Marxist theory. The Party's aim was to ensure 
that black students looking for accommodation were 
directed to such addresses in the hope that its social 
welfare approach would prepare the way for propaganda.'"
Padmore, however, warned that "it would be unwise 
... to exaggerate the influence of Communism even among 
these young colonial students. It is just a part of 
youthful intellectual curiosity ... The British Communist 
Party will be sadly disappointed if it is relying upon 
these opportunistic intellectuals to lead the proletarian 
revolution in Africa!"."'
We may then ask what was attractive about Communism 
to African labour and nationalist leaders, students and 
youth? Basically, the answer is simple. Communism was one 
of the ideologies which addressed the nature of 
imperialism and colonialism and how it could be defeated 
in the colonies. To communists, capitalism is the highest 
stage of imperialism.40 It was based on Marxist-Leninist 
explanations of imperialism and economic
underdevelopment. Communism posits that, for the colonial 
people to be freed from colonialism, the proletariat 
would have to revolt (although this was later modified
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particularly among Western European Socialists). 
Communists often cited the example of the Bolshevik 
Revolution in Russia, and other revolutions in Eastern 
Europe and Asia, to insist upon the applicability of the 
ideology to African colonies.
No less important was the non-capitalist pattern of
Soviet development since 1917. The relative success of
Soviet development was appealing to some nationalist and
labour leaders and students. They believed that if the
Soviets could attain industrialisation under Lenin and
his successors, colonial peoples could also apply
communist models in their efforts at economic and
political independence.41 Erlich and Sonne are apt in
their description of the situation. To them:
... Marxist-Leninist appeal ... carried 
real strength not because Soviet leaders 
un-yieldingly stuck to the initial 
premises of the doctrine, but because 
they made massive departures from it and 
took advantage of compensating errors in 
the early predictions.42
But there were as many factors that made communism 
unattractive to many Africans in the same period. The 
differences between the Soviet or European situation and 
that of Africa are some of these factors. As will be 
highlighted in the case of Nigeria, leading nationalist 
leaders, such as, Azikiwe, Awolowo, Balewa, Bello, and,
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some labour leaders, were apprehensive about the 
communist techniques and especially about revolution. 
They were not prepared to lose control of their parties 
to marxist leaders and thus served as counter-weights 
against such groups. Many of them did not cherish the 
doctrine of the inevitability of the class struggle which 
would make way for the dictatorship of the proletariat.
In fact, many former Nigerian members of the 
Communist Party of Great Britain on returning home became 
unsympathetic to communist ideas.4' Adi has mentioned 
that, the banning of the "Nigerian Branch", unguided 
statements about Nigerian affairs and the arrogance of 
the CPGB leaders were instrumental to the 
unattractiveness of communism in the 1950s; indeed, most 
were "proletarian in London and bourgeois in Lagos".4'1 
There is need for a background and some elaboration here.
One of the ways through which the CPGB aimed at 
achieving its goals among colonial peoples in the UK and 
within the colonies generally was via its committee 
system. For instance, the International Department also 
had an international committee, under which there were 
different sub-committees. These included: India, Far
East, Burma and Malaya, Africa (West and East) and the 
West Indies sub-committees. 4d These committees liaised
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with various district committees all over the United 
Kingdom.
Perhaps impetus to the intensification of CPGB
activities in the colonial field was as a result of the
conference on "The Crisis of British Imperialism" held in
London on October 2nd and 3rd 1948. After denouncing
British imperialism as practised by the Labour government
and arguing that there were signs of the decline of
imperialism all over the world, Palme Dutt, outlined the
task before the CPGB thus:
Our Party occupies a special position 
among the Communist Parties of the 
World in that it operates in the centre 
of the largest world colonial empire.
Hence we have a special responsibility 
to unite the struggle of the British 
people and the Colonial peoples. At 
the present time this takes on 
exceptional importance.40
Henceforth political campaigning and propaganda was 
to focus upon the colonial question; reviving the labour 
movement; practical solidarity with colonial liberation 
movements and world-wide Communism. The CPGB's aim in 
Nigeria, as indeed in other colonies was:
(1) "To bring out the extent of British imperialist 
exploitation of Nigeria and methods adopted to retard 
economic development and the creation of a balanced 
economy;
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(2) Support the Nigerian struggle for self- 
government ;
(3) Assisting in the unity of Nigerian working class 
under a Marxist Party; and,
(4) Expend our propaganda on Nigeria and to explain 
in simple terms the issues which affects the common 
interests of both the Nigerian and British peoples".
Efforts towards forming a 'Marxist Party' in Nigeria 
was emphasised by CPGB leaders. This was based on the 
premise that Nigeria was not only the largest British 
colony, but was "one of those (together with the Gold 
Coast) where the British imperialists have been able to 
win over a substantial element of the rising national 
bourgeoisie and feudal elements into partnership with 
British imperialism".4" The point was that: "The unity of
the Nigerian working class can only be achieved and the
working class educated to play its part in the national 
struggle when the Marxists in Nigeria come together in a 
united Marxist party".49
The CPGB leaders did not hide their vision for a
Marxist Party in Nigeria as an important part of the
struggle. In summing up, they reiterated that:
The case for a Marxist Party is 
that the working class cannot play
its full part in the national
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struggle, cannot establish an alliance with the
peasantry, unless
it is united and organised as a class 
and made conscious of its mission in the
wider movement. To bring the working 
class to that level of unity and 
consciousness and to lead it forward is o n l y
possible when there is an influential Marxist
Party.50
These pronouncements and other activities might have 
accounted for the influx of Nigerians, and other West 
African membership of the CPGB in the late 1940s and 
early 1950. Of all these new recruits, Nigerians were 
said to be largest in number.51 They were dubbed the
"Robeson Branch".52 The London district of the CPGB, was
however, not in agreement of "a special Nigerian Branch", 
as it was not in line with the Party's rules. Instead 
Nigerian affairs were to be treated alongside other West 
African by the West African sub-committee created in 
1951.53
The June 1952 political document entitled "For a 
Lasting Peace and Peoples Democracy", and Palme Dutt's 
article; "People of Nigeria Rise in Struggle for 
Freedom", 1953, did much damage to an already sore 
situation. Both write-ups were critical of factions among 
the various Nigerian political parties, the marxists, and 
the general lack of coherence among Nigerian members of 
the CPGB.54
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As a result of the unsuccessful attempts in April 
1953 tc revive the "Nigerian Branch" and unite divergent 
opinions about Nigeria, the CPGB commissioned "The 
Nigeria Commission" in May to look into the whole matter 
and propose solutions. Although there was no West African 
on this Commission, its report in 1954 led to official 
recognition of the "Nigerian Branch"."5 The new branch 
was to get "the utmost political and practical support 
from London District and the International Department".3,1
The gesture was, however, too late as leading 
Nigerian members resigned en mass before the report was 
published. The main reason for this, was the rejection of 
Nigerian members adaptation of marxism to their 
situation. Barbara Ruhemen, Idris Cox and Palme Dutt's 
criticism of their ways of handling the situation in 
Nigeria, and the denunciation of the Action Group, for 
instance, did not go down well with Agunbiade-Bamishe and 
company.37
Another factor responsible for the unattractiveness 
of Communism was the contradiction between it and pan- 
Africanism. This had long been the subject of widespread 
debate. Robert July summarized the situation thus:
While many Africans subscribed to
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socialist principles regarding public 
control of the means of production and 
distribution, they also suspected 
international communism of utilizing 
misery, poverty, ignorance, and want in 
Africa on behalf of Soviet foreign policy 
objectives. African Marxists therefore, 
were often ambivalent, poised between 
their socialist beliefs and their desire 
for domestic economic and political 
advances .58
The expulsion of George Padmore as a member of the 
Comintern/Communist International in 1934 is another 
factor. His writings and conclusion about communism were 
influential for many would-be African communists in the 
late 1930s and afterwards. Padmore's thesis, based upon 
personal experience, was that "those who hoped for future 
reform had best forget the blandishments of self-serving 
communists and place their faith in pan-African 
solidarity".59 The level of Padmore's influence is, 
however, suspect. While he distrusted Stalinist 
communism, he nonetheless, remained a defender of the 
Soviet Union. As one of his critics noted: "... he was
never one to supply the anti-communist with ammunition". 
He also believed in the Leninist dictum that: 
"Imperialism divides; Socialism unites".60
Other factors are: the unhealthy rivalry between
Khrushchev and Mao upon the death of Stalin in 1953; the 
failure of the communists to convert many black
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Americans; and the inconsistency in Soviet Union policy 
during the period. Arnold Hughes summarized the event 
thus: "... the gyrations and inconsistencies in Soviet
policies towards the independence struggle in Africa and 
elsewhere accounted for the absence of significant 
proletarian or peasant organization ..." As he rightly 
concludes: "Such hesitation and manipulation only helped
to explain the ambivalence of most Africans towards 
communism" . 6±
The relative attractiveness of communism was of 
concern to Britain, as there were some marxists in the 
colonies. The British, for their part, took measures to 
safeguard their interests in the colonies. Such measures, 
as will be discussed later, were aimed at guiding 
nationalism and labour movements in Africa in order to 
avoid another Burma.62 As Hyam notes "the long term aim 
was preparation for self-government... The slogan was to 
secure more Ceylons and fewer Burmas".63
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CHAPTER THREE 
BRITISH COLONIAL POLICIES. COLD WAR 
POLITICS AND THE WESTERN ALLIES
(3.1) BRITISH ADMINISTRATIVE PLANS AND SOCIO-POLITICAL 
HIGH POLICIES FROM THE LATE 1930s TO 1950s :
There are many studies about British colonial 
administration prior to 1930s. The 1930s was significant 
in view of general recognition of the need for colonial 
reforms in order to stem disorder in the colonies. This 
was partly as a result of economic hardship that had been 
apparent earlier in the inter-war years.
More important was the need to prevent nationalist 
and labour leaders from seeking support from the 
Communist International (Cominform from September 1947) 
as an end towards political and economic independence. 
Some colonial officials were also concerned about the 
defects in Native Administration. For instance, Crocker 
noted as earlier as 193 6 that, there was an urgent need 
for administrative reform in Nigeria where he had served 
as a junior administrative officer.1 Professor Coupland
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in a memorandum to the CO in September 193 9 also noted 
the need for reforms in West Africa, particularly in the 
Gold Coast and Nigeria, so as to prepare them for self- 
government after the wart
Morgan has described the 193 0s as an important phase
in the history of British colonial development. It was
the era of disturbances and intellectual ferment in the
colonies. It was also the period, unlike the preceding
years, when more questions were raised about the
colonies.3 As Morgan put it:
From a state of being unheard of at the 
beginning of the 1935, the Colonial 
Question became, in the first six months of
1936, one of the chief topics of p u b l i c
discussion. Between 11 July 1936 and 10 February
1938 nineteen papers were circulated and
discussed by the Cabinet Committee on Foreign
Policy on, or concerning, the Question out of a
total circulation of forty-five papers. 
Twelve of the nineteen were circulated 
and discussed in the year 1937. The House 
of Commons debated the matter on eleven 
occasions in 1937 and six in 1938. 4
The 1930s also marked the genesis of "changes in the 
Colonial Service; growth of Unofficial Representation; 
and the Reorganisation of the Colonial Office". "Colonial 
policy also became an important part of British foreign 
policy" and experience in the 1920s was put to test. 5
The most influential personality in colonial reforms
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was however Lord Hailey, a former Governor-General of 
Punjab (1924-1928), the United Provinces (1928-1930), and 
director African Research Survey (1935-1938) . In a 
confidential report of 1940-1942, Hailey drew attention 
of colonial officials and the government to a number of 
points requiring attention and to at least one point upon 
which it was desirable to have a policy statement.6 He 
noted that it is not in line with British tradition to 
explore far-reaching constitutional issues until the 
force of circumstances makes it essential to do so.
To him, 'there is one reason at least why some 
further consideration should be given to the question 
whether a responsible government based on representative 
institutions is to be held to be the most suitable 
constitution for the African colonies'. He warned that, 
'it is increasingly clear that Africans must before long 
be given a material addition to their very limited 
representation in the legislative councils'.7
Some of Hailey's general conclusions, quoted by
O.G.R. Williams in his memorandum in July 1943, need to
be quoted in full. As he wrote:
... Measures for improving the physical 
and social condition of the people must 
now have a claim on our attention which 
should take precedence over other 
considerations. It is no disparagement of
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those whose chief interest lies in 
furthering political advance to say that 
the satisfaction of the ambition of what 
is still a small minority of Africans can 
be no substitute for the expenditure of 
the protracted effort and considerable 
financial sacrifice which may be needed 
to meet the more elemental need of the 
great majority of the people. But the two 
conceptions are fortunately not mutually 
exclusive; the situation only demands 
that we should not allow our pursuit of 
political ideas to detract from the 
attention which must be given to the pre­
eminent needs of social advance. In the 
political sphere, the most important of 
our immediate problems is to interest 
Africans in measures designed to further 
social and economic development, and to 
secure their full cooperation in them. 
The solution suggested in this Memorandum 
is, on the one side, a resolute 
development of local institutions 
combined with progressive admissions of 
Africans to all branches of government 
services, and on the other hand, a policy 
of caution in political matters which, 
while leaving an opening for advanced 
opinion to play its part, would keep the 
substance of power in the hands of the 
official government, until experience has 
shown us under what constitutional forms 
the dependencies can move most securely 
towards the final stages of responsible 
government.8
Hailey's conclusion influenced many colonial 
officials and Cabinet members both under Labour and the 
Conservative governments, though with some reservations. 
Amongst them was Sir Alan Burns who became the Governor 
of the Gold Coast in late 1941. Before his departure, 
Burns minute to Sir Cosmo Parkinson, Permanent Under­
secretary of State in the CO, about his plans for the
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advancement of the Gold Coast. His proposals included 
reforms of the Executive and Legislative Councils, 
Africanisation of the civil service and the improvement 
of race relations.
To some officials, such as Bourdillon of Nigeria, 
Burns' ideas were too far-reaching.' To Burns 
nationalists were better pre-empted by reform rather than 
fought. Rathbone identified three stages in Burns' ideas. 
"First, he wished to gain time to build up native 
authorities as more effective instruments for both local 
administration and for promoting local economic and 
social development"; "Secondly, he wanted to use 
participation in native administration and municipal 
councils as the means by which Gold Coasters would gain 
experience in responsible self-government upon which 
further political advance would be built"; and, "lastly, 
African rulers and those connected with native 
authorities, already thoroughly associated with colonial 
government were seen by Burns as a continuing 
counterbalance to nationalist politicians".10
On September 30th 1941, CO officials met the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies, Lord Moyne, to 
discuss Burns' initiatives.11 Discussions and further 
correspondence between CO officials and Burns seemed to
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have been instrumental in O.G.R. Williams memorandum of 
1943.12 In February 1943, Williams as the head of West 
Africa Department issued a memorandum on future policy in 
West Africa. In the memo, Williams warned that His 
Majesty's Government should not delay too long over 
reforms in the colonies.
He noted that action was required along three main 
lines: (1) "The provision of greatly increased
educational facilities. This is fundamental to all the 
rest"; (2) "Greatly increased employment of Africans in 
the public administration and municipal government. This 
is clearly dependent upon the extent to which the 
increased educational facilities can produce men and 
women of the right type and with the right training"; 
and, (3) "A progressive education of the African in the 
handling of public affairs, whether in municipal councils 
or in legislative councils. This is the most difficult 
problem of all...".13 He also suggested an overhaul of 
the economic sector so as to better the lot of the 
colonial peoples.1'1
Needless to say that with few modification, 
Williams' memorandum was judged "excellent" by senior 
bureaucrats and the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies.15 Williams also wrote another memo on
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"Constitutional Development in West Africa" on July 29th 
1943 as part of forward looking initiatives in political 
advancement of West African colonies during the war.16
It has to be noted that constitutional reform in 
West Africa during the war was not a priority. Rather, it 
was treated as part of post-war reconstruction. British 
policy during the war was more concerned with keeping the 
Empire intact against external influence.
The end of World War II, however, marked a watershed
in colonial policy.1 British bureaucrats and politicians
became apprehensive of the Soviet Union activities in the
colonies generally. There was also the unprecedented
development of international interest in, and criticism
of, colonial powers, apart from the Cold War tactics of
the Eastern and Western blocs.1" In 1948 British colonial
policy was officially defined thus:
...It is to guide the Colonial 
Territories to responsible self- government within
the Commonwealth in conditions that ensure to
the people concerned both a fair standard of
living and freedom from oppression from 
any quarter.19
Administering officers were however, advised not to 
confront genuine nationalist aspirations. Inasmuch as 
there was the willingness to carry out reforms in the 
colonies, it was also recognised that African colonies
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must not be rushed into 'premature' independence. It was 
also noted that political advancement for colonies should 
proceed in a smooth,gradual and orderly way, with a 
strong economic structure to sustain them in a post­
independence era. The policy was basically to encourage 
'genuine' nationalists capable of resisting communism, as 
well as the improvement of standards of living and the 
development of the community generally.
As it related to Africa, G.B. Cartland, a seconded 
colonial service officer, observed that Lord Hailey's 
remarkable survey of 1938-1939 needed to be dusted off 
and adapted in the reform of native administrations.21 
A .B . Cohen, an Assistant Under-Secretary of State at the 
Colonial Office, took a further initiative by asking for 
opinions from other officials.22 He recognised the need 
for "redefining the policy of native administration; 
making proper use of administrative staff".^3 In May 
1946, Cohen and Cartland were directed by Sir George 
Gater, Permanent Under-Secretary of State at the Colonial 
Office, to undertake preliminary enquiries in East 
Africa. This was followed by in-puts from other parts of 
the Empire particularly West Africa.
What resulted was a three stage programme of 
consultation and meetings. First was the organisation of
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summer schools where officials discussed problems of 
local government in Africa, at Queens' College, Cambridge 
in August 1947. Second, in November 1947, a conference of 
African Governors was called. And third, a larger 
gathering of African official and unofficial members of 
the Legislative Councils met in September 1948. At these 
meetings there was a general stocktaking of British rule 
in Africa. The conclusion was that Indirect Rule was 
obsolete, and that there was an urgent need for an 
"efficient democratic and local government" which would 
prepare Africans for the art of governance.
While this was seen as part of the devolution 
process, an immediate effort was geared towards
redirecting the energy of the urban politicians to 
grassroots politics. As Hyam notes, "the local government 
strategy was designed to bring in the masses to redress 
the balance of the professional politicians, who were 
reckoned to be bent only on removing the colonial power 
for their own benefit".24
By mid-1948, the CO also began to collate
intelligence reports in order to alert the colonial
peoples to the dangers of communism. Bevin, Creech Jones,
Griffiths and senior officials in the CO and FO agreed 
that communism was a destructive evil that must be nipped
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in the bud. Bevin, the Labour Government's Secretary of 
State for Foreign Affairs, had noted as early as October 
1946 that it "was clear now that Russia sought by every 
means to bring about the dissolution of the British 
Empire".2:1 To Creech Jones, Labour's Secretary of State
for the Colonies (1946), the sole aim of communism was
• 26 "to destroy social democracy altogether by repression".
He, however, implored men-on-the-spot to distinguish
legitimate nationalist aspirations from the communist
bogey.
Equally important in Labour Government's high policy 
initiatives was the need to improve social well-being of 
the colonial peoples. Hyam has rightly noted that '... 
the Labour government's African policy rested upon a dual 
foundation of local government and community 
development'.~ The Labour government policy, and that of 
their successor Conservative Government, emphasised 
mutual aid, voluntary service, trade unions, co-operative 
movements, community development and education. Trade 
unions and other self-helped groups were to be supported 
so as not to lose them to the communists.
The Colonial Development and Welfare Acts of 1940 
and 1945 emphasised the co-ordination and integration of 
colonial research as part of the decolonization
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processes.2" Areas covered included, colonial products 
research, fisheries, agriculture, medicine, social 
sciences, economics,land tenure, insecticides and 
trypanosomiasis. The research on trypanosomiasis was 
particularly encouraged in order to boost the production 
of African crops. The survival of the cattle against 
tsetse-fly infection would invariably improved production 
of cash and food crops. A West African Institute for 
Trypanosomiasis was established in Northern Nigeria in 
late 1950. A similar centre was contemplated in East 
Africa. The Medical Research Council was also encouraged 
and financed in order to improve the health services in 
West and East Africa.
Earlier, between 1943 and 1944, Creech Jones as the 
Vice-Chairman of the Elliot Commission which looked into 
higher education in West Africa, had stressed that there 
could be no effective progress towards self-government 
without educational and economic development. He stated 
that 'there must be simultaneous progress at all levels 
of education'.29 In 1945 a committee was set up under the 
chairmanship of W.E.F. Ward, the CO's Deputy Educational 
Adviser, to enquire into the problem of colonial 
education with a view to making it a tool of social 
values and democratic practice. Its report was however 
tenuous and was criticised by influential governors such
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as Sir Phillip Mitchell of Kenya.JJ Between 1945 and 
1951, universities were set up in five colonial 
territories - Malaya, East Africa, the West Indies, the 
Gold Coast and Nigeria as part of efforts at improving 
the educational provisions for colonial peoples.
Labour's socio-community development policy in the 
colonies also emphasised participation of the colonial 
peoples in the various programmes, which has official 
support. "The technique", writes Hyam, "was to select a 
project with a carefully chosen local objective, set up 
a provincial team to get it going, and then hand over to 
African leaders who would carry on the process of self­
betterment" . 51 Funds were provided from the CDW for 
further studies and research on community development in 
Africa to the Colonial Department of the University of 
London's Institute of Education.
An anti-socialist policy was also paramount in 
Britain's planning and development programmes during the 
latter part of the decolonization era. This is what 
Schatz referred to as "Nurture-Capitalism".3z It involved 
collaboration between the corporatist State and private 
entrepreneurs in the development of the economy. In fact, 
the idea of economic planning had earlier been criticized
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in 1920s and 1930s as a "communist device intended to
destroy private enterprise and establish political
dictatorship".j3 However, Keynesian economics, the Labour
Government's welfarist programme and the Cold War were
the dominant reasons for an anti-socialist approach to
development and planning during the decolonisation
period. Falola concludes that:
The idea that there must be a plan 
to guide economic behaviour and 
governmental activities stimulated 
an enduring policy of planning in 
the last years of colonial rule. 34
He contends further that, "the theory was to implement 
planning strategies in the context of a free market 
regulated primarily by the interests of the state". To 
him, "the colonial state rejected socialist planning, 
with its centralized and mandatory guidelines".35
Hyam identified two reasons for post-war economic 
policy: first was the "prevailing world economic
situation", and second, the need for the Western powers 
"to strengthen their defensive war potentials" by 
encouraging "colonies to contribute strategic war 
materials". He concludes that: "these factors seemed
increasingly to point to the need for more conscious and 
centralised planning of colonial production and trade, 
and proper integration of colonial planning with domestic
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planning, hitherto neglected". The ultimate goal was "to 
promote the economic well-being of the people, with due 
regard to the interest of the Commonwealth, other 
colonial territories, and world economic developments, 
and to bring them to the point where they are able to 
economically sustain the financial burdens of self- 
government and to stand on their own in the world 
economy" .36
Post-1945 high policies were not solely the idea of 
the men of the CO. The Foreign Office also made 
meaningful contributions both under Labour and 
Conservative Governments. Concerning the communist 
menace, FO observations ranged over the use of religion, 
defence and intelligence reports, and how to finance the 
various anti-communist measures envisaged. As early as 
January 1948, the FO had recommended that the best way to 
deal with the communist menace was through counter­
propaganda. The use of the "Third Force" was regarded as 
the most plausible counter against communism. This 
involved finance and moral support of government and 
non-government agencies such as the Central Office of 
Information, Public Relations Offices, the British TUC, 
British Council and the Oxford Group Moral Re-armament 
Movement.3'
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A sequel to this was the Cabinet's approval of an 
anti-communist publicity committee in early 1948 with a 
view to taking the offensive against communism and the 
effective use of the "Third Force".3" The guiding 
principle under the Labour Government was "...to reveal 
ourselves to colonial peoples as the staunch friend and 
not the treacherous enemy of their political 
dreams...".39 One way of realising this, was official 
diffusion and de-politicisation of racial issues in the 
colonies. It was perceived that anti-colonial sentiments 
could thrive on bad race relation. In West Africa, there 
were attempts among colonial officials to minimize the 
significance of race relations in explaining most 
conflicts. The consensus was that; "... race relations 
offer perhaps one of the easiest points of entry for 
communist penetration". 40
In fact, as far back as May 10th 1948, J.L. Keith 
had reiterated that: "the existence of colour prejudice
in the UK greatly increases anti-British feeling amongst 
colonial students and enhances the attraction of 
Communism as a political creed which repudiates the 
colour bar".41 Another official noted that: "it is the
introduction of the racial issue... which... capture the 
minds and imagination of these students, which are so 
dangerous".45 To Keith, "African governments' needs to
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reform so as to diffuse political agitation among 
colonial students in order not to drive them further into 
the arms of Communists and other propagandists". 43
H.T. Bourdillon (an Assistant Secretary in the CO,
1947-1959) noted that "...if we can lead them forward in 
the ripeness of our own experience and moreover convince 
them that we are doing so, we need have no doubt of the 
victory over communism in the colonies".44 As he noted 
further, "We can look forward, I believe, to a 
Commonwealth, impartial in matters of race, creed and 
colour, in which the evolving independence of the members 
may be accompanied by an increasing and not diminishing 
solidarity of the whole".45
Between 1951 and 1964, Conservative Governments took 
further initiatives in British global and colonial 
policies. Perhaps the most important high policy during 
this period was that on rearmament and defence. On 
October 26th 1951, Winston Churchill became the Prime 
Minister and shortly afterwards asked his Minister for 
Defence, Earl Alexander, to investigate Britain's 
military commitments within the context of the envisaged 
"Hot War" .46
Primarily, the effort was to improve upon Labour's
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re-armament policy. In consultation with the Chiefs of
Staff, a Defence Policy and Global Strategy Paper
outlining what was thought 'as reasonable preparations
for hot war' was issued in 1952. This high policy paper
can be summarized thus:
In the Cold War, Europe had to be 
given top priority, with the Far 
East next and after that the Middle
East. In a hot war Europe should
remain a top priority above the Far- 
East owing to the importance of 
communications through the Middle 
East, its oil and the necessity to 
prevent communism from spreading 
throughout Africa.4
Early in January 1952, Sir Charles Jeffries, Deputy 
Under-Secretary of State (1947-1956) wrote that, much had 
to be done on local government in Africa than hitherto 
had been achieved. He noted that, "two elements in 
British system - Parliament and Local Authorities- are 
complementary. But what we have done in the colonies is 
to develop one element in the absence of the other".4" To 
him, and some other officials, while much was achieved in 
terms of the Westminster Parliamentary model, the local 
authority system needed an overhaul to make it 
complementary to the Westminster model.
In a minute to Sir Charles Jeffries' note, R.S. 
Hudson (Head of the African Studies Branch in the
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CO,1949-1961) and T.B. Williamson (Assistant Secretary in 
the CO,1948-1961) noted that, 'one of the ways out was to 
follow the Gold Coast model by establishing a local 
government training school for persons of the public 
service, both central and local'.4" Since the situation 
differed from one colony to another, Administering 
Officers were directed tc either follow the Gold Coast 
model or to initiate their own policy towards meeting 
manpower problem in local government.
Another issue was the position of the colonial 
police and the power of colonial governors. At the 1951 
conference of commissioners of colonial police, the 
danger of the police force being an instrument of 
political parties was highlighted. Also, questions about 
the loyalty of the police were discussed given the 
unfolding political and constitutional changes. Since the 
police had been modelled upon the British system, Sir 
Charles Jeffries advised in April 1952 that ' . . .the 
police should be especially mentioned in constitutional 
instruments ' . 50
The Cabinet response to Jeffries' minute was the 
setting up of a Working Party to look into the matter 
closely. The Working-Party members were officially 
appointed in June 1952 with Sir Charles Jeffries as the
110
chairman, W.A. Muller (Inspector General of colonial 
police, 1951-1957), J.N.A. Armitage-Smith (Principal, CO,
1948-1956) and I.B. Watt as secretary.51 The framework of 
the Working-Party was to make recommendations on how 
colonial police could be insulated from party politics, 
politicians and the government i.e. central and local.
In its report on April 22nd 1953, the Working-Party 
agreed that "on balance, it is desirable to make 
constitutional provisions for the safeguard of the police 
in the colonies". It recommended that "provision be 
included in constitutions, as opportunity arises, 
constituting a Police Council for the territory to be 
appointed by the Governor acting in his discretion after 
consultation with the Chief Justice...".53 The question 
of the 'operational control' of the police was not, 
however, within the framework of the Working-Party.
Subsequent to the report of another conference of 
commissioners of colonial police forces at the Police 
College at Ryton-on-Dunsmore, Warwickshire on 13th July 
1954, an official of the CO noted that it is time the CO 
reconvened the Working-Party "to do the whole exercise 
in one and to invite a Home Office representative 
along".34 During an inter-departmental meeting with the 
Home Office representative on November 5th 1954, it was
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noted that colonial police commissioners should enjoy the 
same autonomy in administrative matters as the Chief 
Constables of Counties, and the Commissioner of the 
Metropolitan Police in the United Kingdom.53 Based on 
this, Sir Charles Jeffries stated that the CO would spell 
out in detail the "positive functions and powers of the 
police, to prevent it from being mis-used by a member of 
the government of the day in any colonial 
territory. . . " . 56
The Conservative Government was also concerned with 
the survival of the Commonwealth. In this they did not 
differ from their Labour predecessor. Lyttleton, the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies (October 1951-July 
1954) in a minute to the Prime Minister, Churchill 
(October 1951-April 1955), noted that the government 
should continue with Oliver Stanley's (the War time 
coalition Government's S of S,1942-1945) policy on the 
incorporation of colonies into the Commonwealth.57 Oliver 
Stanley had earlier stated in the House of Commons in 
1943 that, "We are pledged to guide colonial people along 
the road to self-government within the framework of the 
British Empire".58
In keeping with this policy, Lyttleton observed two 
fundamental points. First, he noted that "we all aim at
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helping the colonial territories to attain self- 
government within the British Commonwealth". "To that 
end" , he continued, "we are seeking as rapidly as 
possible to build up in each territory the institutions 
which its circumstances require". Second, Lyttleton noted 
that, "we are all determined to pursue the economic and 
social development of the colonial territories so that it 
keeps pace with their political advancement".53
The caveat, however, was that another Burma should 
be avoided at all cost. Lord Swinton, the Secretary of 
State for Commonwealth Relations in a memorandum in April 
1953, observed that modification should be made in the 
election of ex-colonies to membership of the Commonwealth 
to avert another Burma situation. Swinton maintained that 
"there must be an assurance that the UK will be prepared, 
when the necessary conditions are fulfilled, to grant a 
territory independence".60 This was based on hope and 
goodwill - "a hope that, when this takes place, the 
territory concerned will wish to remain in the 
Commonwealth and will be accepted as fellow-member by the 
existing members". 61
In fact, Swinton's committee appointed by the 
Cabinet to look into the idea of a two-tier membership in 
the Commonwealth, recommended that it would be inimical
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to the survival of the Commonwealth if a two-tier 
membership was adopted. The idea, it was concluded, might 
divide the body as ex-colonies would see themselves as 
being inferior in the set-up.05 Sir Norman Brook's draft 
report on the future of the Commonwealth in 1954 also 
echoed the same prejudice against a two-tier system.03 On 
December 7th 1954 the Cabinet unanimously upheld the 
conclusion of Swinton's committee and Norman Brook's 
draft as the best framework for a future Commonwealth, 
united and strong against external threats such as the 
communists.
There was also the issue of a governor's reserved 
powers. In April 1956, Lord Salisbury, the Lord President 
of the Council (1952-1957) suggested that, "colonial 
governors should have reserve powers to enable them to 
take limited action to preserve order without going to 
the length of declaring a State of Emergence".64 On July 
23rd 1956, the Cabinet Colonial Policy Committee met 
under the chairmanship of Lennox-Boyd, the Secretary of 
State for Colonies, to discuss Salisbury's view. As 
Lennox-Boyd put it, "colonial governors had been 
empowered as far back as 1950 to deal with any subversive 
activities" . 65
However, there was a problem. While colonial
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governors had power to deport undesirable aliens, the 
same could not apply to citizens of the colony concerned. 
Lord Kilmuir, the Lord Chancellor, was of the view that, 
"It might...be worth reviewing the present state of 
colonial governors' powers to deal with subversion so 
that Ministers could... consider whether powers should not 
now explicitly be sought to deport persons belonging to 
territories" . 66
He suggested the use of the advisory machinery, 
which had been effective during World War II under 
Defence Regulation 18B, as a safety valve against mis-use 
of power by the colonial governors. The deportation of 
persons belonging to a territory would then be carried 
out after consultation with the advisory body, although 
the final decision rested with the colonial governor 
concerned.67
After much deliberation, the committee came up with
some conclusions which the Cabinet endorsed as part of
the recipe for preserving order and control in the
colonies. They concluded that; (l)"Such machinery 
(advisory body) might be mainly valuable for its effect 
on public opinion locally. Governors themselves were 
unlikely to feel the need for moral support";
(2)"If such advisory bodies were to serve purpose, their 
existence would have to be known and all cases for 
deportation would have to be referred to them, even 
though some of these would be politically embarrassing.
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It would however, be necessary to allow Governors in 
urgent cases to report the facts to the advisory body 
after action had already been taken to deport a 
particular undesirable";
(3)"No reports of such advisory bodies would be 
published. On the other hand, it might be difficult to 
prevent disclosure on some occasions of the advice 
tendered to colonial Governors. In such circumstances it 
would be for the Governor's prestige if he should appear 
to have been over-ruled by the advisory body";
(4)"It would therefore be necessary to make it clear that 
such bodies were not courts of appeal,but had a purely 
advisory function;
(5) "There might be one such body for each sizeable 
colonial territory, composed of one judge, one expatriate 
civil servant and one representative of the non-official 
classes in the territory. On the other hand, since the 
number of cases was not likely to be at all large, it 
might be possible to consider a central body with a 
distinguished membership".68
In brief, there was a general agreement that powers 
of colonial governors should be redefined in the light of 
colonial situations in order to promote a smooth 
devolution process. Through this initiative, governors 
and their officials were able to deal with known and 
unknown extremists (communist or non-communist) in the 
colonies. It seems to me that the success of many high 
policies in the colonies was partly due to the Cabinet's 
redefinition of colonial governors' powers.
(3.2) A BRIEF ON COLD WAR POLITICS :
The Cold War began in Europe and moved to East and
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South-east Asia and Latin America. This is a well 
explored area. My concern is to briefly highlight events 
as they relate to this study. To Walker, "the Cold War 
was not a struggle for supremacy of arms alone. It was 
also a struggle for supremacy between two conflicting 
ideologies: freedom under God versus ruthless, godless
tyranny".09 Eric Hobsbawn notes on the other hand that: 
"the Cold War was based on a Western belief... that the 
Age of Catastrophe was by no means at an end; that the 
future of world capitalism and liberal society was far 
from assured".70 Obviously, global political system after 
World War II was of great importance in colonial policy 
formulation.
From Potsdam to Yalta, there was no doubting the 
fact that the former Allies were on the brink of breaking 
up. Dunbabin has stressed the German question as the 
turning point in Cold War history. In brief, at Potsdam 
it was agreed that Germany would be treated "as a single 
economic unit,and all German administrative bodies were 
accordingly to be created". ,x What emerged however was a 
Germany divided between the Eastern and the Western 
blocs.
In 1947, Britain and France signed a fifty-year 
treaty of alliance, known as the Treaty of Dunkirk. In 
1948, following the communist take-over of
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Czechoslovakia, Britain, France, Holland, Belgium and 
Luxembourg signed the Treaty of Brussels, setting up the 
Western European Union. By this union they agreed to co­
ordinate their forces against the danger of 'an armed 
attack in Europe'.'2 Soon after, representatives of 
Western Europe met those of Canada and the USA in 
Washington D.C. They were later joined by representatives 
of Italy, Norway, Denmark, Iceland and Portugal.
In April 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation (NATO) was formed. The signatories agreed 
that 'an armed attack against one or more of them shall 
be considered an attack against them all'. 73 During the 
same year, the International Confederation of Trade 
Unions broke away from the World Federation of Trade 
Unions, thus beginning the East-West struggle for labour 
unions world-wide.
In 1950 NATO members strengthened their cooperation 
by establishing a unified military command and a single 
military commander-in-chief. Realising the importance of 
German manpower, West Germany was admitted as a member of 
NATO in May 1955. Also in May 1955, a few days after West 
Germany's admission to NATO, the USSR under Khrushchev, 
entered into a defence pact (the WARSAW PACT) with its 
satellites . 74
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Part of the politics of the Cold War was the 
initiation of the Marshall Plan by the United States of 
America to aid the reconstruction of war-ravaged 
Europe.'5 The United States of America, under Harry S. 
Truman, also entered into an agreement with Australia and 
New Zealand in 1951 called the ANZUS Pact.76 In 1954 
Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, 
Pakistan, Britain, France and the USA joined to form the 
South-east Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO). By 1955 an 
agreement was reached with Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Turkey 
and Greece called the Baghdad Pact which set up the 
Central Treaty Organisation(CENTO).
The relevance of the above to this study is to 
highlight Britain's position after 1945 and how it went 
about preserving its political eminence afterwards. 
Britain not only emerged from the war as an economically 
weakened nation, it also faced two major crises in 1947 
and 1949. These were the convertibility and devaluation 
crises respectively. Perhaps one could argue that 
Britain's membership of international organisations 
during the period also accounted for its economic crises. 
This is because, she was not only a major partner in the 
various alliances but was also a strong financial 
supporter. A scholar has rightly stated that "In the 
total structure of British overseas interests, the
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strength of the United Kingdom economy was a vital 
element... sufficient gold and dollar reserves, and a 
strong pound were essential".75
The convertibility crisis of 1947 led to the 
devaluation of the pound which reduced, momentarily, the 
dollar deficit.73 Also the outbreak of the Korean war on 
June 25th 1950 halted British benefits from the 
devaluation exercise as there was re-grouping of 
interests. More efforts were geared towards rearmament. 
Rearmament estimates were said to have "increased from 
the 1949/1950 level of £740 million to £950 million - in 
July 1950, to £1,130 million in August 1950, and to a 
staggering £1,555 million in January 1951".50
Britain however, encouraged cash/food crop 
productions in the colonies in order to meet its 
agricultural needs. Apart from the various socio­
political administrative plans during the same period, 
Britain also initiated Development Plans in its West 
African possessions. Such plans, it has been argued, were 
not solely for the benefits of the colonies but for the 
satisfaction of the colonial power.01
(3.3) THE WESTERN ALLIES: FRANCO-AMERICAN ATTITUDES
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It is not my intention to write a history of Franco- 
American attitudes towards Communism. Issues and events 
involved are so complex that one cannot adequately 
analyse them here. Rather, this section is a summary of 
the role of the French and the United States, as Western 
Allies, in Britain's anti-communist strategies. I 
emphasises general policy guidance of the two Allies as 
it relates to the question of Communist menace. This is 
to butress the view that "one of the policies supported 
by the Colonial Office was the encouragement of a closer 
relation with the United States and perhaps with 
France" .82
In fact, David Goldsworthy in his volumes in the 
British Documents on the end of empire series, where he 
discusses the role of the Conservative governments in 
combatting world-wide communism also supported this 
view.83 I should add that such efforts between 1951 and 
1960 were attempts towards improving upon Ernest Bevin's 
idea of a "Third World Power"."4 The idea of a "Third 
World Power" was consummated in 1949 when Bevin was the 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. The whole idea 
was aimed at consolidating the gains of the Western world 
in the colonies against International Communism under 
Soviet Union. 05
121
Despite differences of emphasis, Franco-American 
views about anti-communist strategies recognised and 
accepted the reality of the Soviet Union's interests and 
financial as well as moral support of radical groups. 8b 
While France was concerned more with diagnosing the 
situation in West and North Africa, Madagascar and South­
east Asia, British officials were sceptical about the 
secrecy of Anglo-French talks on communism as the French 
Communist Party remained a strong political force in 
government (1946-1947) and outside the government.
As a Foreign Office report highlighted, "Anglo- 
French talks on communism were a poor security risk as 
agreement reached might become known to the French 
Communist Party" in the long run”7 (although the French 
Communist Party had ceased since 1947 to be part of the 
government, this did not avert fear among some senior 
British officials).
Despite such scepticism, officials of the Foreign 
Office and the Quai d'Orsay met to discuss international 
aspects of the situation. To the French, the colonies had 
to be economically self-sufficient before independence so 
as to shield them from Soviet economic aid.8" There were 
meetings, talks and exchanges of correspondence between 
British and French officials about policies in their West
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African colonies throughout the period."" One should note 
that discussions, however, transcend communism and anti­
communism. Issues such as the Ewe unification,90 
technical, economic cooperation and development of the 
colonial resources, intelligence etc were also 
encouraged.
As far back as 1945, Anglo-French technical co­
operation had developed. Conferences covering the West 
African region, or the whole of Africa south of the 
Sahara had been held on many technical subjects.91 
Officials noted that: "Useful contacts have been
established and valuable practical recommendations have 
emerged" .92
In 1948 closer co-operation in the economic sphere 
was agreed upon. More important was the agreement in June 
1948 between Britain and France about exchange of 
information and the development of closer contacts both 
in Europe and West Africa. Part of the agreement was 
that:
... information should be exchanged 
between the two Governments, and b^ween
the local administrations,
over a wide range of constitutional, 
local government and other political 
questions; that Studies Branches should 
be maintained in the two Colonial 
Ministries; that contacts should be developed at
all levels between the territories in West Africa;
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and that for this purpose not exchange of visits
but exchanges of postings should take
place.95
At another meeting in May 1949, Britain proposed an 
Anglo-French Secretariat to be based at Accra to "promote 
co-operation and exchange of information".94 One can say 
that Anglo-French relations were largely cordial in West 
Africa. There was frequent exchange visits between 
Governors and senior officials "and some very valuable 
discussions on matters of common interest".95
By August 1950 senior officials met regularly, and 
some District officers were said to have met on a day-to- 
day basis. Perhaps the greatest efforts as it relates to 
Anglo-French exchange of information was Harry Cooper's 
(Head, Public Relations Department, Nigeria) visit to 
Dakar in 1950. The outcome was a comprehensive programme 
of co-operation between the various information units in 
French and British colonies. The governments also 
exchanged official bulletins and other publications as it 
relates to administration of their colonies and the trend 
of political agitations.96
The evolution of a special relationship between the 
United States and Britain is adequately studied.97 
William Roger Louis and Ronald Robinson have analyzed
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that whether directly or indirectly, the "American scare" 
during World War II was accountable for British reforms 
in the colonies. Roosevelt's criticisms of British 
colonial policies was assuaged by Britain's plan to carry 
out reforms in the colonies after the war. Studies about 
issues and events during this period and after are 
many.9r' This section only emphasis United States' 
interest in moulding a pro-Western nationalism and labour 
unionism in West Africa; and, a review of US intelligence 
reports about potentialities, both material and manpower, 
of British West African colonies, in the event of a war 
with the Eastern bloc. As Hobsbawn succinctly notes:
"...anti-communism was genuinely and viscerally popular 
in a country built on individualism and private 
enterprise where the nation itself was defined in 
exclusively ideological terms ('Americanism') which could 
be virtually defined as the polar opposite of
• 9 9Communism".
The Truman era was remarkable. Between 1947 and 
1952, many security and intelligence reports were written 
about the subject of communism and the break-up of the 
colonial empires. In June 1949, Louis Johnson, the 
Secretary of Defence submitted a memorandum to the 
National Security Council where he argued that a "major 
objective of United States policy is to contain Communism
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in order to reduce its threat to US security".100 In 
colonial territories, the US was concerned about the 
implications of 'premature' independence to her 
security, and the West generally. These explain various 
intelligence reports about nationalism, economic and 
strategic potentials of the colonies; the capabilities of 
the Soviet Union and her changing tactics towards the 
colonies, conducted during the period.101
By 1951, Bourgerie, the director of the newly 
created African Affairs department, with the support of 
George McGhee, the Assistant Secretary of State for 
African Affairs, asked Childs, the US consular officer in 
Nigeria, to document economic, strategic and geological 
potentials of Nigeria. Simply put, the State Department 
was interested in Nigeria's mineral resources, industrial 
capacity, agricultural development and transport 
facilities, as part of war preparation with the East.102
Moreover, basic reporting on individual products was 
encouraged, as well as a series of reports showing the 
best estimates of Nigeria's resources with the consular 
general's description of specific difficulties and 
problems prevalent against expanding such mineral, 
agricultural and industrial production.lu3 The consulate 
was also requested to appraise socio-political situation
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within the context of improving conditions of the 
colonial peoples so as not to drive them into the hands 
of Communists. US policy towards Nigeria during the 
period was "to secure the maximum use of its resources 
and keep the territory firmly within the political orbit 
of the Free World".1"4 This should not be surprising 
because the US was a leading Western Allay.
The consular general responded that, social problems 
were not particularly serious, but recommended constant 
watchfulness on, "the rabid nationalists, some of whom 
are likely to be pawn for the Communist International" .lu'5
Perhaps, the most significant intelligence report 
during the Truman years, was the "Report on the Strategic 
Ports of West Africa" . This was an attempt by the US 
National Security Resources Board to "evaluate and 
observe firsthand, political, economic and particularly 
port security situations and problems as they might 
affect the national security interests of the United 
States in the event of mobilization for total war, 
whether in the immediate future or over the longer term". 
The report recommended that, West Africa must be 
preserved by Britain as her colonial master, as an 
integral part of the Free World. 106
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The year 1953 marked a turning point in the history 
of US policy towards communism. First, the Eisenhower 
administration was able to solve the "communist plague" 
within the State Department."0 Secondly, it pursued an 
international anti-communist policy as part of efforts 
towards containing Soviet penetration of the "Third 
World" in particular.
Despite US support of liberal nationalist 
aspirations, it nonetheless, agreed with British 
administrations in the colonies on preventing communism 
from gaining ground.10" The US policy on African 
nationalism was aimed at ensuring the emergence of a pro- 
Western labour and nationalist groups, while its anti­
communist policy was to diagnose and prescribe solutions 
to the communist menace world-wide.109
Five policy guidelines had become identifiable in US 
anti-communism during the late 1950s. These were:
(a) "Cooperate locally with security organisations 
to combat Communist subversive activities to the extent 
that this can be done without assisting in the repression 
of responsible non-Communist nationalist movements";
(b) "Seek to prevent or at least curtail formal 
representation of Sino-Soviet bloc countries in Africa";
(c) "Seek to provide constructive alternatives to
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Soviet blandishments but avoid trying to compete with 
every Soviet offer";
(d) "Give general support to non-Communist 
nationalists, and reform movements, balancing the nature 
and degree of such support, however, with consideration 
of (our) NATO allies"; and,
(e) "In areas where trade unionism develops, guide 
it towards Western models by working with the 
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, by 
direct advice and assistance, and by an exchange of 
persons program" . llL)
The extent to which Britain benefitted from this 
policy, and US execution of the policy, will become clear 
when I discuss anti-communist policies in Nigeria in 
chapter six.
As earlier as 1951, Anglo-American officials at the 
United Nations had agreed that nothing should be done at 
the UN to delay the achievement of self-government by 
colonies. It was also agreed that efforts should be made 
towards preventing the colonies from being drawn to the 
communist bloc and that they should be drawn into the 
economy of the Free World.111 The United States also 
supported the principle of self-government within the 
context of the British Commonwealth as part of the
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safety-valve against communism. Hence, it supported 
British decolonization processes in the colonies.
The United States also "encouraged policies and 
actions of metropolitan powers which lead the dependant 
peoples toward responsible self-government or 
independence".112 Its policy also involved: "avoid US
identification with those policies of the metropolitan 
powers which are stagnant or repressive and, to the 
extent practicable, seek effective means of influencing 
the metropolitan powers to abandon or modify such 
policies".1*' It also made available the services of the 
United States Information Service and the Voice of 
America in the colonies, in order to "emphasize... the 
colonial policies of the Soviet Union and particularly 
the fact that the Soviet colonial empire has continued to 
expand throughout the period when Western colonialism has 
been contracting" . 114
By April 1959, high level tripartite talks between 
France, the United Kingdom and the United States of 
America began in Washington D.C. to discuss further ways 
of containing communism world-wide. The background to 
this was the intensification of Soviet activities through 
the Afro-Asian Solidarity conference in Cairo, and the 
Soviet presence at the pan-African Congress meeting in
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Accra in 1958. Also important was the Soviet Union's 
economic aid to independent African countries such as 
Guinea, Ethiopia, Egypt, Liberia and Ghana.11'
It should not be surprising therefore that, the 
Ambassadors of France, the UK and the USA during the 
Washington talks concluded that self-government and 
economic independence loomed large in pan-African 
conferences. To them, the Free World had no option other 
than to support and accommodate African aspirations in 
this wise in order to ensure a continuing fruitful 
association between Africa and the Western bloc.110 
Britain and her Western Allies could not afford to lose 
the "Battle of the Atlantic, because Europe will be 
endangered, the West's communication to the Far East will 
be cut and a tremendous source of raw materials will be 
lost" .117
As the wind of change began to blow across Africa, 
the West became more apprehensive of a post-colonial 
Africa aligning with the Eastern bloc.11' Sir Michael 
Denny, one of the British representatives at the 
Washington talks, was right when he stated that: "U.K.
strategic interest in Africa derives from the need to 
deny the continent to the Russians and keep it, in so far 
as possible, aligned with the West".119
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE COLONIAL STATE AND THE THREAT OF COMMUNISM
(4.1) INTRODUCTION:
I do not deny for one moment the 
great inspiration I derived from 
the communist philosophy which 
has become the most vital deve­
lopment in the political history 
of our generation.
(Mokwugo Okoye, 1980; p.165).
This chapter highlights how the few communists, as well 
as their sympathizers, attempted to dominate nationalist 
and labour movements in Nigeria during the 1940s and 
early 1950s. But first it is useful to outline general 
patterns of communist infiltration into the colonies, so 
as to ascertain its magnitude during the devolution years 
in Nigeria.
There are four stages of communist tactics in the 
colonies. First, the propaganda stage when communist 
literature pours into the country; second, the 
infiltration into labour organisations; third, the
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infiltration into the armed forces; and fourth, the 
"peace offensive" -- violent overthrow of government.1 
One can imagine that with few communists and sympathizers 
in Nigeria, it seems hard to see this strict form of 
penetration being followed. Nevertheless, this chapter 
analyze the role of communism in militant nationalism as 
a prelude to emergent marxian groups in the 1950s, which 
is the subject of the next chapter. Suffice it to say 
that Nigerian Marxists believed that Communism is a 
better ideology to colonialism or capitalism. That seems 
to me, to be the basis upon which they based their anti­
colonial struggle.
Although inadequate, but quite informative, British 
officials by 1950 had documented "A Survey of Communism 
in Africa". While outlining the direction of Communism in 
Africa generally, the "Survey" maintained that it had 
followed the pattern of infiltration into the nationalist 
and labour movements via Soviet satellites in Europe. 
British officials were concerned about the activities of 
"national liberation movements" such as the 
"Rassemblement Democratique Africain" (RDA) in North and 
West Africa, particularly in the French sector.
They were also concerned about activities of the 
Communist Party of South Africa and its potentials as a
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front in sub-Saharan Africa; the potentiality of 
Communists using bad race relation to garner supporters 
in Kenya and the Rhodesias; the growing influence of 
Communists in Algeria (until 1955 when it was outlawed); 
Soviet and Chinese aid to neighbouring Morocco and 
Tunisia; and the influence of the French Confederation 
General du Travail in North Africa."
Of more significance perhaps, was the activities of 
the Communists in neighbouring West Africa. It was in 
French-speaking West Africa that the French Communist 
Party made greater impact immediately after the war. 
Their efforts bear fruits upon the formation of Group 
d'Etudes Communistes in 1943 in Abidjan, Bamako, Bobo- 
Diolasso, Canokry and Dakar. These are Marxists groups, 
which organised classes where ideological education and 
training were conducted for members. It was this group of 
Africans that formed the Rassemblement Democratique 
Africain (RDA) in 1946 (by 1955 the organisation had 
become liberal and many radical allied movements such as 
the U.P.C. were expelled). Under Felix Houphouet-Boigny 
(who later renegaded) and Gabriel d'Arbroussier, the RDA 
aligned with the French Communist Party in Paris 
(although this was broken in 1950 ) .3 And in French 
Cameroun, the French were faced with militant activities 
of the communist influenced, Union des Populations du
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Cameroun (UPC)
Above all, it seems to me that, officials were 
concerned about CPGB's commitment towards influencing the 
formation of a nation-wide Marxist party in British 
colonies, the possibility of Kremlin exploitation of 
local discontents, and the long term aim of the Cominform 
in gaining some influence.5
United States' intelligence officials in Lagos 
identified four principal phases of communist penetration 
in Nigeria. These were:
(1) "Recruitment of party members from Nigerian students 
in the UK, with their indoctrination and subsequent 
training conducted by the British Communist Party or at 
an Iron Curtain universities, chiefly the University of 
Prague";
(2) "Infiltration and control of the rudimentary Nigerian 
labor movements, with special emphasis upon the central 
labor federation, The All-Nigerian Trade Union Federation 
(ANTUF). Communist efforts within ANTUF have been 
concentrated on effecting WFTU affiliation and excluding 
ICFTU and British trade union influence";
(3) "Direct propaganda, chiefly printed material, either 
distributed by direct mail or through a small chain of 
bookshops in the principal southern Nigerian cities";
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and,
(4) "Efforts to place expatriate party members in 
influential official positions in the Nigerian civil 
service, or on the staff of the University College, 
Ibadan, and in the quasi-official department of Extra- 
Mural Studies".6
This view is also supported by records from the Communist 
Party of Great Britain and the British Trade Union 
Congress respectively. These and official records in 
Britain, Nigeria and the United States show that, 
whatever progress made by Marxists, was thwarted, partly 
through British measures which are discussed in chapter 
six.
(4.2) NIGERIA FLIRTS WITH COMMUNISM:
Studies about nationalism and decolonisation in 
Nigeria have played down the seriousness with which 
British and American officials viewed growing communist 
tendencies on the part of a few eloquent nationalists, as 
well as neglecting anti-communism as a theme in transfer 
of power.7 Activities of communists such as I.T.A. 
Wallace Johnson and George Padmore, and pan-Africanists 
such as Du Bois, Marcus Garvey and Ladipo Solanke, and 
anti-colonialists such as Gandhi and Nehru in India, in
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the late 1920s through to 1940s formed important 
impressions on young Nigerians." Britain and her Western 
Allies were also worried about the activities of 
organisations such as the Communist Party of Great 
Britain; the International Union of Students, the World 
Federation of Trade Unions, the Women International 
Democratic Federation, and the World Federation of 
Democratic Youth.
Despite formation of various political associations 
in Nigeria in the 1920s and 1930s, marxist nationalists 
and labour unionists did not emerge until the end of 
World War II. This was partly because younger elements 
were looking up to Azikiwe, for instance, to give 
leadership in the struggle against British rule. As 
events later showed, neither Azikiwe, nor any of the 
older generation, was prepared for a communist pattern of 
decolonization.
Young nationalists and labour unionists were not 
satisfied with the level of progress made by associations 
such as the National Congress of British West Africa 
(1920); Nigeria National Democratic Party (1922); the 
West African Students Union (1925); and the Nigerian 
Youth Movement (1934). They were also dissatisfied with 
British handling of the Italo-Ethiopian crisis (1935);
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West Indian colonial problems (1935-1938); and the "deep 
problems of increasing unemployment in urban areas, 
poverty, social disruptions caused by colonial changes
and increasing urbanization, ethnic rivalries, and
inadequate schools, as well as the fact that development 
was in general too slow to meet the aspirations of a 
population that was becoming better informed".3 They
seemed to have had no option than to pursue a militant 
way of seeking independence from the British. Such
militancy was influenced, partly by, readings from 
marxist literature and contacts with Communist 
International.
A few Nigerian youths were also sympathetic about 
the plight of the Soviets, particularly after the German 
invasion. Coleman noted that: "earlier in about 1943,
Nigerian youths formed the Red Army Club in solidarity 
with Soviet Russia after the German attack".10 During the 
same month "they sent a cable to leaders of Soviet Russia 
espousing the willingness to establish relations with the 
youths of Soviet Russia".11
According to Awa, the pioneer leader of marxian 
socialism in Nigeria was Nnamdi Azikiwe. In 1943, Azikiwe 
spelt out his theoretical ideas in two booklets: Economic 
Reconstruction of Nigeria; Political Blue-Print of
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Nigeria. He asserted that "marxian philosophy with its 
dynamic analysis should become the basis of a new 
economic system in the country". He recommended the 
reorganisation of the economic and political systems to 
usher in socialism, with the proviso that such 
reorganisation should be done through the democratic 
process . 13
As events showed, Azikiwe abandoned socialism for 
free trade, constitutionalism and moral re-armament. One 
can speculate three reasons for his change of heart. The 
assassination story of 1945, his joining the Moral Re­
armament Group in 194913, and the reality of the colonial 
situation. He nonetheless provided the lead in 
ideological orientation in nationalist politics. This 
shall become clear as I analyze events during the period.
Azikiwe stated that the aftermath of the General 
Strike of 1945 was "the emergence of ideological 
movements whose objectives included not only political 
freedom, but also social equality and economic 
security".14 Nigerian youth provided the leadership in 
"practical" ideological movements. The youth were tired 
of "long articles, plenty of talks and no work" that had 
become the feature of elite nationalism up to 1945.10 In 
fact, with the collapse of the Nigerian Youth Movement 
and the formation of the National Council for Nigeria and
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the Cameroons (later, National Council of Nigerian 
Citizens) in August 1944, some Nigerian youths felt that 
there was need to start a socialist movement.lb
Earlier in 1945, Amanke Okafor formed a marxist 
group called "Talakawa Party". It did not however exist 
as a political party but as a think-tank group. Its aim 
was to rally the working class together in order to 
"achieve a free independent and a socialist Nigeria". 
This group however did not seems to have made any impact 
because its founder/leader soon left Nigeria for further 
studies in the United Kingdom. He however joined the 
Communist Party of Great Britain while in England and 
featured in its activities before his return to Nigeria 
in early 1950s.17
On July 8th, 1945, the Nigerian National Socialist 
Party was born under the leadership of Fola Arogundade. 
Other members were: A. Chukwura, Babatunde Shotade, G. 
Menkiti, Mudashiru Dawodu, Shola Morris, S. Okeke, Alii 
Zazau and Alabi Mclver.1" Its secretariat was located at 
9 Ondo Street, Ebute-Metta East, Lagos. This embryonic 
organisation did not enjoy the support of older 
nationalists because of its communist orientation.19 
Members regarded capitalism as the cause of Nigerian 
misery. According to them, "it had encouraged the
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enactment of inhuman legislations to foster the 
degeneration of mankind". 20
Despite anti-capitalist rhetoric, the leader of the 
NNSP lamented after its collapse that: "its adherents
were a very meek and weak lot of young people... We want 
to practise socialism but we are an ignorant mass of 
citizens comforted by the maxim that none can learn to 
swim until one is in the water" . ^  The organisation was 
a non-starter and its immediate collapse was not 
surprising. Its leader's remark is but a reflection on 
why many would-be leftist organisations during the 
colonial era did not last long.
Between 1946, when the Zikist Movement was formed, 
and 1948 when it assumed a militant posture towards the 
British administration in Nigeria, the stage seemed set 
for Nigerian marxists and their sympathizers in the 
struggle against British colonialism. On February 16th 
1946 young radical Nigerians within the NCNC formed a 
movement which derived its inspiration from one of the 
leading nationalists of the period, Nnamdi Azikiwe.
Its founding members were Kola Balogun (first 
President), C.K. Ajuluchukwu (the first secretary- 
general), Abiodun Aloba and Nduka Eze. Other members 
included Raji Abdallah (second President), Osita Agwuna,
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K.O. Mbadiwe, Ogedengbe Macaulay, Nzimiro, Mokwugo Okoye 
and Ralph Aniedobe.2~ It should be stressed here that 
contrary to official perception that the Zikist Movement 
was full of "irresponsible young men"2j, the formation 
of the Movement was due to their growing impatience with 
what they considered to be the slow pace of Nigeria's 
political advancement during the period.24
By October 1948, Osita Agwuna had made his "A Call 
For Revolution", where he called for a peace offensive 
against the British administration in Nigeria. In 
February 1949, Ogedengbe Macaulay talked of "dragging of 
the government down, and seizing power by force".'5 
During the same month, Raji Abdallah implored his 
northern brethren to join in the violent struggle.2G He 
also called for "positive action to end British rule", 
(this phrase was later used by the CPP of the Gold 
Coast) .27 Although government clamped down on them by 
arresting and charging ten of them with sedition in 
1949,°" this did not deter other members from inciting 
other uprisings in other parts of the country.
On February 16th 1950, a Zikist sabotage plan was 
uncovered by the police Special Branch after a search at 
Ikenna Nzimiro's house in Lagos. Documents found included 
"plans to destroy oil storage centres and essential
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government houses".'" During the prosecution, Nzimiro 
confirmed receiving the messages in his mail box on 
February 7th 1950 and was awaiting further instructions 
before the police search. He was found guilty of sedition 
and sentenced to nine months in prison.50
The height of Zikist activities was an abortive 
attempt on the life of Hugh Foot, the Chief Secretary, in 
February 1950. On February 18th 1950, Reuter reported 
that a young Ibo man named Heelas Chukwuma Ugokwe of the 
Posts and Telegraph Department tried to kill Hugh Foot 
with a knife when he was entering the Secretariat 
building in Lagos. Ugokwe was charged with attempted 
murder on February 20th 1950. In his report to the 
Secretary of State, Governor Macpherson noted that the 
attempted murder was arranged by the Zikist Movement. 52 
Ugokwe was sentenced to life imprisonment by Mr.Justice 
Rhodes at the Lagos Magistrate Court on March 13th 
1950.33
Ugokwe, a World War II veteran, had joined the 
Zikist Movement at its inception in 1946. It was reported 
that he was specifically recruited as an "assassin" at 
the Zikist Movement convention at Kaduna in December 1949 
along with eleven other youths to carry out a nationwide 
plot in an effort to forcibly seize power from the
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government.54 It was further claimed that instructions on 
this assignment was given by Mokwugo Okoye. 3'5
Initially, Ugokwe's job was to assassinate 
Macpherson, but having waited for nine days, decided to 
assassinate Hugh Foot, the Chief Secretary. Ugokwe's 
action was applauded by fellow Zikists and their 
sympathizers. An appeal was made to the West African 
Court of Appeal which reduced the life sentence to twelve 
years imprisonment.55
The significance of this incident was the tightening 
of security within official circles and the eventual 
banning of the Movement under the "Unlawful Societies 
Act, April 1950". According to Government Notices No.21, 
Volume 37 of April 13th, 1950, "conclusive evidence has 
been obtained from many parts of the country that the 
Zikist Movement is an organisation which aims to stir up 
hatred and malice and to pursue seditious aims by 
lawlessness and violence".37 The government also 
confiscated "all banners, insignia arms, papers, books, 
documents and any similar property" of the 
organisation. 3"
Although the Zikist Movement was banned in April 
1950, this did not lead to its collapse. There was re­
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grouping of interests and tactics, as well as, continued 
importation of communist literature into the country 
through the CPGB in London. First, a change in tactics 
involved the elimination of the older generation as part 
of their struggle. This was largely because of the 
attitude of Azikiwe and others who, rather than support 
the Zikists' course, ditched them. It also involved 
abandoning reformism and military action for an 
organisational putsch.
By organisational putsch, the Zikists "aimed to 
manoeuvre their opponents (Nigerians and British) in 
debates, elections and practical work". As Okoye puts it: 
"The point here is to beat the opponent at his own game 
by demonstrating a superior intellect, energy and 
patriotism, thus throwing doubt in the enemy's mind as to 
the value of his ideals or lack of them while at the same 
time showing that the methods and aims of the 
revolutionary group are preferable to any other". He 
concludes that, "organisational putschism is to be 
distinguished from sheer reformism or fabianism which is 
essentially a doctrine of middle class complacence and 
only thrives where national prosperity is high and there 
are no sharp distinctions between classes".59
Second, there was increased volume of communist
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literature brought into the country which was distributed
among the Zikists and other communist or socialist
followers. A British official noted that:
In November 1950, out of a total 
of 70 sacks of second class mail, 
six were taken at random and 
examined. And in each sack examined 
there were 1,000 communist pamphlets under
twelve titles and it was estimated that 50,000
pamphlets must have entered Nigeria by one mail
boat alone.40
In the latter half of 1952 and the beginning of 1953, the 
volume perceptibility increased and at the same time 
there was a change in emphasis. Earlier types of 
propaganda were Marxist books, propaganda advertising the 
Russian way of life and Stalin's virtues. This changed 
and was outnumbered by Cold War propaganda, anti-colonial 
propaganda and newspapers and periodicals. There was an 
increased number of pamphlets sent to private addresses 
despite the fact that the people could not pay for 
them.41
A discussion of the aims and activities of the 
Zikist Movement suggests that anti-communism was as 
important after 1950 as it was before 1950, more so when 
there was an increased volume of communist literature in 
the country, and membership of the organisation was 
coloured by marxian teachings.42
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While the motto was "secrecy and ruthless execution 
of our plans"4', the aims of the Zikist Movement at its 
formation in 1946 were rather confusing as they 
vacillated between pro and anti-British statements. Its 
main motto was towards African irredentism, an idea 
coined from Azikiwe's Renascent Africa (1937). The 
Movement had nine goals which were spelt out thus:
(i)"To study painstakingly and objectively, practice 
conscientiously, seriously and constitutionally the creed 
of "Zikism" as set out by Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe in his 
Renascent Africa and allied teachings and as propounded 
in its philosophical form by Nwafor Orizu";
(ii)"To faithfully follow the leadership of Dr. Azikiwe";
(iii)"To courageously and intelligently preach Zikism, 
making it understandable to the mass of the indigenous 
elements of the country with the purpose of aiding the 
evolution of a united nation out of the varied tribes of 
Nigeria and the British Cameroons";
(iv)"To faithfully dedicate our lives to the task of 
African Redemption by concretely demonstrating and 
defending even at the risk of paying the supreme 
sacrifice,the Zikist way of life";
(v) "To use every available means of submitting 
constitutionally the opinions, feelings, sentiments and 
customs of the people of the country to the British 
Government of Nigeria";
(vi)"To take interest in all activities,events,happenings 
and practices that affects the destiny of this country";
(vii)"To cooperate with other organisations in the 
country whose aims and aspirations do not clash with 
those of this movement";
(viii)"To cooperate with the Zikist Movement the world 
over" ;
(ix)"To raise funds from Zikists and the general public 
in furtherance of these objects".44
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In fact, British and American officials were 
apprehensive of the Zikists' sponsored editorial on 
September 3rd 1946 of Nigerian Spokesman which castigated 
the Police Force, the Army, and lawyers. This was based 
on the idea that in a colonial situation, "a lawyer 
becomes a societal flower and even an anachronism in the 
United Nigeria Republic since his profession is based on 
laws enacted by the former (colonial) rulers". The 
editorial continued that "the Army and the Police Force 
would have to be disbanded and reformed because they are 
co-operative part of what socialists recognise as the 
state machine".45
Apart from sponsored editorials in Nigerian 
Spokesman, Daily Comet and the West African Pilot (before 
1949), the Zikists aired their thoughts in "Zimo 
Newsletter", the official publication of the 
organisation. Topics covered included, "What is the 
Zikist Movement?", "Workers of Nigeria revolt", and 
reproduction of Marxist-Leninist thoughts and philosophy. 
The Zikists openly declared their commitments to 
socialism and accepted the Marxist thesis that economic 
factors conditioned the moral, legal and political 
aspects in the development of any given society.4b
This explains why members of the Zikist Movement
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were variously described as; "Communist propagandist", 
and a "band of youths who advocated the violent overthrow 
of the British administration". Some of them (i.e. 
Abdallah and Oged Macaulay) were described as making "a 
violently anti-Government speeches in public", despite 
being civil servants. Osita Agwuna, the writer of "A Call 
for Revolution", was referred to as a man "inclined 
increasingly towards violence... probably because he 
aspires to make a martyr of himself".47
Perhaps the British officials were right. Agwuna was 
the first to voice the threat of 'positive action' when, 
at a meeting of the Lagos branch of the NCNC on October 
9th 1948 at the Yaba Stadium, he proposed a resolution 
accusing the government of fanning tribal discord by 
encouraging "minority elements".4" He then called upon 
those present to pledge themselves 'to take any measure 
to silence the "minority" and to overthrow the 
Government and hand over power to the NCNC' .49 As the 
report shows, wiser counsels prevailed and the resolution 
was withdrawn.
However, three weeks later in late October, Agwuna 
followed it up with a lecture which he entitled "A Call 
for Revolution". He said that Nigeria had two enemies: 
the first was the Government, and the second was the fear
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of the people to rise and drive the Government out. As 
far as he was concerned the only hope of salvation was 
progressive revolution beginning with a civil 
disobedience campaign. He then recommended that every 
taxable Nigerian should refuse to pay tax to the 
Government but should pay an equivalent amount into the 
NCNC funds; Empire Day should stop forthwith; nobody 
should join the civil service or the army; the NCNC on 
its forthcoming tour should "preach a doctrine of hate 
and contempt for the Government".55 It is important to 
highlight Agwuna's speech: "A Call For Revolution", in
order to identify its marxist leaning.
"A CALL FOR REVOLUTION" :
(a) "Like heroes let us show the spirit to dare and 
conquer; let us forget the momentary interests of our 
cumbrous flesh and pursue a lasting pearl that is 
freedom; let us fight for the honour of smashing the 
present Imperialist State machine BY AS FOUL AND VICIOUS 
METHODS AS WITH WHICH WE ARE STILL CAPTIVATED (emphasis 
by Agwuna); let us for once cast aside that simplicity 
and complacency which have been a curse to our race and 
cultivate those wordy virtues which speak, use and 
understand the language of the World in every changing 
epoch";
"Our youth must then assimilate the methods of India, 
Burma, Indonesia, Lybia (sic) and Palestine, where
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unwilling Rulers have been shown their way out; MUST DAMN 
RELIGIOUS AND HUMANIST INHIBITIONS (emphasis by Agwuna) 
and, where the means is certain of the end, work on the 
hypothesis that the end justifies the means. MUST EMBRACE 
ACTIVE REVOLUTION AS THE CURRENT WORLD ORDER, MUST 
EMBRACE THE SCIENTIFIC USE OF FORCE (emphasis by Agwuna) 
for justice without force, it is said, is powerless; and 
force without justice is tyranny".
(b) "The youths of Africa should interest themselves in 
Military tactics of defence, in physical adventures of 
all kinds and should demonstrate more than a passing and 
academic interest in the methods and tactics of 
revolutionary movements in other countries and seek 
communion with them. In particular, they should organise 
themselves for intensified picketing and boycott. 
DELIBERATE GROUP VIOLATION OF EVERY LAW (emphasis by 
Agwuna) and executive order which they deem to be 
tyrannical and a breach of human right, and for various 
forms of revolutionary activities and should highly 
resolve to save this continent from the predatory 
clutches of Imperialism through any mean". 51
As a result Agwuna, Anthony Enahoro - chairman of 
the meeting - Duke Dafe and Ralph Aniedobe were arrested 
and prosecuted for sedition by the colonial court. 
Although the arrests did not occasion much excitement
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initially, some of the ex-servicemen soon came out with 
attacks on Azikiwe saying that "he put these young men 
up to making the speech and that if he was the patriot he 
held himself to be he would have insisted on going to 
prison with them" . 52
The prosecution of these men notwithstanding, other 
Zikists continued the struggle. In mid-November 1948, an 
unsigned message was issued from the Zikist Movement 
secretariat in Lagos and distributed throughout the 
country. The message read thus:
NATIONALIST MESSAGE LAGOS
Be it known by all Zikists and 
freedom-loving Nigerians that 
this is the hour. The Zikist 
Movement can no longer hope to 
have reason where,it is evident, 
respect for reason does not exist.
The movement is therefore calling 
upon the youths of the country to 
support it in the present struggle 
for freedom. We cannot allow this 
challenge to our manhood to go. The 
Zikist Movement, in humble obedience 
to the call, is now ordering all the 
branches and regional presidents to 
organise and lead campaigns throughout 
the country so as to make our stand 
known. Our branches and branch officers 
should not antagonise any tribal and 
political groups. The campaign should aim a t
focusing the attention of the masses towards the
one common central danger - t h e  B r i t i s h
Government. 5j
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While the Azikiwe-led NCNC seemed ambivalent, 
Abdallah and other Zikists were in favour of identifying 
themselves completely with Agwuna on the need for a 
"positive action". The Zikists lost no time in trying to 
whip up excitement both in Lagos and in the provinces. In 
late November 1948, seven instructions were passed on to 
branches outside Lagos for its executives'
implementation. These were:
(i)"A campaign should be held by summoning meetings 
with executives of private unions, family unions, 
headmasters, explaining to them the need for progressive 
revolution beginning with civil disobedience without 
violence or non-cooperation";
(ii) "If our men now standing trial are sentenced 
without option of fine, the workers and market women 
should make positive demands to government to release
them. Such demands should be followed up with an
ultimatum, organised slow strike and stop marketing";
(iii)"In the event of the government contravening 
such ultimatum, a country-wide demonstration should 
follow by damaging mercantile houses, prison walls, post 
offices, police barracks and police rifles should be 
seized first; time limit for all these will be December 
24th 1948" ;
(iv) "Our order to all branches should read as
follows:-
"I believe in genuine and beneficial 
cooperation - ZAKARI";
(v) "On receipt of this instruction, summon all
regional presidents and secretaries and distribute these 
instructions to them";
(vi)"From now onwards all private and important 
documents should be dispatched to the headquarters only 
by sending a messenger by land"; and
(vii)"0ur struggle for freedom does not consist only
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in pouring abuse, what we need to do is to wage war on 
those forces against us".5’4
These instructions led to an assembly of people who 
disturbed the proceedings of the preliminary 
investigation of the sedition cases against the Zikists 
in Lagos, as well as a demonstration in Onitsha which led 
to the closure of the market for one day. 55
On this occasion, Abdallah and Oged Macaulay were 
arrested, leaving Eze, Okoye, Ndulue and others to 
continue with the struggle. On September 5th 1949, the 
Zikist Movement, under the momentary leadership of Eze 
and Okoye, issued an operation order to its members. They 
were asked to organize "a peasant movement throughout 
the country".55 In addition, members were implored to 
infiltrate trade unions and seek positions there as part 
of preparations for a civil disobedience at a later 
date.5 The order also encouraged youths to "embrace 
active revolution and deliberate group violation of every 
law and executive order".5" There is no doubt that this 
operational order has a Communist undertone as it called 
for active revolution and the re-awakening of the 
peasantry and the working class. It shows the extent to 
which the Zikists under Eze and his cronies, were 
influenced by marxism, and their efforts towards
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establishing a "Communist State".
In late February 1950, men of the Nigerian police 
and the Special Branch raided the Zikist Movement's 
headquarters and arrested sixteen people. Three were 
discharged, one was fined £25; ten were sentenced to six 
months imprisonment and the remaining two to four weeks 
and thirty-three months respectively.59 Mokwugo Okoye, 
the secretary - general of the Zikist Movement, was the 
hardest hit. He was sentenced to thirty-three months 
imprisonment after being found guilty of possessing 
seditious documents. Hence, when others regained their 
freedom, he was still serving his sentence. Ndulue sought 
the support of Fenner Brockway and Reginald Sorenson, 
Labour MPs, in seeking a Royal pardon.65
Brockway's appeal to the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies was turned down because in the first instance 
the Royal Prerogative was exercised by the Governor and 
not the Secretary of State for the Colonies. The 
Secretary of State for the Colonies only intervened if 
there was evidence of a failure of due process in the 
colonial courts. A Colonial Office official noted that, 
"the circumstances of the case do not justify his own 
intervention in a matter in which the Governor is in the 
best position to judge the desirability or otherwise of
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exercising his powers".6^ The Colonial Office was 
therefore right to have concluded that "it was not only- 
wrong for Brockway to send an appeal directly to London, 
the Zikists were engaged in a plot and not a riot, and as 
such the invocation of liberalism to permit the release
of those found guilty of plotting violence is a trifle
• • 62 inappropriate".
It is important to stress at this juncture that
anxiety about communism and Zikists' activities were not
limited to nationalist groups, but had also penetrated
student groups and the labour unions as well. Both the
Americans, and the British administrators, in Lagos were
concerned about growing radical tendencies within the
University College, Ibadan. As Erwin Keeler noted in a
despatch to the State Department in Washington D.C.:
. . . The intensely political and radical 
atmosphere of the campus is already 
established, with the encouragement and
direct assistance by the local 
nationalist leaders. . .
He noted further that the attitude of the
nationalist leaders towards the College could be found in
the remarks of Kingsley Mbadiwe, an NCNC leader, during 
the 1952 budget session of the Nigerian House of
Representatives.64 During the discussion of government 
financial support of the College, Mbadiwe stated that,
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"if money was to be spent upon the College it should and 
must be made a place where young Nigerians were trained 
to be nationalists"."" The government was however, more 
concerned about the students being "a prime target of 
the communists at such future time as the opportunity 
might become auspicious for them".c" It was, however, in 
the labour unions that official anxiety became more 
vociferous. I shall discuss this shortly.
(4.3) The Careers Of Nduka Eze, Gocro Chu Nzeribe and Sam 
Akoata:
The careers of Nduka Eze, Gogo Chu Nzeribe and 
Samuel Akpata in labour unionism further explain attempts 
by communists to infiltrate into sectors of the Nigerian 
colonial state. While there were other communists and 
their sympathizers during the same period, these men are 
unique in view of their credentials. Concerning Eze for 
instance, records from the CPGB indicates that he was 
"the most outstanding" personality in "the history of the 
Nigerian working class movement" during the colonial 
era.67
The year 1950 remained memorable in the life of 
Nduka Eze. First, he established contact with the CPGB 
leaders such as Harry Pollitt, Margot, Barbara Ruheman,
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Idris Cox, perhaps through Okafor and Onowochei who had 
joined the CPGB around 1946 in England. Second, he was 
instrumental in the publication of Labour Champion, the 
first Nigerian labour newspaper. Though short-lived, 
Labour Champion was a clear expression of Marxist 
influence, with a strong emphasis on the principles of 
international unity. With this paper, he was in close 
contact with officials of the Daily Worker, a communist 
newspaper in London. In fact, he was reported to have 
sent one of his young reporters, Idise Dafe to the Daily 
Worker (London) to be trained as a journalist.''"' Eze had 
earlier sought financial support from the British TUC in 
setting up the Labour Champion in June 1949.67
However, the response was negative because TUC 
officials were clearly informed about Eze's role in the 
defunct Nigerian Trades Union Congress in March 1949 and 
his marxian doctrination. 70 In fact, the Labour Adviser 
in Nigeria, Roberts Curry, was not in support of Eze's 
appeal as he viewed it as, one of the Communists tactics 
of presenting themselves as pro-Western leaders in the 
colonies only to turn out to propagate Communist ideology 
through the paper. In his words: "Eze's methods are
typically Communist, his speeches and press reports are 
very obviously inspired from outside sources".71
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Eze was, at one time, President - General of the 
Zikist Movement; the Secretary of the United African 
Company Workers' Union and the Nigerian National 
Federation of Labour, a breakaway organisation from the 
(Nigeria) Trade Union Congress, apart from being the 
Secretary of the National Scholarships Board formed in 
May 1950. 72 Of Igbo origin, he joined the U.A.C. as a 
manager- in-training in 1944. He took an active part in 
trade union activities and in 1946 became the secretary 
of his branch of the UAC Workers Union. 3
There are conflicting reports about the 
circumstances that led to his exit from the UAC staff 
list. To the CPGB, Eze left the UAC voluntarily in 1947 
after many "attempts by the management to buy him off and 
intimidate him failed".'4 To British officials, however, 
many activists had indeed being sacked but for a variety 
of reasons including, as in Eze's case, 
"insubordination". 75
As President of the Lagos branch, executive member, 
and later President of the Zikist Movement, Eze 
constantly inspired and educated young men in the 
movement in the spirit of Marxism. He taught Marxism, not 
in the abstract, but in relation to the needs of the 
Nigerian Labour movement and the political situation in
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Nigeria generally. He gathered around himself a group of 
young men who had developed a deep interest in Marxism, 
composed of Osita Agwuna, 0.1. Dafe, J. Onwugbuzio,
Mokwugo Okoye, G. Nzeribe, I. Nzimiro, A. Ikoro, Ezuma, 
C.K. Opara, Mailam Abdallah, M. Kolagbodi, Chikwendu 
Nwariaku, and others who began to apply Marxism in their 
practical political activities and carried it to the 
labour movement. 76
It was through many of his activities that he sought 
and received supports from Communist bodies in Europe. 
One of his activities was in connection with the 
selection of Nigerian students for study in East Germany 
and Czechoslovakia. 7 In order to succeed in this he 
formed the National Scholarships Board in 1950. Needless 
to say Eze and his group were in close contact with the 
Free German Youth in East Germany. In fact, a solidarity 
message was sent by the Free German Youth (FGY) to Eze on 
the Enugu incident.78 Moreover, the FGY had since 1950 
made specific offers indicating that they were prepared 
to admit selected Nigerian students into East Germany to 
study at universities or secondary schools. The FGY also 
stressed that all expenses once the students were across 
the German border, would be paid by them.79
Immediately there followed local advertisements
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sponsored by the newly formed National Scholarships Board 
under the presidency of Folarin Coker"’ and the 
secretaryship of Nduka Eze. An unspecified number of 
scholarships were allotted for university training. For 
secondary education, ten places were made available for 
applicants not exceeding fourteen years of age. Moreover, 
all board, tuition and lodging were free and the 
Scholarships Board was apparently prepared to provide 
passage money. Importantly, such students were to be 
recommended by 'democratic organisations' after the 
payment of a small affiliation fee.81
By October 1950 the Board was able to send two 
students, who were accompanied by one N.E. Kolagbodi, an 
ex-Zikist, to Berlin and Prague. And by early November 
1950, about six and nine students respectively had 
applied for placement at secondary schools and 
universities in Berlin and Prague through the Board."2 In 
order to expedite processing of the students' passage, 
Edward Onowochei, a Nigerian member of the Communist 
Party of Great Britain, was appointed London liaison 
officer for Eze's National Scholarships Board. He was in 
charge of student welfare and their onward passage to 
either Berlin or Prague.'" In 1951, the American Consul 
General in Nigeria, A.W. Childs, concluded that 
"Onowochei was directing the entire scheme and appeared
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to act as liaison officer with both the Free German Youth 
and the Communist Party of Great Britain".
In March 1951, another batch of seven students 
arrived in Berlin. The eighth was said to have been held 
up for some time by legal complications in London, but 
she later arrived in Berlin in April.85 It was reported 
that apart from Onowochei, the CPGB and WFTU, the Czech 
and Soviet Embassies assisted Nigerians, as well as other 
colonial students' journeys to Berlin and Prague. "6
By April 1951, a report from Germany indicated that 
students were provided by the Soviets with clothing, food 
and recreation. And, more importantly, "political 
science" became a mandatory course that must be taken by 
all students, particularly those from colonies. During 
the same month, fifteen students were selected for 
Agricultural and Forestry Workers Scholarship in Eastern 
Germany/" By May 1951, another batch of eight students 
was sent to Berlin under the Scholarships Board scheme.
Despite strict observation of non-issuance of 
international passports to Nigerians intending to go 
behind the Iron Curtain, Eze's machinations seemed to 
succeed. A.W. Childs noted that, "in at least one and 
probably more cases passports have been obtained by means
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of forged application and blank passport forms".B" This 
led to criticism of the local passport authority in Lagos 
for "laxness in allowing blank passports to be stolen, 
and not controlling immigration more efficiently to 
prevent students from reaching Czechoslovakia, Eastern
• 89Germany and Russia".
Men of the Nigerian police and the Special Branch 
raided the headquarters of the NSP in 1951. Eze and 
Onwurike (a beneficiary of the NSP Award), were arrested 
and charged with being in possession of forged passports 
and blank forms. Further investigations resulted in the 
arrest of an immigration police corporal, Ajayi Busari, 
in November 1951. Onwurike and Eze were fined £10 and £50 
respectively for possessing a false passport. On the 
other hand, Busari was sentenced to three years 
imprisonment for theft and sale of passports, passport 
application forms and making false entries in the 
passport register.90
Nduka Eze was involved in labour unionism which was 
his primary constituency for the greater part of his 
career. As he did for the Scholarships Board, he was able 
to gather funds for the labour movement to foster their 
anti-British activities. His first move in labour 
movement was to dislodge pro-Western leaders such as
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Adio-Moses from the Nigerian TUC in late 1949. His 
formation of the Nigerian National Federation of Labour 
in late 1949 was the seal of his dominance of the labour 
movement in Nigeria during the period. By 1950 he had 
affiliated the body with the World Federation of Trade 
Unions in Paris, and established, a fraternity with the 
Communist Party of Great Britain.
It was through his links with the WFTU and the CPGB 
that, he was able to get sponsorships from these bodies 
and other satellite groups. In early 1951, the sum of 
£2,300 was transferred from the Communist Third 
International in Prague to Ezuma's account at the 
Barclays Bank DC and O in Lagos. There is need for a 
historical background to the WFTU grant. When the Labour 
Champion could not meet its financial obligations in late 
1950, it naturally died. Attempts to resuscitate it led 
to Eze, Ikoro, Ezuma and Nzimiro's appeal to WFTU early 
in 1951.
Ezuma was sent to Paris to solicit for WFTU 
assistance under the guise that the Labour Champion 
belonged to the Nigerian Labour Congress. Naturally, it 
was easy for the sympathy of the WFTU to be enlisted for 
the only newspaper owned by the workers of Nigeria. And 
more importantly they were aware about Eze's credentials
182
as a frontline Marxist. Two errors were committed: the 
first was believing that the Labour Champion was owned by 
the NLC, and second, the deposit of the grant into a 
private account - Ezuma's/1 It is however unfortunate 
that the Labour Champion was never resuscitated despite 
the receipt of the money.
The US consular noted that the sum of £2 00 was given 
to the Nigerian Labour Congress on the agreement that 
certain communist sympathizers were nominated to the 
executive of the Congress.92 Later in the year, WFTU 
deposited another £2,000 into the account of the union.9" 
It was thus, easy for the Daily Times and the West 
African Pilot, to "prove that the Communist World, far 
from trying to help Nigerian workers was aiming at 
financing destruptive (sic) activities in Nigeria". 94
The aftermath was a crisis in the labour union and 
a split in All-Nigeria Trade Union Federation (ANTUF), 
which led to the emergence of new groups.95 While those 
who objected to the communist fund later formed the 
National Council of Trade Unions, Nigeria, the Left-Wing 
emerged under the name of Trade Union Congress, Nigeria 
(TUCN). The National Council of Trade Unions, Nigeria, 
under Borha, Adio-Moses and Adebola, were in support of 
membership of the International Confederation of Trade
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Unions (ICFTU, while the Trade Union Congress, Nigeria, 
(TUCN) under Eze, Nzeribe, Imoudu and Wahab Goodluck, 
preferred to join the World Federation of Trade Unions 
(WFTU) .96 The split in the labour movement during the 
period could be interpreted as a struggle between 
communism and capitalism.97
The split did not, however, solve the problem among 
the Left-Wing as several hundreds of workers who lost 
their jobs in December 1950 when a communist-organised 
general strike failed, demanded strike and unemployment 
pay.5' A member union of the Congress, the Nigeria 
Brewery Workers' Union, demanded that a General Council 
meeting of the Congress be called forthwith to discuss 
the allocation of the communist funds." There was also 
dissension in the union as to the control and expenditure 
of union funds. When members of the Trade Union Congress 
began to make allegations of corruption against Eze, the 
colonial administration effectively used this to clamp 
down on him by charging him with corruption and other 
offenses, such as passport forging.100
It must be stated that Eze's activities in Nigeria 
attracted the attention of the CPGB leaders in London. 
Some of them believed that he had showed some leadership 
quality and could lead a Marxist party if given further
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supports. Not all CPGB leaders were in favour of Eze 
however. There were some who were worried about Nigeria 
trade union members allegation of corruption against Eze 
and his vulnerability to government in this regard.
Gogo Chu Nzeribe was born in 193 0 at Oguta. He was 
educated at the prestigious King's College, Lagos. Like 
Eze, he had served as councillor on the Lagos Town 
Council in 1950-51. Nzeribe was the founding secretary of 
the All-Nigeria Trade Union Federation.101 He was also the 
Secretary General of the Union of Posts and 
Telecommunications Workers of Nigeria from 1952 to 1954. 
To British officials, Nzeribe was a rebel, while to his 
opponents he was a communist. To the Americans, he was 
"a courageous champion of the rights of the workers and 
certainly a radical and probably a communist 
sympathizer" . 105
He soon proved officials right, when, on the morning 
of March 19th 1958, an estimated 3,000 employees of the 
Posts and Telegraphs Department ceased work in response 
to a call to strike by Gogo Chu Nzeribe.10" Although 
Nzeribe described it as a "48-hour protest demonstration" 
against management inefficiency and ineptitude, the 
government and the press described it as a communist 
tactic to attack the government.104
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I should point out that by this period, anti­
communism had become an instrument used by many folks 
(both officials and non-officials) to silence opposition. 
It should not be surprising, therefore, that the 
management of Posts and Telegraph referred to the strike 
as communist-inspired. While not denying Nzeribe's 
socialist inclination, management's conclusion of the 
strike as being sponsored by Communists is however 
suspect and inaccurate. It nonetheless highlights the 
fear of the Nigerian Federal Labour Minister, Okotie- 
Eboh, in July 1957 concerning the potentials of Gogo Chu 
Nzeribe. 105
The strike was unique in several respects. In the 
first place, it was the most efficiently organised and 
most widely based strike to have occurred in the country 
in several years. Secondly, the secrecy with which the 
strike was arranged taking the public and the government 
by complete surprise, was little short of astounding. 
Thirdly, one can say that the complete ruthlessness and 
disregard for public welfare which characterised the 
strike suggests, and was condemned by the press, as 
communist tactics.106
British officials were astonished. Nigerian
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administrators and politicians who had assumed partial 
governance during the mid-1950s, did not take kindly to 
communism in labour unions. To the Permanent Secretary of 
the Ministry of Labour and Welfare, Francis Nwokedi, "the 
disruptive tactics employed by Nzeribe were typically 
communist", and to the Prime Minister, Tafawa Balewa, 
"the government probably underestimated him".107
Another closely monitored and highly educated 
communist during the period was Samuel Bankole Akpata. 
Born in Lagos in 192 0, Akpata was educated at Umuahia 
Government College, and Yaba Higher College, where he 
spent two years. From Yaba, he went to the United Kingdom 
in 1941 to study at London University. It was there that 
he associated with W.A.S.U; Communist Party Of Great 
Britain; World Federation of Democratic Youth, 
International Union of Students, and the Free German 
Youth.
By late 1945 he had been elected into the executive 
of the WFDY. Also in late 1945, Akpata was involved in 
the formation of the West African National Secretariat. 
The antecedent was a secret meeting held with Nkrumah, 
Botsio, Nikoi, Wallace and Awooner-Renner in London.
At the meeting, the party agreed to "form a radical
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progressive organisation for seizing power in Africa as 
quickly as possible". Their ultimate aim was "national 
unity, independence and a union of African Socialist 
Republic".1”' He was an assistant secretary, and later 
secretary of the WANS in early 1947. He also supported 
the Gold Coast Students Union rally at Trafalgar square 
on March 8th 1948, where he denounced the colonial 
Government's handling of the February 1948 riot in 
Accra.109
The Communist Party of the Soviet Union later 
offered him a scholarship to read for his Masters and 
Ph.D at the Charles University, Prague, in 1949. Between 
1949 and 1953 he attended various communist conferences 
among them the World Federation of Democratic Youth 
conference in Budapest in 1949, where he claimed to 
represent Youth Congress of Nigeria, and the communist 
organised Berlin Conference of 1951. He returned to 
Nigeria in July 1953 and was appointed Secretary General 
of the Railway Workers Union on a salary of £240 per 
annum.110 At the height of his career, he became the 
Librarian of the University College, Ibadan.111
(4.4) Communists or Sympathizers?: The Case of H.O.
Davies and Funmilavo Kuti:
Apart from Nduka Eze, another personality closely 
watched was H.O. Davies. His activities as a member of 
the West African Students Union in the 1920s is well 
documented and need not be repeated here.11” Davies more 
than anyone else was the defender of the radicals and 
professed marxists in Nigeria during the period under 
review. Apart from his legal work, he formed an embryonic 
political party called the People's Congress Party. He 
also established a newspaper called The Nigerian People's 
Voice.^ : The PCP seems to have had two major planks in 
its platform: a denunciation of Nigerian tribalism and 
regionalism, and support of the workers with a 'self 
characterisation of being the friend of the workers'. 11,1
Robert Ross, the American vice consul, summarised
the place of Davies during the period under review thus:
... a man to watch on the local 
political scene as a potentially 
strong leader of the Leftist 
elements of the politically 
conscious minority in Nigeria.
He might well become a likely 
candidate to fill the position of 
chief communist contact because of his 
very high intellect and political maturity.115
Ironically, Ross was proved wrong by later events as 
Davies pitched camp with Azikiwe in the NCNC, a party 
considered, like the Action Group and the Northern 
People's Congress, as favouring constitutional and
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gradual decolonisation, rather than the revolutionary 
liberation of Nigeria.1”' He, like Azikiwe, opted for 
Fabian socialism and pragmatic ideas that preached non - 
violence. This was one of the ways through which Azikiwe 
contained the Leftists in the NCNC.11
I should note that Ross was not the only one that 
was proved wrong. Leaders of the Communist Party of Great 
Britain (who had hoped for his leadership of a marxist 
group, that would metamorphosed into a Nigeria Communist 
party), were also disappointed about his liberal attitude 
towards British rule in Nigeria after 1945. Davies had 
been close with some British members of the CPGB during 
the World War and immediately after.
He was reported to have visited the CPGB office 
while in London as a student. The case of Davies, it 
seems to me, is that of someone in search of knowledge. 
He was interested in knowing about marxism and communism, 
and whether it could be adapted to situation in the 
colony. A CPGB document in late 1951 titled: "Draft
Discussion on the Nature and Personnel of the Leadership 
of the Nigerian Trade Union and National Movement", 
highlights the disappointment of the organisation about 
Davies' switch to the right. 11K
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Their hope in him as a leader of a marxist group was 
dashed as he joined the NCNC. Leaders of the CPGB 
concluded that Davies "character as a Yoruba separatist 
and splitter of the national movement is now so well 
known that it requires no further comment".119
Furthermore, anxiety about communism during the 
1950s can be seen in the way Funmilayo Ransome-Kuti was 
treated by the government. The wife of Rev. Ransome-Kuti, 
Funmilayo was, perhaps, the most vocal and radically 
educated woman in Nigeria during the devolution period. 
She and her husband had been exposed internationally 
through close contacts with Ladipo Solanke (founder of 
WASU), Reginald Sorenson, Arthur and Violet Creech Jones, 
Freda Grimble, and the Labour Party leadership before 
1947.120 It has to be noted that none of these people was 
remotely connected with communism. They nonetheless 
inspired her in her attitude and perception of British 
rule in Nigeria.
She was included as a member of the NCNC delegation 
to London in 1947 to present the views of the party on 
the Richards Constitution to the Secretary of State for 
the Colonies. It was during this period that she joined 
the Women's International Democratic Federation (WIDF), 
a USSR inspired organisation founded in Paris in 1945. 
Its aims were to: "unite women regardless of race,
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nationality, religion and political opinion, so that they 
may work together to win, implement and defend national 
independence and democratic freedoms, eliminate 
apartheid, racial discrimination and fascism; work for 
peace and universal disarmament" . i”1
Between 1946 and 1957, Funmilayo was involved in the 
WIDF activities. She, in fact, contributed a chapter in 
a communist sponsored book in 1948 where she criticised 
British rule in Nigeria and called for the improvement of 
women's condition in the colonies and protectorates.122 
She attended a WIDF conference in Vienna on the defence 
of children on April 9th 1952, as well as participated 
during the Copenhagen Congress in June 1953 where she was 
elected as one of the vice-presidents of the WIDF. Her 
paper was published along with others in 1954 by WIDF 
entitled: That They May Life: 'African Women Arise' .
Given her international connections, she formed an 
embryonic organisation called the National Women's Union 
(NWU) in 1952, through which she sought to educate women 
about their socio-economic conditions under British rule. 
The partial success of this organisation could be seen in 
its refusing to pay the water rate levy in Abeokuta 
district in 1952.
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However, the government banned WIDF literature in 
July 1954 after the visit of the organisation's Secretary 
General to Funmilayo at Abeokuta in the same month.123 
Earlier in 1955, she was refused a passport to travel to 
Helsinki, Finland, to attend a communist sponsored World 
Assembly of Peace.
Funmilayo was also actively involved with other 
organisations during and after the colonial period, 
although her private papers did not detail the extent or 
outcome of such contacts. As far back as 1949, Funmilayo 
had contacted Marcus Garvey's United Negro Improvement 
Association's Women's corp.124 She also corresponded with 
women in Trinidad, Korea and Vietnam.125 In Africa, she 
visited the Gold Coast (Ghana) several times and assisted 
in the formation of its Women's Movement in 1960. i2b
Her quest for women development was also 
instrumental in her joining the British Women's 
International Association, a non-communist organisation 
in 1952. Although Mcgregor Wood, leader of BWIA was 
sceptical about Funmilayo's ideological leaning, she was 
assured by Solanke that "Mrs. Funmilayo Ransome-Kuti is 
not a communist".12. This assurance from the WASU leader 
and Funmilayo's correspondence with Wood was instrumental 
in the acceptance of her membership and the affiliation
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of the Nigerian Women Association to BWIA.
Funmilayo's case shows that, some nationalists were 
only interested in what they could benefit from some 
international organisations, as a means towards achieving 
their set goal. While its has been difficult to identify 
other nationalist in this category, one can argue that it 
was a miscalculation for any nationalist to have joined 
a pro-communist organisation during the period. While 
official intelligence reports maintained that she was a 
communist, her biographers are of the view that Funmilayo 
"was a pragmatist unwilling to be controlled by any of 
them (East or West)".12*
Although she was allowed to visit Peking in 1956 to 
attend a WIDF council meeting, her passport was not 
endorsed for the 1957 WIDF conference. It should be 
stressed that leading nationalists who occupied high 
office during the mid-1950s maintained anti-communist 
measures hitherto in place. Although official non­
endorsement of Funmilayo's passport drew many criticisms 
(as it was a restriction of individual freedom of 
movement and expression), Balewa, as the Head of 
Government Business (later Prime Minister) remarked that 
"in the past when it was thought Mrs Kuti might be an 
innocent victim of communist schemes, she was informed
194
officially ... but now it can be assumed that it is her 
intention to influence the various Nigerian women's 
organisations with which she is connected with communist 
ideas and policies ... On those grounds the government 
would not renew her passport".129 Despite her protests 
Balewa's government did not change its decision until 
after independence when approval was given for the 
renewal of her passport. 130
(4.5) Conclusion:
In summary, communism was seen as a threat to the 
sustainance of a "nurtured capitalism" and the survival 
of a world-wide capitalism.1”1 In Nigeria during the 
period under review, the ideology of Communism was 
imbibed by some labour leaders and the nationalist groups 
particularly the younger elements. It had assumed a 
potent force within the Labour/Trade Unions largely 
because of the activities of people like Eze, Nzeribe, 
Akpata, Bassey, Imoudu, and Wahab Goodluck. With the 
banning of the Zikist Movement in April 1950, efforts to 
rejuvenate marxist ideas within the nationalist and 
labour groups were met with counter-measures by the 
central and regional governments. Hence marxist 
organisations that emerged in the 1950s enjoyed, at best, 
a suspended animation as they found it difficult to co-
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exist with the stiff governments measures. The next 
chapter is about activities of marxist groups that 
emerged in the 50s.
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CHAPTER FIVE 
MARXIST ORGANISATIONS IN THE 1950s
(5.1) INTRODUCTION:
Marxist ideas1 developed in Nigeria with the rising tide 
of national liberation movement after World War II. Such 
ideas were reflected both in politics and trade unionism 
during the period. Nigerians were not isolated from the 
divisions between many followers of Marx and Engels as 
relates to actualization of a Communist State. More 
important is their attempts to interpret Communism in 
relation to their colonial situation. Hence, some of them 
claimed to be Marxists, Stalinists, Titoists and Maoists. 
These divisions, as will be shown shortly, created many 
pseudo-Marxist organizations in the '50s and beyond. The 
primary purpose in this chapter is to further show that 
the banning of the Zikist Movement did not lead to the 
collapse of Marxian ideology in Nigeria. Rather, it 
partly put in disarray, as well as made difficult, the 
formation of a nation-wide organisation.
217
As in the '40s, the history of the Nigerian working 
class movement was connected with an entirely different 
set of people. But, unlike the '40s, there emerged many 
embryonic Marxist organisations in Nigeria in the '50s. 
In fact, the Communist Party of Great Britain, the main 
satellite with which Nigerian marxists were closely 
associated (as far as official records have revealed), 
was disturbed about the series of marxist splinter groups 
that were formed and re-formed on many occasions during 
the decade preceeding Nigerian independence.
(5.2) THE MARXIST GROUPS :
At least, six different groups of marxist 
organisations were identified in 1953 as existing in 
Nigeria by the Communist Party of Great Britain.2 In 
fact, CPGB officials noted that there might have been 
some of which they did not have real knowledge.J In 
November 195 0, Nduka Eze, undoubtedly the most 
outstanding defender of the Nigerian working class, 
formed the Freedom Movement. Their aim was to continue 
along with his comrades, the crusade for the emancipation 
of Nigerians generally. The group hoped to replace the 
banned Zikist Movement, and continue the struggle for 
Nigeria's independence, obviously the communist way. It 
organised marxist lectures and discussions and circulated
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marxist literature on different subjects.4 By October 
1951, however, the group had ceased to exist partly 
because of different opinions among members, as well as 
stiff government opposition.
Earlier in 1951 another group emerged in Ibadan 
which called themselves The Communist Party of Nigeria 
and the Cameroons. The only record of the organisation is 
a letter sent to CPGB office (London), from Ibadan on 
March 19th 1951 by Samuel Alamu and 0.0. Gbolahan. The 
list of members are not available, neither is the record 
of their activities like most marxist groups during the 
period. This must have been a clique of youth interested 
in CPGB and the Daily Worker's assistance in realising 
the educational pursuit of their members.5 The 
organisation was only a Communist Party in name and not 
much impact was made on the political scene. The group 
was later associated with the "Lagos Marxist" which 
formed The League in February 1951.
Formed as a result of the momentary fusion of two 
existing Marxist groups in Lagos (Eze and Ikoku/Ogunsheye 
factions), The League emerged to "initiate, direct and 
guide the building of a many-sided and nation-wide 
working class movement on the basis of Marxism"/' This 
was the first time, and perhaps the last, when the
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Marxists were united. By early 1952, Ikoku/Ogunsheye 
group had formed another group called the Committee for 
People's Independence. This was later changed to Peoples 
Committee for Independence in February 1952.
The League within its short span however made some 
impact. Comprising of eighteen comrades, The League's 
activities were threefold:
(a) "To disseminate Marxist thought throughout the 
country";
(b) "To initiate purely Marxist ideas through trade 
unions, political and other organisations"; and,
(c) "To formulate policies for the individual of the 
Marxist organisations (i.e. trade unions, political 
parties, peasants, youths, women, student and ex- 
servicemen's organisations)".7
The League met once a week to discuss the ideological 
education of members. At every meeting an aspect of 
Marxism was discussed, to be followed by a discussion on 
a topic of the day in order to train comrades to apply 
their knowledge.
As time went by, however, it was realised that 
justice could not be done to the study of marxism in the 
ordinary meetings. A number of special meetings were
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therefore arranged (mostly secretly). Topics dealt with 
covered both local and international issues. Emphasis was 
placed upon:
(a) "Marxism as a scientific approach to the study of 
human society";
(b) "Social development and the laws that govern it";
(c) "The nature of capitalist society";
(d) "Imperialism";
(e) "The post-war tactics of imperialism";
(f) "Marxist tactics (general - in the trade unions, 
reactionary parliaments, compromise, etc);
(g) "The dangers of overseas capital with special 
reference to Nigerian Government policy;
(h) "The Persian oil dispute";
(i) "The local political scene (from time to time)"; and, 
(j) "The constitution".8
While it is difficult to assess the success of these 
programmes, one can say that it marked an improvement on 
Marxists' efforts to make an impact on the political 
economy of the colonial state during the 50s. By early 
1953 however, The League had died, primarily because of 
personality clashes amongst its leaders. Those who left 
(Agwuna, Ogunsheye, Nzimiro, Ikoku, etc) formed the 
Peoples Committee for Independence, which I will discuss 
shortly.
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There also emerged a few months after The League in 
1951, a group called the Nigeria Convention Peoples 
Party. This was not a political party but another 
splinter Marxist group formed by Eze's former cronies. 
One of its leading members was Ikoro, a former close 
associate of Eze. This group was more inclined towards 
the Gold Coast CPP and made fruitless efforts to garner 
financial supports from it.9
As in the case of previously organised groups, one 
of the main reasons for its formation was the personality 
clashes that existed among Nigerian Marxists since the 
failure of the December 1950 labour strike. The group 
nonetheless preached "scientific socialism to the masses 
in the village, workers in the factory, unemployed ex- 
servicemen, youths, and progressive intellectuals".1" 
With inspiration from Palme Dutt's "Britain's Crisis of 
the Empire", its leader, Ikoro published a pamphlet 
titled "Imperialism versus the People", where he 
castigated British rule in Nigeria and warned Nigerian 
Marxists that theory alone will not win socialism for 
Africans".11 Interestingly, unlike other groups, the 
Nigeria CPP openly stated its willingness to accept 
directives from the CPGB concerning it activities in 
Nigeria.
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Perhaps the most formidable group that emerged out 
of Eze's debacle was the Peoples Committee for 
Independence, formed in February 1952. With its office in 
Yaba, a Lagos suburb, the new group set an ultimate 
objective of building a mass and united nationalist 
movement. Its aim was to conquer political power and 
establish a socialist society. This involved "waging of 
an uncompromising battle against British imperialism and 
the reactionary forces within the ranks of our 
countrymen" . i3
To this end, they maintained that Marxism is a guide to 
action which embodies the experiences of common people 
all over the world in the struggle for national 
independence. Thus, Marxism to them is "open to 
adaptation and should not be seen as a set of ready-made 
rules".14 Like previous groups they emphasised 
ideological education, the use of trade unions, and 
unity, as important in the struggle.
At a meeting on May 7th 1952, executive members of 
the Peoples Committee for Independence (Ikoku, Ogunsheye, 
Gogo Nzeribe, D. Fatogun, J. Onwugbuzie) made an 
important stride in the political field. They agreed to 
form a nation-wide Marxist-Leninist political party which 
would unify all existing pseudo-Marxist groups. 15 Their 
un-doing perhaps was the criticism of other Marxist
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groups and the presentation of themselves as saints, 
which fell short of CPGB officials' expectations.
Some members of the Peoples Committee for 
Independence were also involved in the formation of 
another group in July 1952 called, United Working 
People's Party. At first, its secretary was Ogunsheye, 
who was replaced by Uche Omo, upon the former's 
appointment in the Labour Department in late 1952 . 16 It 
comprised of some "returnees" such as Anozie, Anagbogu 
and Onwugbuzie to mention a few. This group distanced 
themselves from the main political parties maintaining 
that Communism had remained elusive because of the 
domineering position of the bourgeoisie.17
In the absence of adequate information (even from 
the CPGB and British TUC archives) it is difficult to 
assess the strength and influence of the U.W.P.P. It is, 
however, clear that the group was confined to the Eastern 
Region. By 1955, they had changed their anti-party 
position by openly working in alliance with the Action 
Group and the U.N.I.P. (Chike Obi's party - a break-away 
from the N.C.N.C).18
In September 1955, the U.W.P.P. and U.N.I.P. made 
futile attempts to disrupt activities of the Azikiwe led
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N.C.N.C. government in the Eastern Region. A joint 
statement calling for an army to fight "the combined 
forms of imperialism and reactionary leadership of the 
N.C.N.C." was issued in Enugu. l9 There is no indication 
that the Action Group was involved in this.20 When most 
of its leading members joined the main political parties 
or became employed by government departments, the 
U.W.P.P. died naturally before the end of 1955.
(5.3) IKOKU AND "THE NIGERIAN SOCIALIST REVIEW" :
One of the most prolific Marxists during the 50s was 
Samuel Ikoku. One of Eze's followers, Ikoku soon broke 
along with others to form the Peoples Committee for 
Independence and later the United Working Peoples Party, 
both in 1952. In his various correspondence with CPGB and 
WFTU leaders, he emphasised the need for a sustainable 
press through which Marxist ideas could be propagated.21 
It has to be noted that Ikoku was a joint editor of the 
Labour Champion, established in 1950. The collapse of the 
Labour Champion was disappointing to Ikoku, who put the 
blame on Eze and Ezumah.
With support from CPGB and the WFTU, Ikoku began the 
publication of another newspaper in February 1952 called, 
Nigerian Socialist Review/" The paper, like its 
predecessor, did not last long as government soon clamped
225
down on its editor in late 1952. The first edition was 
published on February 29th 1952. In its editorial, the 
paper called for a new party of the working class made up 
Marxist intellectuals and the poor peasant.23
"The new party", according to Ikoku, "must be the 
rallying centre of all the finest elements in the working 
class, who have direct connections with the non-Party 
organisations of the working class and frequently lead 
them"/" By non-party organisations, he was referring to 
U.W.P.P. and P.C.I. , Marxist groups of which he was a 
member. This was in defiance of Eze's idea that Marxists 
should work within existing political parties.
The new party was to be guided strictly by the theory of 
Marxist-Leninism. He maintained that the party should 
"adopt the road of open and determined revolutionary 
struggle against imperialism and against all forces of 
exploitation and oppression. It must be an efficient and 
virile organisation on a national scale".25
There is no doubting the fact that Ikoku and other 
members of the editorial board (C.O. Mmaba and Meke 
Anagbogu) were Stalinists. Their position as shown in the 
various publication before the government clamp-down on 
them (in late 1952 and early 1953), was strictly 
Stalinist. They seemed to have imbibed the idea that,
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"there is no alternative to Stalinism in the Marx-Lenin
tradition" .26 Emphasising the need for a working class
party, Ikoku quoted Stalin to justify his position thus:
Its function is to combine the work 
of all the mass organisations of the 
proletariat (i.e. the working class) 
without exception and to direct their
activities toward a single goal, the goal of the
emancipation of
the proletariat.~
This was the first stage in the struggle. Ikoku's 
philosophy was that a new party would make the Marxists 
truly independent of the bourgeoisie. This stage was to 
lead to the second stage when a National Front would be 
formed to act as the army of the revolution.28 Successful 
completion of this stage, and the defeat of British 
imperialism, according to him, would usher in the third 
stage - completion of the democratic revolution (the 
fight for the security and guarantee of political rights 
for all) .29
Acquiring political power and concentrating it in 
the hands of the "toiling masses", was seen as the last 
stage in their revolution in Nigeria. Ikoku maintained 
that "this is the road for us to tread, this is our line 
of march". He concluded, like a true Stalinist that, "it 
is the only sure road to national independence and 
working class emancipation". Assurance of a victory was
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however placed on the need for a new party.30 In a short 
article titled "A Young Socialist at Work", C.O. Mmaba 
supported Ikoku's idea of a new party. He reiterated the 
need for unity among marxist intellectuals as a prelude 
to a successful inauguration of a working peoples party 
consisting of all existing Marxist groups. 31
When the second edition of Nigerian Socialist Review 
was published on March 14th 1952, Ikoku concentrated upon 
the workers themselves. He noted that, emancipation of 
the working class can only be achieved by the workers 
themselves. The principle, according to him, is that 
Nigerian workers must organise independent parties, 
associations and trade unions in order to propagate and 
realise the ideas of Communism.3z It was in support of 
this position that Meke Anagbogu in an article titled: 
"Unfurling the banner of Struggle for Independence and 
Socialism", remarked that "only a revolutionary mass 
movement, headed by the working class and its political 
party, can effectively and sincerely fight for 
independence and socialism not for reforms and 
capitalism" . 3j
As should be expected, the paper was outlawed in 
January 1953 under the "Unlawful Publication Ordinance 
1950". Its editor was later jailed for sedition and
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unlawful possession of some copies.34
(5.4) PERCEPTION OF THE CPGB:
In the 50s, the International Department of the CPGB 
was responsible for moulding and guiding ideological 
orientation of members and fraternities in the colonies. 
Officials such as Palme Dutt, Margot, Cox, Harry Pollitt, 
Barbara Rehumen etc, were concerned about the conflict of 
opinion among Nigerian Marxists. The International 
Department was thus charged with uniting the divided 
house in Nigeria. To this extent, the CPGB intervened in 
the Nigerian situation.
The main emphasis of the International Department 
therefore was "the need to unite all progressive elements 
claiming to be Marxists, and to speed the formation of a 
united Marxist P a r t y " . I t  must be stressed, however, 
that it refused to choose between rival Marxist groups. 
Rather, it urged them to come together, thrash out their 
differences, and formulate an agreed policy and 
programme. JD
The main reason for this line of action is that 
there had been occasions when individual Nigerians have 
returned from England and Europe claiming to have the
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backing of the Communist Movement. Such claims only- 
heightened an already tensed situation, and increased the 
gap among Nigerian Marxists. In fact, it became necessary 
for Harry Pollitt to issue a letter making it clear that 
no one returning to Nigeria had any authority to speak 
for the CPGB."'
An example was Anagbogu's claim upon his return to 
Nigeria in December 1952 that, he had secured pledges of 
"fraternal assistance from abroad", and Agggams' claim 
that he had the backing of the CPGB. 38 It should not be 
surprising therefore that the International Department 
from the early '50s onward refrained from any official 
contact, even by post. All the letters which passed to 
and fro were between individuals and were sent in the 
form of personal messages.38
However, the CPGB seemed to have supported Eze's
view about the "road to a Marxist Party" in Nigeria. To
the CPGB leadership "a Marxist can only work effectively
as a member of an organised party, which has close
relations with the working class and the peasantry, and
which seeks to win mass backing for the policy which it
pursues in the wider movement".40 They maintained that:
A Marxist party in Nigeria would aim to 
develop militant trade unionism... to 
create an alliance between the working class
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and the peasantry and to win a leading position
for the working class,
and the Marxist party in the broader 
national movement.41
Taking the situation as a whole, and bearing in mind 
all the complications of the rival Marxist groups in 
Nigeria, the CPGB evolved four guidelines throughout the 
'50s. These were:
(1) Maintain friendly contact with all Marxist groups in 
Nigeria and all individuals interested in Marxism.
(2) Refrain from official recognition of any Marxist 
group, but urge all professed Marxists to unite and reach 
a policy and programme that would speed up the formation 
of a Marxist Party.
(3) Ensure a more adequate supply of Marxist literature 
to groups and individuals, and other means of assistance 
for the regular publication of material in Nigeria.
(4) Regularly make a more thorough on-the-spot review of 
situation in Nigeria before making an official 
pronouncement.
(5.5) CONCLUSION:
Between the late 1950 and towards the end of 1960, 
Marxists intensified their activities in Nigeria. The 
momentum was however lower than in the previous years. In 
November 1960, a group of youths made largely of members
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of the Nigerian Youth Congress (of which I shall discuss 
fully in chapter seven) formed the Communist Party of 
Nigeria in Kano. Official record indicates that the idea 
was influenced and sponsored by the Communist Party of 
Great Britain. The question that readily comes to mind is 
why was the party formed in Kano?. Who are the leaders of 
this group?. Official records are silent on these. The 
little information available is that its membership list 
(which is still classified) is larger than that of the 
Communist Party of Nigeria formed earlier at Ibadan in 
1951. Interestingly, its Constitution was based on the 
1945 Constitution of the Chinese Communist Party.4" 
However whether it received financial sponsorship and 
political directives from the Chinese Communist Party is 
not yet clear as official record is silenced about these. 
The only available evidence is that financial supports 
came from Egypt and Ghana, perhaps for nationalistic 
purposes rather than in the furtherance of Communism as 
official record would want us believe.
Another group identified by official intelligence 
report is the "Nucleus" made up of returnees from the 
Iron Curtain countries. The "Nucleus" probabaly emerged 
in late 1959 and early 1960. But because of its secretive 
nature, officials could not penetrate into its membership 
activities. The United States intelligence was of the
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view that "although small in memebers it presents a long­
term threat to security since its leaders are 
indoctrinated disciplined Communists with close relations 
with the Soviet bloc and markedly untainted by the 
corruption and venality which afflicts other pseudo- 
Communist bodies in Nigeria".43 This is the group that 
the Communists looked up to in a post-independent Nigeria 
to provide the impetus towards detaching the country from 
International Capitalism. The British and their allies 
(both Nigerians and the Western powers) did not allow the 
pendulum to swing in favour of the Nigerian Marxists as 
policy was initiated and effectively executed to counter 
the ideology of Communism during the period.
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CHAPTER SIX 
ANTI-COMMUNISM IN NIGERIA FROM THE 1940s TO 
THE LATE 1950s
(6.1) INTRODUCTION:
This chapter is about the evolution and implementation of 
an anti-communist policy in Nigeria after World War II. 
It analyses both official and non-official anti-communist 
measures from the late 1940s to independence. Anti­
communist policies evolved partly as a result of colonial 
disorder, and, the infiltration of communist literature 
into the colonies.1 Secondly, it was evolved to stall the 
formation of a nation-wide Marxist movement in Nigeria. 
The third reason was the emergence of a bipolar world 
after World War II. The threat of fascism and nazism 
during the war was replaced by that of the Soviets and 
Cominform after 1945. In other words, Russia's renewed 
interest in Africa after World War II, the emergence of 
militant nationalism, and the presence of some Marxists 
and their sympathizers were partly instrumental in the 
evolution and implementation of anti-communist policies 
in Nigeria, as elsewhere, in British colonies.2 One might
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add that it was also aimed at satisfying British Allies, 
particularly the United States of America, as part of the 
Cold War efforts.
Dunbabin is right when he writes that, "communism 
was perceived as a major threat during the two postwar 
decades within which decolonization was concentrated". 5 
He notes further that, "the enlistment against it of 
local nationalism was regarded as an important counter 
not only by the United States but also by Britain".4 I 
should add that at the local level, anti-communism became 
an instrument used by many folks (officials and leading 
politicians) to garner support for a policy or further 
other interests.
Hyam, Goldsworthy and Rathbone have separately noted 
the significance of British anti-communist policies after 
World War II. They have individually highlighted British 
documents on the subject without giving details about
Nigeria.3 My task is to complement their works and bring
anti-communism to the forefront of studies about British
decolonization in Nigeria.
(6.2) THE BACKGROUND: EVOLUTION AND POLITICS :
Although available evidence seems to suggest that
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there was no unified opinion between the Colonial and 
Foreign Offices, and Administering Officers in the 
colonies, on how to curtail communism, they all 
recognized the danger of communists taking over the 
colonies.6 As early as 1947 an anti-communist publicity 
committee, with members drawn from both the Colonial and 
Foreign Offices, had been set up. At its meeting on 
December 30th 1947, members noted "His Majesty's 
Government's use of the Third Force to counter communist 
propaganda in Europe as a right step in the right 
direction".1
In a letter, C.F.A. Warner, Regional Information 
Officer in West Africa, suggested to K.W. Blackburne, the 
Director of Information in the Colonial Office, London, 
that, "the Third Force could be effectively used in West 
Africa in view of the growing communist threats".3 
Trafford Smith, an Assistant Secretary in the Colonial 
Office (1945-1950) and Rees-Williams (later Lord Ogmore), 
a Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State (1950), noted 
however, that, "as at the end of 1948 there was no policy 
towards containing communism in the colonies".^
Trafford Smith and Rees-Williams identified five 
reasons for this. These are:
(1) "some believed that the best policy against communism
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was to appoint information officers to conduct counter­
propaganda ;
(2) some believed in an outright ban on communist 
literature;
(3) some advocated the introduction of education against 
communism;
(4) some believed that the issue should not be over-blown 
stating that there was nothing to fear; and,
(5) some believed that incorporating the nationalists 
into colonial administration, and the labour leaders into 
I.C.F.T.U. and T.U.C. would influence a pro-Western 
labour/nationalist group in the colonies".10
To the Labour Government's Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs, Ernest Bevin, the whole approach to 
communism was that of defence and security.11 In his 
contribution on how to curtail the menace in the 
colonies, he suggested "a Colonial Office conference as 
soon as possible so that decisions could be taken and 
orders given to colonial governors on how to curtail 
communism in the colonies".12
The Foreign Secretary's view only reinforced earlier 
efforts of the Secretary of State for Colonies. In 
October 1948, Creech Jones held a meeting with senior 
officials in the Colonial Office. During the meeting he 
reiterated the anxiety of the Prime Minister and the 
Foreign Secretary on the danger of communism infiltrating 
the colonies and the need for the Colonial Office to give 
general guidelines on how to curtail it.lj
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The CO had always taken the initiative on the 
communist menace. Earlier in August 1948 for instance, 
the Secretary of State for the Colonies sent a circular 
to Administering Officers in colonies on the need to 
review police and security forces in relation to 
communist infiltration.14 He maintained that colonial 
police, intelligence units and the Special Branch should 
be strengthened in line with the "metropolitan countries 
and the methods which have been developed there".13 On 
August 20th 1948, a Police Adviser to the Secretary of 
State for the Colonies was appointed to advise on general 
police matters, the organization of security and 
intelligence services, especially Special Branch work in 
colonial police forces.16
Creech Jones, however, warned that "the Special 
Branch should not be treated as an elite group, rather 
Administering Officers should seek the assistance of 
defence security officers (where they exist), other 
police sources, provincial/district officers and any 
other unofficial persons, whom governments may be 
accustomed to look for reliable information as to the 
state of public feeling".17 In order words, the two 
streams (police and political) were seen as valuable 
cross checks on one another in the maintenance of peace 
and order. The Administering Officers' response was swift
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and quick. In Nigeria, for instance, Governor Macpherson
noted that his government had taken necessary measures,
since July 15th 1948, to control disorder and communist
infiltration. According to him:
... new intelligence organization 
which includes the expansion of 
the Special Branch of the police; 
the appointment of an administrative 
officer and a police officer in each 
region who devote all their time to 
intelligence work and corresponding 
direct with the Central Intelligence 
Committee in Lagos at which repre­
sentatives of the Administration,
Police and the Military meet every
week, and more often when necessary, to
collate and review the intelligence 
• • 18 reports coming in.
By late 1948, officials in the Colonial and Foreign 
Offices had agreed on the need for collation of political 
intelligence reports from the colonies, so that action 
could be taken on different situations as they presented 
themselves.19 It was concluded that action should be 
taken to:
(a) "establish in colonial territories civil and military 
organizations capable of dealing with any foreseeable 
emergency;
(b) improve the machinery in the Colonial Office for the 
collation of security and political intelligence;
(c) formulate positive and constructive policies against 
communism in all its manifestations and to give colonies 
the lead;
(d) ensure that the public in the colonies were educated 
to appreciate the nature of communism and steps which
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were being taken to counter it".
This involved:
(i) "improvement and extension of broadcast propaganda;
(ii) building up of information services;
(iii)use of the press; and
(iv)control of newspapers and other literature"."3
Three main objectives thus emerged: "to secure our
people against aggression; to sustain a foreign policy 
dominated by global resistance to the onrush of communist 
influence; and to achieve the most rapid development 
practicable of our overseas possessions"."* And as A.V. 
Alexander (Labour Minister of Defence-1949) put it, 
"without such colonial development there can be no major 
improvement in the standard of living of our people at 
home"."3 Simply put, if nationalist and labour movements 
are controlled there will be peace and harmony, the 
bedrock of effective exploitation of colonial resources 
by the metropole. Communist exploitation of colonial 
disorder on the other hand aimed at disrupting the 
colonial economy.
Between late 1949 and 1950, the Colonial and Foreign 
Offices took further steps toward curtailing communism in 
the colonies. The training of colonial and home staff was 
uppermost during this period. The CO cooperated with the
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FO in organizing international conferences for junior and 
senior staff involved in colonial and foreign 
administration. The Information and Research Department 
of the Foreign Office was most useful in this regard.23
The IRD staff documented activities and scope of 
communism in Africa and played a major role in the 
training of officials in England. Ralph Murray, the head 
of the IRD, gave the first lecture on security and other 
matters at the conference on May 23rd 1950, during which 
he explained how to manage communist propaganda in the 
colonies.24 A similar conference was organised for labour 
officers in London to enable them to handle the growing 
communist infiltration of the labour sector. As will be 
stressed later, the Labour Department between the late 
1940s and 1960, left no stone unturned in its efforts at 
building sound industrial relations between employers and 
employees, either in government or private 
establishments. 35
Another step taken was the encouragement of defence 
discussions for colonial officials on leave in London. 
Although such meetings were voluntary, it should be 
pointed out that the CO got nominations for the meetings 
at the rate of twenty-five and thirty for three 
discussions annually. This was quite large, given the
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fact that not many officials would normally want to 
engage in any official matter during vacations.
An official noted that "we think not only that this 
is as much as we can conveniently handle, but also that 
it provides a very suitable cross section of the colonial 
service".26 One advantage of such meetings was that 
experiences were shared by officials from different parts 
of the British Empire. Such experiences were later 
adapted to local situations which, perhaps, aided the 
success of measures taken in most of the colonies before 
independence.
Two general training courses were organised for 
colonial administrative staff. The first course lasted 
about a year at Oxford, Cambridge or London University, 
and was for newly selected officers who had not yet taken 
up their appointments in the colonies.2' I must mention 
that this was not soley about Communism however. The 
second course was taken by officers who had spent three 
or four years in the colonies, and lasted two or three 
terms.3" The first course started in 1950 and it included 
a "summer school" at Cambridge between August 8th and 
17th for all the officers. The second course also started 
with a "summer school" in September in Cambridge. 
Lectures and discussions focused more on communism and
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anti-communism. O.H. Morris, the CO representative for 
the courses liaised with the FO on suitable speakers for 
the occasion. The Colonial Service Clubs at Oxford, 
Cambridge and London, also organized occasional talks on 
the communist question."5
Despite the defeat of the Labour Party in the 1951
elections, the Conservative Party that assumed power
pursued anti-communist goals similar to those of the
Labour Party. The Conservative government set up a
committee of enquiry in October 1952, to look into
overseas information services with a view to assessing
their potential. The committee was also charged with
assessing the possible roles of the Colonial and Foreign
Offices, the Commonwealth Relations Office, the British
Broadcasting Corporation, and the British Council in an
anti-communist crusade.3" The committee members viewed
their objectives as important and were prepared to work
out modes of operation with officials in the colonies. As
they noted in their recommendation in November 1953:
It is vitally important to maintain our 
ties with the colonies at a time when 
they are advancing so rapidly towards 
self-government and are becoming 
increasingly threatened by communism.31
The committee recommended that four information offices 
should be established in Nigeria, the Gold Coast, East
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Africa and the West Indies which cost Her Majesty's 
Government £60,000. Although there was debate as to whose 
vote should be used, the government could not afford to 
allow such discussion to delay the realisation of a firm 
and realistic policy.32
(6.3) FROM MACPHERSON TO BALEWA: 1948 to Late 1950s :
The effect of various correspondence, discussions 
and meetings was the overhaul of security intelligence 
arrangements for the colonies. In West Africa, a liaison 
officer was stationed in Accra to coordinate security and 
intelligence reports for the region. And, by May 1948, a 
Political Intelligence network had been set up in Nigeria 
to facilitate the work of the Special Branch and Central 
Intelligence Committee.33 Marika Sherwood notes that: 
"The quality of surveillance was improved in the colonies 
from mid-1948, without any pressure from the FO" . She 
maintains that, "in the very first fortnightly report on 
communism it is stated that 'senior members of the Secret 
Service from the UK on a recent visit put the Special 
Branch work on a more efficient basis: officers will be 
going to the UK for training soon'".34
That aside, intensification of security measures in 
Nigeria might have been influenced by some local
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newspaper editorials. An example was the Daily Times
editorial of November 11th, 1948. In response to the
growing threat of communism in Nigerian affairs, the
editor stated that:
. . . the fact cannot be denied that some 
communist minded people are working hard 
behind the scene to infuse communist 
ideas into the youths and exploit the latter'
ignorance to their selfish ends....33
The paper suggested that, the Nigerian Government must do 
something to arrest the situation. As the editorial 
stated, "Government should now see the writing on the 
wall, and be alive to its duty in respect of this. No 
measure can be considered too strict to rid the country 
of this threat".36
One of the first steps was to sanitize the civil 
service and prepare it for the task ahead. Africanisation 
aimed at increasing African participation in both local 
and central government. This could be said to be "the 
best defence against communism" as well as "the best 
chance of getting future African states to remain in the 
Commonwealth".37 Towards achieving this goal the colonial 
administration in Nigeria set up the Foot Commission in 
1948 to work out ways of increasing the number of 
Nigerians in the senior level of the public service. This
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perhaps was the first step in pacifying the nationalists, 
an indication that Britain was willing to reform.
However, we should note that this did not involve 
losing control. As Williams noted with reference to 
Nigeria: "Through their control of the political process
of decolonization, the British promoted class and power 
relations which would ensure the continued domination of 
Nigeria by international capitalism".3'1 He concludes 
that, "while new opportunities for political, 
administrative, and commercial activities were opened up 
for Nigerians, the British moved with severity against 
radical nationalists and trade unionists".39
And concerning the overhaul of security and 
intelligence, the Attorney General, Sir Gerald Howe (who 
later chaired the All-Nigerian Constitutional conference 
in 1950), laid a Bill before the Legislative Council on 
December 31st 1949, in order to amend previous laws on 
disorder and emergencies.40 After some deliberations, the 
Nigerian Legislative Council passed the Criminal Code 
Ordinance in 1950.
The Criminal Code stated that, "any person who by 
any means whatever, causes, or attempts to cause, or does 
any act calculated to cause disaffection amongst persons
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serving as members of His Majesty's forces, police 
officers or prison officers, or does any act calculated 
to induce any person serving as aforesaid to withhold his 
services or to commit breaches of discipline, shall be 
liable on conviction to imprisonment for a term not 
exceeding three years or to a fine not exceeding £3 00, or 
to both".-11 It was stressed that "if a police officer or 
prison officer defected, he shall forfeit all pension 
rights and be disqualified from being a police or prison 
officer".42 The Criminal Code of 1950, which was 
primarily a response to the Zikists1 call for defection 
from the police and army, made adequate provision for the 
punishment of persons, attempting to undermine the 
discipline and loyalty of the armed forces or of 
police/prison officers. Needless to say the Act had the 
support of the Secretary of State for the Colonies. 43
Sir John Macpherson, the Governor (later Governor- 
General, 1948-1955), unlike Arthur Richards before him, 
was willing to carry out reforms in Nigeria. His most 
significant effort was in stemming the tide of radical 
nationalism, and putting into disarray, the Marxist 
groups. Part of his strategy was to involve the 
nationalists in evolving a constitution for the country. 
In 1949, a Select Committee of the Legislative Council 
was set up to prepare the background for the 1950 All-
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Nigerian Constitutional conference. Macpherson never hid 
his courtship of liberal nationalists. He, along with his 
officials, isolated the Marxists during the 1950 All-
Nigerian Conference, and afterwards. The conference came
up with the Macpherson constitution of 1951. While there 
are studies of the provisions of the constitution44, we 
should note that it marked the beginning of exclusion of 
the Left-Wing nationalists from participating in the 
decolonization process.
During the same period, Macpherson's government took
measures to disunite the Zikist Movement and other known
Marxist groups. The first step was to seek collaborators 
from amongst them. And the second step was to persuade 
the collaborators to preach the gospel of 
constitutionalism as the only practicable way forward. It 
is now known that British officials held secret talks 
with Azikiwe, Emejulu, Kola Balogun and Onyiocha. 42 The 
success of the secret talks was the repudiation of the 
Zikists' "Call for Revolution" by some of its officials 
and leading NCNC members.
This partly explains Azikiwe's silence which the 
young Zikists, like Nzimiro, Abdallah, Ndulue and Okoye, 
could not understand.42 As Pearce graphically put it: 
"Zik shut himself away for a day, and when he came to a
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decision it was to repudiate violence. Instead of 
visiting Moscow and Prague he went to see Cohen and 
Creech Jones".47
In addition, eminent members of the Zikist Movement 
such as Emmanuel Ojaleye, who was also the Federal 
Treasurer of the NCNC, threatened to resign from the body 
and all connected bodies of which he was a member, unless 
they reverted to more constitutional means.4" While Kola 
Balogun disassociated himself from the revolutionary 
Zikists, talks were held with Emejulu, the Secretary of 
the Railway Workers' Union, and a member of the NCNC and 
the Zikist Movement, so as to break Michael Imoudu's 
power there. All these men were prevailed upon by the 
Acting Chief Secretary, A.W.L. Savage, to follow a 
constitutional course, rather than, resort to violence.
Sir John Macpherson had always seen the courtship of 
liberals as one of the steps by which the Left-Wing could 
be dealt with. Upon his appointment in March 1948, he met 
Adio-Moses at Trafalgar House in London, to discuss how 
responsible labour union and a sound industrial relations 
could be evolved in Nigeria. Adio-Moses was previously 
the Secretary General of the Nigerian Trades Union 
Congress and was on a British TUC scholarship in England. 
As I shall point out later, he was one of the liberal
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labour leaders used by government, and the United States, 
to counter Marxists in the labour movement. Needless to 
say that the meeting between Adio-Moses and Macpherson 
was facilitated by the British TUC officials which 
regarded him as a trusted labour leader of the liberal 
school.50
The most discernible effort of the communists in 
Nigeria was the distribution of thousands of propaganda 
pamphlets. At the initial stage the policy of the 
Nigerian government was to allow the importation and 
distribution of these publications as long as they were 
not openly seditious. This policy was as a result of the 
CO suggestion that if they withheld or made illegal the 
distribution of such literature, local people would 
develop an abnormal interest in such information. 
However, all shipments and materials making seditious 
attacks upon the governing power were scrutinized and 
confiscated at the port, presumably by the joint task 
force of the men of the customs and excise and the 
Special Branch, without public knowledge. An example of 
this was when they took possession of a large air 
shipment of World Federation of Trade Union pamphlets at 
Lagos airport in mid-1953.51
Another measure was to counter communist or
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"near-communist" literature by "utilising information 
derived" from such literature, "to bring the truth to the 
educated few and through them to the illiterate 
masses".53 Macpherson, along with his political officers 
and the police, felt that among the best methods of 
combating communist propaganda was to counter it with 
publications designed to belie communist material, and, 
to explain the policies of the government to the 
people.53
This, however, was not without a lead from the 
Colonial Office. Between January 1949 and July 1953, the 
Colonial Office issued many policy papers as part of 
their effort towards combating the communist menace. Such 
policy papers included: "Broadcasting in the Colonies,
1949", and, "Undesirable Publications Policy, 1952-53". 
In order to ensure that more government 
programmes/projects were publicised in the colonies, the 
"Working Party For Colonial Information Policy Committee" 
was created around 1949 in the Colonial Office, with 
F.R.A. Murray of the International Research Department of 
the Foreign Office as the Chairman. Other members were 
drawn from the Central Office of Information, the 
Commonwealth Relations Office, the Foreign Office, the 
Colonial Office and the British Broadcasting Corporation. 
The WPCIPC viewed with seriousness, the growing communist
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menace in the colonies. Its discussions focused on 
"hampering movements of undesirables", "Anti-communist 
Publicity machinery in Africa"; "Commonwealth Journalists 
to visit the colonies"; "Trade Unions and the colonies" 
etc .54
The body was significant in moulding a colonial 
broadcasting policy against communist propaganda. The aim 
of the Colonial Office, as that of the Committee, was to 
ensure that broadcasting services in the colonies 
developed "as instruments of social and educational 
advancement and that every effective opportunity will be 
taken to counter attacks upon democracy (West) by means 
of positive explanation and advocacy of its methods and 
achievements".5' A technical survey team was sent to West 
Africa early in 1949 to advise on the development of 
broadcasting services. As a result of its report, the sum 
of £295,000 was allocated to West Africa compared with 
£178,000 and £42,000 to East and Central Africa 
respectively, from the Colonial Development and Welfare 
Fund for the purpose.5'
It was made clear that, "broadcasting services are 
also seen as an effective service under public control 
with its unique powers operating against 
misrepresentation and rumour".57 The Colonial Office
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prejudice the success of its primary task of explaining 
government to the people.61 The Public Relations 
Department accordingly stimulated anti-communist 
propaganda through unofficial channels, such as the 
Nigerian Bureau of Publicity which published a pamphlet 
on Korea, and encouraged Nigerian politicians and 
businessmen to establish a 'Freedom Bookshop'. 02
It was in the light of pro-government propaganda 
that the "Third Force" became important. From the late 
1940s onwards, the Moral Re-armament Movement made its 
impact in the anti-communist politics of West Africa. 
Founded at about 1922 by a United States citizen, Frank 
Buchman, in Hartford, Connecticut, as a protestant group, 
it soon sought to deepen the spiritual life of its 
members by preaching the gospel of "absolute honesty, 
love, harmony, change and non-violence". In fact, as far 
back as 1938, Frank had called for a programme of "moral 
and spiritual re-armament" to address the root causes of 
conflict, and work towards a "hate-free, fear-free, 
greed-free world".
At the end of the World War II, it became one of the 
"Third Force" used in disseminating anti-communist ideas. 
By 1949 it had succeeded in winning the heart of eminent 
nationalists such as Nnamdi Azikiwe, Matthew Mbu,
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Emmanuel Emejulu, Zudonu etc. Apart from its activities 
among nationalist and labour groups, the MRM also 
concentrated its efforts on the youth in secondary 
schools and colleges throughout the country. Its 
activities also involved attempts to bridge the gap 
between the various ethnic groups in Nigeria. 'Ji
Padmore noted that Moral Re-armament Movement 
emerged as the most formidable challenger to the 
communists after World War II. "Because of its financial 
resources and its lavish entertainment and seductive 
propaganda", he wrote, "M.R.A. is the only organization 
active among coloured colonials in Britain which has been 
able to make headway against communist infiltration in 
Africa".64 For instance, Moral Re-armament's Task Force 
tour of West Africa in 1953 yielded fruits in the battle 
for the hearts and souls of colonial peoples. Many 
leading nationalists, labour leaders and traditional 
chiefs in the Gold Coast and Nigeria became members.
By 1954 an All-Nigerian Moral Re-armament Movement 
had been formed, with the "objective of combating 
communism and save Africa (Nigeria) for the West".65 And 
by 1959 leading pro-Western labour leaders had remarked 
that the MRM was supportive in their battle against the 
few Communists. In the words of Egwunwoke, "Moral Re-
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armament has given us sound moral and spiritual 
leadership which communism can never give us". He 
concludes that: "There is no stronger foundation on which
a united labour union movement can be built than MRA".Dt:
The Conference of West African Governors was also 
concerned about the communist menace, and put up its view 
on how it could be curtailed. Between January 23rd and 
24th 1951, the West African Governors meeting in Accra 
noted increased communist activities particularly in 
Nigeria and the Gold Coast.6 The Governors emphasised 
the importance of counter-propaganda being "positive" 
rather than "negative". "Counter-propaganda", according 
to the Governors, "should emphasise the advantages 
presented to Africa by the opportunities of 
constitutional advance". "The aim", it seems, "was to 
immunise West Africans from a disease, not to cure them 
of a disease from which they were not yet suffering". 60 
W.H. Ingram noted that in view of the recurrent Soviet 
interest in Nigeria in particular, the Colonial Office, 
with the approval of the Treasury, had approved an 
unspecified amount for counter-propaganda in Nigeria and 
the Gold Coast.69
An unspecified amount was reportedly given to the 
"Friends of Freedom" which handled the publishing of
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counter-propagandist documents, as well as organised 
discussion groups in the colonies. In collaboration with 
the Public Relations Department, the British Council, 
"The Friends of Freedom", and the Moral Re-armament 
Movement showed films in many parts of the country. Such 
films were laden with Western views on self-government 
and freedom. The most important one was a film titled 
"Freedom" showed in about 1956.70
Another agent in this regard is the British Council. 
The British Council, founded in 1934, provided a wider 
knowledge of British culture. 1 It was financed by the 
government to teach English abroad; develop the teaching 
of science and to maintain libraries and information 
centres. Its office was opened in Lagos in 1943 to 
propagate British culture amongst Nigerians. With the 
onset of the Cold War, it became one of the "agents" of 
the Public Relations Department in its initiatives in 
disseminating governments' programmes in Nigeria. As 
Royle notes: "In Africa, not only was it considered a
useful means of furthering knowledge about democratic 
institutions and creating cultural bonds with Britain, 
but also of countering Communist propaganda".72
Also worthy of mentioning is the University of 
Oxford Delegacy of Extra-Mural Studies under Thomas
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Hodgkin. Conham, a former Senior District Commissioner in 
the Gold Coast noted that:
... Thomas Hodgkins... introduced a 
group of people who had a profound 
influence on assisting the transfer of power in
Ghana by setting up the Extra- Mural activities,
holding lectures and discussions, many of which
were about the way in which democracy worked,
and of course with particular reference to what
we have been calling the Westminster 
Model.73
Needless to say that the group also worked in Nigeria 
alongside the British TUC and the British Council. In 
fact, it had a representative on the TUC Educational and 
Colonial Advisory Committees. /4
J .A . Lean (a member of the group, and, its 
representative on TUC Educational and Colonial Advisory 
Committee), visited Nigeria on behalf of the group in 
July 1948, to assess its activities. He noted that, 
attendance at the groups lectures and meetings varies 
from 14 and 500 peoples. Lectures were given on topics 
such as: Economic History and Problems; Political Theory 
and World Affairs; The Place of Colonies in the Modern 
World; Democracy and Communism in the Modern World; The 
Liberal World Outlook etc.75 While it is difficult to 
assess the number of "converts", the group, nonetheless, 
contributed towards efforts at improving the knowledge of 
the colonial people about world politics.
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Saburi Biobaku (one of the first generation of 
Nigerian academic historians) has narrated the role of 
another group used by the Public Relations Department in 
the 1950s. These were the Schofields. It is not clear 
whether they were members of the "Friends of Freedom" or, 
indeed, the main organisers. Giving their role as 
narrated by Biobaku, one can assume that the Schofields 
might have been close to the latter group. They 
collaborated with the British Council to organise public 
lectures and debates in Lagos and its environs, and 
possibly in Enugu and Kaduna. They also operated a mobile 
library where books were made available for Nigerians 
interested in reading for general knowledge. The volume 
and perceptibility of these books is not known. However, 
one can suggest that they might have been books sponsored 
by the government. 76
It seems to me therefore, that government might have 
been keeping in line with Ingram's remark in 1952 that, 
"the most important thing was the provision of 'positive' 
literature describing the Western way of life and British 
institutions etc, for general use. The briefing of 
officials came next, and definitely anti-communist 
literature for general use was last".7.
As part of measures against Communist penetration
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the colonial government initiated a total ban on overt 
communist literature, considered to be insensitive to 
governments' activities. Some senior officials maintained 
that "there is every justification for banning the 
productions of overt enemy organisations such as the 
WFTU".7" In fact, the Secretary of State for the Colonies 
gave a blanket approval to Administering Officers in the 
colonies to take appropriate action towards communism, 
even if it meant outright banning.79
With the pronouncement of the Macpherson 
constitution in 1951, a diarchy was introduced into 
Nigeria. Henceforth, British and Nigerian politicians 
cooperated in the administration of Britain's largest 
colony in Africa.''1 It should be stressed that emergent 
Nigerian administrators and politicians in central and 
regional governments were men of constitutional and 
pragmatic ideas. They were the backbone of British anti­
communist measures.
At the beginning of 1953, the Nigerian government 
set up the "Central Co-ordinating Committee" to look into 
the problem of communism. Its members included 
Shillingford (Acting Inspector of General Education), 
Macdonald (Acting Inspector General of Police), Stocker 
(Acting Public Relations Officer), and Mr. Justice
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Jibowu, the senior Puisne Judge. The committee generated 
advice on how to curtail communism within Nigeria. On 
April 8th 1953, at its fourth meeting, the committee 
noted that the volume, nature and effect of communist 
propaganda entering Nigeria demanded a more restrictive 
policy than before.
Government was advised to contemplate selective 
banning combined with blanket banning of the publications 
of particular organisations such as the W.F.T.U.01 It 
also recommended an increase in Special Branch staff to 
carry out searches.'2 The Nigerian Council of Ministers 
at its July 1953 meeting, approved the recommendations of 
the Central Coordinating Committee. It further noted that 
Nigerian Government policy not to ban the importation of 
communist literature should be revised. In this regard it 
recommended that, a committee should be set up to advise 
the Governor of the Federation (as he then was) on 
publications that should be banned.83
From May 19 53 onwards the government seems to have 
been successful in its use of the print media at 
containing communism. The government successfully used 
the Daily and Sunday Times, and, the Gaskiya Corporation 
for disseminating its programmes to the people. The 
Nigerian Broadcasting Service also supported government
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in this regard. The NBS, like other government-owned
media, was used to counter "lies and misinterpretations
of government plans".'4 There was encouragement from the
Colonial Office too. S.H. Evans, head of the Information
Department at the Colonial Office advised:
... the governor, senior members of the 
administration and responsible 
politicians to make very frequent public statements
and speeches expressing the views for which
currency is required.85
In pursuit of its selective banning of communist 
literature into the country, the government banned a 
total of thirty-three books, pamphlets and other 
publications carrying communist propaganda in early 1955. 
Also in 1955, the government distributed either free of 
charge, or at a very low prices, over half a million 
informational and propaganda publications designed to 
counter communist propaganda.
This material ranged from strong anti-communist 
materials produced by the government in the United 
Kingdom, to straight forward informational booklets 
concerning the British administration in Nigeria. Topics 
covered included the Council of Ministers, the history of 
British administration in Nigeria and elsewhere; the 
operation of various Government departments; the 
functions of development and welfare bodies; the
operation of Marketing Boards etc.'
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Another aspect of anti-communism was the review of 
passport and immigration ordinances in order to prevent 
notable radicals and communists from entering or leaving 
the country. The activities of Eze and his cohorts made 
it important to control the issuing of passports to 
Nigerians. Beginning in 1949 the government amended the 
1945 immigration ordinance to suit its anti-communist 
objectives. The most significant aspect of the 1949 
Immigration Amendment Ordinance was Section 11(2)[c] and 
[d] and Section 12. Section 11(2)[c] stated that "any 
person who from official government records, or from 
information officially received by the Governor from a 
Secretary of State, or from the Officer Administering the 
Government of any British colony or protectorate....is 
decided by the Governor to be undesirable, will be 
prevented from entering the country". Section 12 further 
emphasised the absolute power of the Governor. It read 
thus :
Notwithstanding anything in this 
ordinance contained, the Governor 
may, in his absolute discretion, 
prohibit the entry into Nigeria 
of any person, not being native 
of Nigeria. 88
This particular section was used to prevent known
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communists, or those the government believed might
constitute a threat to the peace and order of the
country, from entering Nigeria." On September 4th 1950,
the government further amended its policy on immigration
to include immigrants and visitors. This effort was aimed
at reducing, the number of communists into the country.
The Immigration Policy of 1950 stated that:
. . . intending immigrants or visitors will 
have to be acceptable from the security 
aspect... no citizen of a communist or 
communist dominated state, and no known 
or suspected communist should be led to 
suppose that he will be granted an entry 
permit unless prior approval has been 
obtained from this Government.90
The government was strict on immigration policy. For 
instance, Basil Davidson who had organised various 
marxist meetings among colonial students in London was 
not permitted to enter Nigeria in late 1950.91 Also, 
Abdoulaye Diallo of the WFTU was prevented from entering 
Nigeria in 1951, to consult with Eze and others, under 
this Ordinance. Eze had earlier being declared "an unfit 
British protected person to secure a British passport" by 
the government, presumably under the ordinance.
Another case was the prevention of a Canadian 
citizen, Daniel Halperin, to take appointment on the 
staff of the ZIK Press Ltd in July 1950. Whether or not
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Azikiwe was aware about Halperin's membership of the 
Canadian Communist Party is yet to be ascertained. One 
can only proffer that he must have yielded to government 
pressure that Halperin was "most undesirable on the staff 
of the Zik's Press Ltd". It was basis that he was 
declared "a prohibited immigrant by the Governor". It 
was also under this Ordinance that members of the 
communist sponsored organisation, Union des Populations 
du Camerounais (UPC), were prevented from entering the 
country on many occasions.'4 In fact, its deputy leader, 
Ernest Quandie, was placed under police surveillance, 
while in transit in Lagos in May 1959.
The colonial government was quite successful in 
implementing this policy. This is further reflected by a 
United States consular intelligence report for 1953, 
which states that "present procedures of the Nigerian 
Government of controlling the movement of Nigerians to 
the countries of the iron curtain are quite strict".96 
With the full support of the Council of Ministers, the 
immigration and passport control authorities began, in 
late 1953 and from early 1954 onwards, to endorse all 
passports in such a way that made them invalid for 
travel to Iron Curtain countries.
A stricter policy was also imposed on the issuing of
271
passports to Nigerians, none being issued to those known 
to be planning attendance at communist-inspired 
conferences abroad, or for what was believed to be 
communist-inspired reasons. The colonial authorities were 
assisted in carrying out this policy by a policy of 
refusing to make known reasons for the rejection of a 
particular passport application.9. As the Federal 
Intelligence Committee noted in 1958: "a solution was
proffered which will prevent the 'red-followers' from 
embarking on a journey to the Iron Curtain ...". 98
Apart from preventing Nigerians from seeking 
educational advancement in the Iron Curtain countries, 
the colonial government was also apprehensive of 
scholarships from radical Muslim universities such as the 
King Farouk of Egypt scholarship to Nigerians, tenable at 
Al-Azhar University, Cairo.09 Official rejection of King 
Farouk's scholarship showed that, resistance to communism 
was not really different from other foreign radical 
ideas, such as fanatic Islamic groups or Nasserism. One 
can argue that since the type of education given to the 
youth was one of the central aim of anti-communist 
policies, Britain was conscious not only about Iron 
Curtain schools but also other foreign radical schools. 
Hence, official opposition to scholarship offers tenable 
at Al-Azhar should not be surprising.
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The background to this was an official report from 
Cairo to the Colonial Office in 1947 that Al-Azhar and 
Al-Awal Universities students had evolved a "crude 
nationalism" which was not only detrimental to their 
studies but was also hostile to the relationship between 
Britain and Egypt. "The students here", wrote J.R. Cotton 
of the Foreign Office, "have acquired an unenviable 
reputation for extreme nationalism coupled with 
xenophobia and communism".i0u Hence, when Nigerian 
newspapers reported the offer of thirty scholarships to 
the Muslim Congress of Nigeria, with headquarters in 
Ijebu Ode, Western Region, Macpherson wrote to the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies that "we shall 
naturally place whatever obstacles we can in way of these 
scholarships being taken" . 101
This position was supported by the British Embassy 
in Alexandria, Egypt. As the Embassy Chancery noted in 
June 1951, "Azhari students [and] nearly all political 
agitators rely on El-Azhar for a claque and that so many 
current communist-inspired lines of propaganda, such as 
anti-colonialism, anti-imperialism, 'neutralism' etc, 
have a great appeal for this class of youth".102 On July 
16th 1951, the Colonial Office, acting on the advice of 
the Foreign Office, upheld the Nigerian government's view 
and more efforts were geared towards monitoring the few
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Nigerian students already in Egypt. ljj
There was also a direct government efforts at 
isolating Nigerian students in the UK during the 1950s 
from the communist camp. In furtherance of this, the 
government courted the Nigeria Union (UK) formed in about 
1950. The courtship was based upon Colonial Office 
assurance that the group under Obahiagbon, was only 
interested in marxism for intellectual purposes. It is, 
however, difficult to ascertain how many Nigerian were 
solely interested in marxism for intellectual purpose. 
Officials not only attended summer schools organised by 
the group in London, but "promised a more permanent 
liaison between the union, the Colonial Office and the 
new Nigeria Office".104
As part of its anti-communist effort within the 
educational sector, the Nigerian government took a step 
further by ensuring that the few communists at the 
University College, Ibadan (as well as its Extra-Mural 
Unit), were closely watched and their influence amongst 
students curtailed.102 The government, on the advice of 
the Colonial Office, adopted a policy of vetting 
appointees to teaching and technical posts at the 
University College.102 Although such vetting was contrary 
to the academic independence of the university, its
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head, Dr. Mellanby, willingly cooperated with the 
colonial administration.
At a secret meeting on September 19th 1951 at the 
Colonial Office, Macpherson and Mellanby reached an 
agreement on the recruitment of academics for UCI. It was 
agreed that recruitment would be managed by Mr. Adams of 
the Inter-University Council in London, and shortlisted 
candidates would be sent for security clearance without 
the knowledge of the College's Selection Committee 
(except that of Mellanby), before their names were 
forwarded to UCI for appointment.
As regards employment of other professionals from 
the United Kingdom, it was agreed that applications 
should be made through the Crown Agents who arranged for 
the security check. And in those rare cases where it was 
necessary to recruit a technician direct, the security 
check was carried out by Mr. Adams and Mr. Bourn of the 
Inter-University Council and the Colonial Office 
respectively. 107
So far as local recruitment was concerned, the Chief 
Secretary's clearance was necessary before appointments 
were made. A case in point was the appointment of 
Dr.Chike Obi as Lecturer Grade II in Mathematics in
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September 1951. Dr Obi was cleared by the Chief Secretary 
for appointment as a lecturer because the government was 
satisfied that his earlier contact with Nduka Eze and the 
Communist Party while in the United Kingdom, had been 
overtaken by his rather liberal tone and break-up with 
Eze and his organisation in early 1951.108 In brief, 
through the vetting system, government was able to 
monitor academic appointments in higher education 
institutions throughout the period.
(6.4) The Ban On the Employment of Communists in the 
Nigerian Public Service:
In 1950, Nigeria was placed in the "Special Category 
of front-line colonies" because "it had become a major 
object of Soviet Cold War attention".109 On May 1st 1951, 
Macpherson, in carrying forward his anti-communist 
measures, requested approval from James Griffiths, the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies, for the ban of 
communists in government employment.110 Griffiths' 
response was that the Nigerian Council of Ministers 
should deliberate on the matter.
However, it was not until May 25th 1954 that the 
Federal Council of Ministers asked for the submission of 
a paper on steps that might be taken against communist
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infiltration into the civil service and trade union 
movement. It seems that this was provoked by Dr. 
Nkrumah's speech at the Gold Coast Legislative Assembly 
on February 25th 1954 that his government would in future 
refuse to employ in certain branches of the Public 
Service persons who had proved to be active communists.1" 
These branches were the administrative, education, 
community development, labour, information services, 
police, army and the Gold Coast Commissioners' Offices 
overseas. And two years later, Nkrumah was proud to say 
that: "the infiltration by Communist agents into 'our
workers' organisations has now been completely 
checked" . 112
The background to Colonial Governments' ban on the 
employment of Communists and fellow-travellers, cannot be 
exonerated from metropolitan initiatives. Despite Labour 
Government's past relationship with the Communist Party 
and the Labour movement generally, the government was 
sincere in its anti-communist positions. I should mention 
that participants at the various Labour Party Annual 
conferences during the 1940s noted the fundamental 
differences between the Labour Party and the Communist 
Party of Great Britain. As one participant put it: "...
our Party seeks to achieve Socialism by persuasion and 
the ballot boxes in contrast to the Communist party
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doctrine of the overthrow of capitalism by armed force if 
necessary..." This partly explains the futile attempts 
to affiliate the Communist Party with the Labour Party 
during the 1946 and 1947 conferences.114
It should not be surprising therefore that the 
foundation of anti-communist policies was laid under a 
Labour government. Attlee on the floor of the House of 
Commons on March 15th 1948, announced that:
... a civil servant suspected of 
membership or association with the Communist
Party or a Fascist organisation in such a way as to
raise legitimate doubts of his reliability,
shall be summarily dismissed or 
transferred to less sensitive sector of t h e
National parastatals. 10
In an answer to a question during the debate, Attlee 
maintained that: "Experience, both in this country and
elsewhere, has shown that membership of, and other forms 
of continuing association with, the Communist Party may 
involve the acceptance by the individual of a loyalty, 
which in certain circumstances can be inimical to the 
State" .116
Although acknowledging the difficulty of reading the 
minds of men, the Prime Minister maintained that "there 
is no way of distinguishing such people from those who, 
if opportunity offered, would be prepared to endanger the
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security of the State in the interests of another 
Power".11, The policy was, however, only applicable to 
Communists and fellow-travellers. Fabian-Socialists, who 
are also influential in the Labour Party, were exempted 
from the ban. This gave the opposition (Conservatives) 
room for criticism, as they opined that Socialism is a 
transitory stage to Communism. They also criticised 
government's secret trial of suspected Communists or 
fellow-travellers maintaining that it's against 
democracy. 118
Such criticism did not stop Attlee and his cabinet 
from executing the policy. As he graphically noted: "I
say that, owing to the fact that they have a different 
loyalty, they cannot serve the State".119 And by mid-1948, 
Sir W. Smithers, representing Orpington in the House of 
Commons, had called on the government "to take effective 
steps to outlaw Communism in this country", rather than 
what he called, "fiddling about with the Civil 
Service".1"0 And at the Annual Labour Party conference in 
1948, majority of the members present supported 
government action.121
The matter was again raised on the floor of the 
House of Lords by Lord Vansittart in March 1950. In his 
address titled, "Communists in the Public Service", Lord
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Vansittart reiterated the government position and noted 
that "continuous and resolute precautions are necessary 
for public security".1"2 He was supported by Lord 
Milverton, formerly Governor of Nigeria, who noted that, 
"there is no room for Communism in the world".123 Some, 
however, were mild in their criticism of the communists. 
To the Earl of Iddlesleigh, "Communists are better left 
alone to continue their loud orations in order not to 
drive them underground" . 124
Despite their criticism of some aspects of the 
policy, the Conservative Government also pursued anti­
communist policies. Keeping Communism within bounds was 
seen as a step towards preserving democratic freedoms a 
la Westminster. In the colonies, both nationalist and 
labour leaders were expected to be wholeheartedly anti­
communist. Any suspicious act could reverse the course of 
development in the colonies as in the case of British 
Guiana in 1953. 125
As Sir T. Lloyd (Permanent Under Secretary, 1947- 
1956) noted: "Events in British Guiana have shown that
their (Communists) tactics may take the form of building 
up and practising Communism while denying that they are 
Communists, not only to the World at large but also to 
their own followers".126 He concluded that: "A small
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minority of determined Communists will do everything to 
exercise the greatest possible influence and they will 
use that influence solely for the purposes of disruption. 
This is not a remote danger, but a very near one". 127
In West Africa, nationalist governments were 
encouraged to make policies aimed at curtailing 
Communism. Like Balewa, Nkrumah also prop-up some labour 
leaders as fronts in his anti-communist crusade. He 
initiated the merger between the Gold Coast TUC and the 
Ghana TUC in order to place his supporters at an 
advantage position in the new labour union.lz8
Nkrumah however, did not succeed immediately in 
checking activities of Communists such as Woode, Ocran 
and Kumah in the new Ghana TUC that emerged.129 By early 
19 54, however, Nkrumah and his cabinet had succeeded in 
expelling known Communists such as Woode and Ocran from 
the CPP, as well as institute the vetting procedure in 
Civil Service appointments. As Rathbone rightly 
concludes, "the adoption of these apparently draconian 
measures by the CPP dominated government was only partly 
intended to reassure the Conservative government in 
London" .130
By February 18th 1954, Lyttelton, the Secretary of
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State for the Colonies informed the Cabinet at Whitehall 
that the Gold Coast government under Nkrumah had taken 
the following steps:
(1) "ban the entry of all Communist literature into 
the Gold Coast";
(2) "exclude any European with Communist sympathies 
from the public service and exclude any African with 
Communist sympathies from a certain number of Departments 
like the Administration, the police and the Department of 
Education";
(3) "confiscate the passports of the few Gold Coast 
Communists who wish to travel behind the Iron Curtain".131
In Nigeria, it was recognised that the most 
effective prophylactic against communism was the 
education of the community as to its aims and objectives. 
Communism was portrayed as being opposed to the goals of 
independence within the Commonwealth. In view of the 
communists in-road into labour unions, the Council of 
Ministers noted that the greatest danger lay within 
organized labour.13"
On October 18th 1954, both Federal and Regional 
Governments took a step further in their anti-communist 
measures when they finally resolved to place a ban on the 
employment of communists and their sympathizers in the
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public service. On October 19th 1954, J.O. Field, 
Principal Assistant Secretary of the Federation, and J.S. 
Dudding, Senior Assistant Secretary for Security and 
Defence, addressed a press conference on government 
policy on communism.1" A press statement was released, 
captioned "Council of Ministers Report"; it was published 
as "Government Notice No.1769: Statement of policy on the 
employment of communists in the public services". It read 
thus :
After careful examination of the 
situation in Nigeria and in other c o u n t r i e s  ,
particularly those in the B r i t i s h
Commonwealth... the Council of Ministers has
reached the conclusion that steps are necessary to
prevent the infiltration of active communists
into posts in the service of the country in
which divided loyalty might be dangerous 
to the interests of Nigeria. The first 
loyalty of a communist lies not to 
Nigeria, but to a foreign communist
organisation, the objective of which is t h e
political, economic and social subjugation of
Nigeria. The Governments of Nigeria are
therefore of the opinion that persons who are
indoctrinated with communism should not be
permitted to occupy posts in the service of
Government in which it is possible for them to
further the ends of the organisation to 
which they owe allegiance. It has 
therefore proved to the satisfaction of
Government that active communists will in future
not be employed in the following branches of the
Nigerian Public Services: A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ,
Education, Labour, Police, Posts and Telegraphs,
Railway, Civil Aviation, or in certain key posts
in other branches of the Public 
Services . 134
Both active Communists and their sympathizers were
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taken into consideration. Another point in the policy
statement was the remark that employers of labour should
also take steps to prevent communist penetration of the
commercial sector.1'" During this period, about ten
communists were identified as being in the public
service, while not less than two hundred were said to be
out of the public service.1"5 Some newspapers' comments
were favourable to the Governments decision. An editorial
in the Daily Service of October 16th 1954 captured the
mood of the press. It noted that:
.... Based on the past performances of 
communists in non-communist countries, 
we fully endorse the principle outlines 
in the statement, but we will add that 
other positive approaches must be made to 
combat the growth of communism. You may 
not give active communist job (sic), but 
that will not stop communism from gr owi n g.
What will stop it is to carry out social
programmes which will build an educated public
in a prosperous country and will also eradicate
social injustice. Communism thrives on ignorance
and poverty.137
To the West African Pilot, owned by Dr. Azikiwe, the 
best recipe against communism was not repression or 
persecution but rather the "application of a more 
powerful ideology which is based on moral goodness on the 
part of those who govern and those who are governed, thus 
leading ultimately to real existence of freedom of 
thought, speech or association".1" The success of
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governments (central and regional) measures cannot be 
over-emphasized. As the American consul, Herbert T. 
Krueger noted in January 1956, "The drastic decrease in 
the shipment of such propaganda, as compared to the 1953- 
early 1954 period, attests to the effectiveness of the 
ban on communist publications ...", and the employment of 
communists in the civil service.139
The effect of this policy was felt by Marxist 
leaders, both in Nigeria and the Great Britain. The 
situation was not helped by deteriorating race relation 
between CPGB leaders and Nigerian members who had 
complained about "arrogance" among the leaders. The 
Nigerian government ban on the employment of communists, 
announced in October 1954, further reduced the morale of 
some Nigerian members of the CPGB who had earlier thought 
about resigning from the body. As Adi rightly notes: "In
1954, the decline in membership was no doubt accelerated 
by an announcement by the Federal and Regional 
governments in Nigeria, that no known Communist would be 
employed in 'essential public services' or in the civil 
service" .140
Meanwhile, at its meeting of December 29th 1954, the 
Federal Council of Ministers took further action to ban 
communists from the Public Service by applying much the
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same screening methods used at the University College, 
Ibadan, since 1951, on the appointment of Nigerians and 
expatriates in the public sector.141 Azikiwe in a 
conversation with the American Consul-General, McLauglin, 
remarked that the measure had succeeded throughout the 
country and particularly in his area of control (the 
Eastern Region) . 142
In May 1955, the Eastern Region Ministry of 
Education circulated a notice to all private schools 
receiving government support to the effect that State 
funds will be withdrawn from those schools which continue 
to employ communist teachers after December 31st 1955.143 
Awolowo also confirmed that the measure had succeeded in 
the Western Region and Lagos where most of the communists 
and their sympathizers lived and worked. Unlike Azikiwe, 
he added that the governments had been over-zealous about 
the whole matter.144
(6.5) Anti-communism: Commercial Firms and Organised
Labour:
The initial and most embarrassing 
problem is that the workers are 
wont to look up to Communist and 
Communist influenced International 
Labour Organisations for material 
and financial aid... The psychological 
frailty and weakness of the average
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Nigerian worker which - virtually - are 
engendered by want, insecurity and manumission,
constitute the most fertile soil on which the
baneful doctrine Communism thrives than
ever.145
The percentage of the Nigerian working class was put 
at three percent of the total population in 1954. 
Official figures indicates that there are 152,000 trade 
union members organised in 116 trade unions. Seven of the 
unions had over 5,000 members. These are: the Nigerian 
Union of Teachers (26,000); Amalgamated Union of the 
United Africa Company Workers Union (19,000); Public 
Utility Technical and General Workers Union of Nigeria 
and the Cameroons (12,000); Nigeria African Mineworkers 
Union (11,000); Railway Workers Union (11,000); and the 
Nigerian Civil Service Union (6,000) . 146
As the figure show a majority of Nigerian workers 
were employed by the colonial government, which thus gave 
them, a key position to exercise pressure on British 
rule. To Nigerian Marxists, a trade union member should 
stand aloof in the struggle against imperialism as 
practised by the British. They seems to have imbibed the 
doctrine as laid down by the CPGB leaders. As the CPGB 
leaders noted in one of their political ideological 
classes, "Non-political trade unionism is a betrayal of 
the interests of the workers and of the national
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struggle".14' They, however, realised governments' 
determined effort to keep "trade unions subservient to 
the employers and the Government, and to keep them 
isolated from the national s t r u g g l e 14r
Having noted that the sector of the society most 
vulnerable to communism was the labour union, the 
government took three major steps in an effort to combat 
the menace. These were: the training of Labour and
Industrial Officers; the encouragement of the 
International Confederation of Trade Union (ICFTU) as 
against the World Federation of Trade Union(WFTU); and 
the encouragement of a pro-Western Labour Congress 
through the support of activists like Cole, Adebola, 
Borha, Adio-Moses, Porbeni, Labinjoh etc.
British colonial administration's efforts at guiding 
and building trade union and industrial relations in the 
colonies, however, predates East-West ideological 
differences. Lord Passfied (Sidney Webb), the Secretary 
of State for the colonies in a despatch to colonial 
governors in 1930, warned them: "... to deal with trade
unions with a spirit of tolerance and understanding". 
Regarding trade union development, he noted that: "...
there is a danger that, without sympathetic supervision 
and guidance, organisation of labourers without
experience. . . may fall under the domination of 
disaffected persons, by whom their activities may be 
diverted to improper and mischievous ends".i4j This was 
the genesis of government intervention in moulding labour 
unionism, in the colonies.
The 193 0s saw the appointment of a Labour Adviser to 
the Secretary of State, the creation of Labour 
Inspectorates (later Departments), and the appointments 
of trade union officers "to guide and train leaders in 
the art and practice of trade unionism", in the 
colonies.150 These were some of the objectives of the 
Trade Union Ordinance of 1938. During the war efforts of 
the Inspector of Labour in Nigeria, C.H. Crossdale, were 
aimed at nurturing the various unions for war needs and 
maintenance of a sound industrial relations between 
government and European employers.151 In fact, Labour and 
Welfare Officers were often sent to sensitive government 
parastatals to act as the bridge between the government 
and its employees.152
The Nigeria colonial government provided the lead by 
awarding scholarships to Nigerians to train at the 
University of London or under the British TUC. Between 
the late 1940s and 1952, eleven scholarships were awarded 
to Nigerians in this respect.133 The United States Foreign
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Leaders Grant was also made available in the training of 
some Nigerians in US colleges and universities in Labour 
and Industrial Relations. One of the first beneficiaries 
was Matthew Ayodele Tokunboh. Having benefitted from the 
government scholarship during World War II to study at 
the London School of Economics, he was selected for the 
US Leaders Grant to study Labour and Industrial Relations 
at Cornell University, Itchaca, New York. He soon rose to 
the post of a Labour Officer by late 1940s. Other 
beneficiaries included: Adio-Moses, Beyioku, Cole,
Olugbake and Porbeni . 134
Between 1950 and 1960, the Department of Extra-Mural 
Studies of the University College, Ibadan, was charged 
with providing local courses/programmes for future labour 
officers and unionist. The task was shouldered by 
Tokunboh, its first director (1950-1957). Although the 
literature used was provided by the Department of Labour, 
the British TUC, the British Council, the USIS and the 
Colonial Office, the participants at the Departmental 
conference in 1953 advised that, "courses should not 
appear to have been sponsored, arranged, or unduly 
influenced by Government".123 Also sessional lecturers 
were invited to give lectures on trade unionism and 
industrial relations. These included: Nancy Sears (LSE), 
W. Hood (British TUC), H.E. Hannah (US Trade Union
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official), G.F. McRay (Trade Union College, Kampala), and 
G. Paxton (British TUC).156
In 1957 the Department of Labour also introduced 
"Training Within Industry" (TWI) courses in job 
instructions and job relations, involving industrial 
relations, apprenticeship, training and factory 
organisation. And by 19 5 9 the Department had been 
assisted by H.A. Tulaz, of the British TUC, in 
establishing a Trade Union School in Lagos where courses 
were conducted in trade union and industrial relations.15. 
While it is difficulty to ascertain government success in 
this direction, one can say that it left no stone
unturned in its desire to build pro-western trade union.
Another agent of government in its drive towards 
creating a pro-Western trade unionists was the ICFTU. As 
early as March 1949, Roberts Curry, the Labour Adviser in 
Nigeria had written to Vincent Tewson the British TUC 
Secretary, concerning the activities of the WFTU in 
Nigeria, and the need for TUC/ICFTU initiatives. Curry
noted that: "The W.F.T.U. will now be concentrating its
energies on the backward countries and I have grave
suspicions that Nigeria is one of the fertile grounds for 
their activities". He concluded that: "The Government... 
is very concerned about the matter and I am advising
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Government on the methods to combat this menace of 
Communism from spreading its ugly head amongst these 
simple people".13'
Earlier in January 1950, J.H. Oldenboek, the General 
Secretary of the ICFTU, wrote to the Secretary of State, 
Creech Jones, to support the visit of a panel of the 
ICFTU to British territories in Central and West Africa 
later in the year.13' The primary motive was to assist in 
the development of free and democratic trade unions. At 
its executive board meeting of November 1950, it was 
resolved that the goal of ICFTU was to wrest the 
initiative from the communists and communist-led trade 
unions, to which it was prepared to devote substantial 
resources.160 This move was supported by the British Trade 
Union Congress (TUC) and labour officers in Nigeria.161 On 
November 20th 1950, Sir Vincent Tewson of the TUC wrote 
to the Secretary of State for the Colonies that the TUC 
would be holding a meeting with the ICFTU in Douala 
towards the end of January 1951, in order to prevent a 
similar plan by WFTU.16~
In view of its concern about communism in Nigeria, 
the Gold Coast, Sierra Leone and the Gambia, the British 
TUC sent a six-person delegation to these countries, 
prior to the Douala conference, to study the level of
292
communist penetration with the aim of detaching them from 
WFTU and bringing them into the orbit of the ICFTU.1'2 In 
fact, out of £250,000 raised to combat communism the 
British TUC was said to have contributed a sum of 
£100,000. 1d4 The Secretary of State for the Colonies was 
delighted about the British TUC/ICFTU initiative since it 
was difficult for government to become directly involved 
in labour matters. Accordingly Administering Officers, 
particularly in Nigeria, where Eze1s Labour Congress had 
affiliated with the WFTU, were directed to give every 
support to the delegation.165
The response from Nigeria was very swift. 
Accommodation and transport were arranged at the expense 
of the Nigerian government. In order not to create fear 
in labour circles and to disguise its anti-communist 
motive from the labour movement, the government insisted 
that publicity for the ICFTU visit would only be carried 
out by the ICFTU and not the government.166 The ICFTU/TUC 
trip from London was, however, funded by the Colonial 
Office.167 The endeavour was seen as an important 
stabilising influence on trade union movement that would 
provide valuable combat against communist infiltration 
into the movement. 108
On February 15th 1951, the ICFTU delegation arrived
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in Nigeria to propagate the aims of free democracy.These 
included:
(i)"To inform trade union groups of the purposes and aims 
of the ICFTU;
(ii)To obtain the maximum interest and support for the 
West African Trade Union Conference to be held at Douala 
between 2 6th and 2 8th February 19 51;
(iii)To endeavour to win over groups at present 
supporting the communist-controlled WFTU; and,
(iv)To inform the ICFTU on labour conditions and the 
stage of trade union development in West Africa".169
Although they had some difficulties, it seems, 
however that they succeeded in most respects in Nigeria 
and indeed other British West African colonies.17'1 The 
task of the ICFTU/TUC in anti-communism in organised 
labour was to bolster up the moderate and responsible 
elements in colonial labour unions. It was also to 
encourage the production of more leaders opposed to WFTU 
interference. The first step in this direction was the 
setting up of an Information and Advice Centre in Accra, 
which became a Regional Office of the body. 171
A second significant effort of the ICFTU during this 
period was its support for the Adio-Moses, Borha, Adebola
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and Esua group in their effort at establishing a 
pro-Western trade union. Despite Eze's attempt at 
bargaining for financial assistance as a prelude to 
withdrawing his section of the Union's affiliation with 
the WFTU, the ICFTU delegation under Fred Dailey of the 
British TUC, was only willing to assist Adio-Moses' 
group. It is not surprising that Adio-Moses, E.A. Cowan 
and A.B.O. Cole were selected to represent Nigeria at the 
Douala meeting.17*2
Adio-Moses later moved the motion at the Douala 
meeting on March 7th 1951 that the ICFTU should establish 
regional machinery for the co-ordination of trade union 
training in West and Central Africa, including the 
establishment of Trade Union Colleges, and the promotion 
of lectures. These proposals were adopted and machinery 
was set in motion to counter communist influence in 
labour movements . 173
By the end of 1951, Adio-Moses with the assistance 
of Cowan, Borha and Cole had been able to gain some 
ground within the Nigerian labour movement.174 An 'Action 
Committee' was set up under Adio-Moses through which the 
conference recommendations were carried out. The 'Action 
Committee' or 'The Council of Action' as it was variously 
referred to in the TUC record, aimed at:
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(1) Formation of a democratic national centre; and,
(2) Building up of branches along British TUC/ICFTU 
line.175
One way towards achieving these goals, was the setting up 
of Trade Union Educational Committees and mini-libraries 
at trade union secretariats in major parts of the 
country, with books supplied by the TUC.176
It should be noted that Adio-Moses had been one of 
the beneficiaries of TUC scholarships as far back as 
1947. Based on the advice of the TUC Colonial Advisory 
Committee, the General Council offered him a scholarship 
to study trade unionism and industrial relations at 
Ruskin College, Oxford. Adio had earlier benefitted from 
the TUC Educational Trust Fund which enabled him to spend 
sometime attending meetings, lectures and conferences in 
England.1'7 Needless to say that there were other 
beneficiaries from other parts of the British colonies 
during the period.
Activities of the ICFTU was felt in all parts of 
colonial Africa (and indeed in independent African 
States) during the period. Apart from its regional office 
in Accra which published Africa Labour (later Labour 
Africa Survey), conferences and lectures were organised
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from time to time, to ensure a democratic trade unionism 
on the continent. One of such conferences was the All- 
African conference on trade unionism held at Accra 
between January 14th and 18th 1956. According to the 
organisers, it was part of initiatives towards combating 
the Communist led WFTU activities in Africa.17" This was 
complemented by the opening of the Labour College at 
Kampala, Uganda, in November 1958.1/9
In addition to the offer of scholarships to colonial 
trade unionists, the TUC General Council assisted 
colonial trade union movements in the provision of 
educational facilities for their members in the form of 
Ruskin College correspondence courses. These were made 
available to trade unionists in the West Indies, West 
Africa, Burma and Malaya, with the TUC meeting the 
cost.1Rj The TUC also supported Extra-Mural courses at the 
London School of Economics and Political Science, as it 
did for the Ruskin College, Glasgow, Southampton and 
Manchester Universities.1"1 The essence was to aid 
government efforts in building a sound industrial 
relations and labour unions as a step towards combating 
the Communists.
Between 1946 and 1952 seventeen Nigerians benefitted 
from TUC training facilities for overseas trade
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unionists. Out of the fifty-two places in the General 
Training Courses since its inception in 1946/47, twelve 
were allotted to Nigeria, nine to Germany, six to India, 
four to the West Indies, three to Norway and Trinidad, 
two to Burma and Sierra Leone, and one each to the Gold 
Coast, Kenya, British Guiana, Malaya, Australia, Belgium, 
Sweden, Greece, Southern Rhodesia, Kenya and Holland.
The private sector was not left out in the overall 
attempts at curtailing communism. European firms were 
generally apprehensive of communist infiltration of their 
workers' unions. In England, they formed a pressure group 
called the Overseas Employers Federation. Through this 
organisation they were able to press for more measures 
against communism. These included Bank of British West 
Africa Limited; Barclays Bank (D.C.O); British and French 
Bank; John Holt; Rowntree-Fry-Cadbury; UAC; Elder 
Dempster; Peterson Zochonis etc.1"' They cooperated with 
the Labour Department and the British TUC on ways towards 
building a sound industrial and labour relations.
In response to Lyttelton's request of December 9th 
1953 for co-operation between the CO and the TUC, the TUC 
General Council met with Government officials on January 
2 8th 1954 to work out modules of operation. It was agreed 
that private firms had a part to play in the development
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of good industrial relations. To that end, it was 
suggested that the Colonial Office should meet the 
representatives of the Overseas Employers Federation. 
This was to be followed by a meeting between the three 
bodies .184
In a meeting in 1954 between the OEF, the CO and the 
British TUC, it was agreed that steps against communism 
in colonial labour unions should remain secret.1"3 In a 
response to A.R. Mellor, the director of the United 
Africa Company, the Secretary of State for the Colonies 
stressed however that, "while it was communism which made 
the job so urgent ... communism itself could only be met 
by developing sound industrial relations".186
Leading commercial firms in Nigeria, such as, the 
Lever Brothers, the Leventis Group, John Holt Ltd, the 
United Africa Company, Van Der Bergh and Elder Dempster 
supported government anti-communist measures through 
their disposition to notable marxist labour leaders. For 
instance, the managements of Lever Brothers and Van Der 
Bergh did not recognise Wahab Goodluck as the 
representative of their Workers' Union during a trade 
dispute in 1957 partly because he was a communist. 187
During the talks with the Commissioner of Labour,
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management stated categorically that "all we had done was 
to prevent a communist from causing industrial chaos by 
being allowed unrestricted access to our premises".1"" The 
management of Lever Brothers and Van Der Bergh sought the 
support of the government in upholding their decision to 
restrict Goodluck and his cohorts from their premises, 
since, in their view, "government was serious in its 
declared attitude towards communism".189
The Director of Elder Dempster Lines Limited, Bruce 
Glasier, was also concerned about the activities of Wari 
Orumbie (a.k.a. Sidi Omar Khayam), who was believed to 
have the backing of a Trotskyist Group in Liverpool, to 
disrupt cordial labour relations between staff and 
management of Elder Dempster in Lagos.190 The background 
to this was the seamen's strike on board 'M.V. Apapa' at 
Liverpool in 1957, and the subsequent dismissal of the 
workers by the management of Elder Dempster.191 By 
November 1958 Orumbie had successfully staged a walk-out 
in Lagos which disrupted the activities of the company. 
Elder Dempster's tactics were to sponsor other workers to 
disrupt the activities of Orumbie. In this the company 
was successful.192 To the government however, the most 
plausible counter to communism was the building of sound 
industrial relations between the management and the 
workers.
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Further government attempts at eliminating communism 
can be seen in their fostering of the National Council of 
Trade Unions, Nigeria (NCTUN) under Cole in 1957 V 9" The 
background was N.D. Watson's memorandum of 1953, where he 
argued that "it is no use trying to break communist 
leaders if there is nobody to step into their places".194 
He maintained that "quite apart ... from any repressive 
or deterrent action in the administrative, legal or 
propaganda fields that H.M.G. or Colonial Governments may 
be able to take, the fact will always remain that 
resistance to communist infiltration must come from 
within the trade union movement itself".""5 The Secretary 
of State for the Colonies' advice to Colonial Governments 
was that "it is by influence and persuasion that the work 
would have to be done" . 196
Like Nkrumah in the Ghana, Balewa's government 
secretly sponsored activists like Labinjoh, Adebola and 
Borha to join the communist dominated All-Nigerian Trade 
Union Federation (ANTUF) .197 The return of these men to 
ANTUF, led to the resignation of Gogo Chu Nzeribe and his 
cohorts from the body and the temporary declaration of 
ANTUF support for ICFTU.19" But for Adebola this was not 
enough because the goal of the ICFTU at the Douala 
meeting was not to create another faction in the ANTUF 
but "to clean out the minority communist group and 
preserve ANTUF" . 199
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The argument was that irrespective of the 
resignation of Nzeribe and his cohorts, Wahab Goodluck 
and Sunday Bassey still held official positions which 
could only be wrested from them through an election. The 
solution, according to Adebola, was that "ANTUF must be 
completely dissolved; a new centre probably reverting to 
the old name of Nigerian Trade Union Congress, would be 
formed with the NCTUN as the nucleus; and membership 
would be considered individually and no union harbouring 
known pro-communist elements in its executive would be 
eligible for affiliation".""0
These machinations soon paid dividends. On March 7th 
1959, approximately one hundred and fifty labour leaders 
representing seventy unions met at Enugu, Eastern Region, 
to organise a new trade union organisation. With the 
exception of M.A.O. Imoudu, who was elected 
President-General of the new Trade Union Congress of 
Nigeria (TUC) , all of the officers of the new 
organisation had been previously closely associated with 
NCTUN (an anti-communist group) .201 The important position 
of Secretary-General was captured by L.L. Borha, who 
defeated S.U. Bassey, Secretary-General of ANTUF, by 
eighty-five votes to fifty-two. 202 The Deputy 
President-General elect was S.I. Eze, President of the 
Nigerian Transport Staff Union affiliate of NCTUN. O.
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Zudonu was elected first Vice-President, and 0. Egwunwoke 
as Treasurer. The former was President, and the latter, 
Secretary of the Marine Floating Staff Union, which was 
affiliated to NCTUN. It should be noted that both men had 
earlier visited the United States and Caux (Switzerland) 
as strong supporters of the Moral Re-armament Movement.2"'
To achieve this sweep of important offices in the 
TUC, supporters of NCTUN are said to have caucused both 
before and during the merger and adopted a common 
policy.^4 As Theo Adams, the American Consul noted, "an 
internal split among ANTUF representatives to the 
conference combined with an apathy toward ANTUF on the 
part of the regional leaders defeated their aspirants".205 
The Daily Times in its editorial of March 11th 1959, 
remarked that "the new TUC must look into the past and 
learn from the pitfalls of its predecessor, the old TUC" 
under Nduka Eze.206 In the final analysis the constitution 
of the new TUC categorically stated as one of the 
objectives of the new labour movement that "it will 
safeguard against the projection of communism into the 
labour movement" . 207
(6.6) THE ROLE OF MAJOR POLITICAL PARTIES :
Ideological questions did not emerge in party
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politics and the wider nationalist movement in Nigeria 
until 1944, when the National Council of Nigeria and the 
Cameroon was formed. Although the marxists were unable to 
make NCNC a communist-oriented organisation, their 
efforts, thenceforth, were aimed at establishing 
themselves in strategic positions within the party. To 
the NCNC, a Communist Party of Nigeria may have had the 
right to exist. But whether a party that preached 
violence should enjoy existence remained a vital 
question. The party opted for gradualism and a 
constitutional route to independence as against the 
radicals idea of violent liberation.20^
In addition, the Action Group (the most 
accommodating of all the major political parties) and the 
Northern Peoples Congress were anti-communist. This, 
perhaps, was based upon their significant support from 
traditional institutions. Both the AG and the NPC first 
emerged as cultural associations called "Egbe Omo 
Oduduwa" and "Jamatul Islamiyyah Arewa" respectively in 
the late 1940s. They, however, became political parties 
in 1951. To the marxists, both parties were conservative 
and could not serve their purpose (a base for militant 
communist action). However, this view about the Action 
Group later changed. By and large, the AG and NPC 
membership was made up of politicians who had been
304
schooled in the virtues of capitalism and communism. 
While most opted for capitalism and Fabian socialism, 
some who had earlier been associated with the CPGB in 
London, renounced communism upon returning to Nigeria. 
These were barristers, businessman, teachers and 
aristocrats. Both parties were manifestly interested in 
anti-communism.
In view of the governments stiff opposition to 
communism, the Marxists had, by mid-1950s, decided to 
join registered political parties. There was, however, a 
dilemma among the Marxist Groups concerning which of the 
political parties they should join. A majority of them 
however, preferred the Action Group. Sklar identified 
four reasons for this. First, the Left had recently 
suffered set-backs due to Azikiwe's anti-communism; 
second, they were impressed by the organisation and 
methodical planning of the Action Group; Third, their 
membership was concentrated in the West; and fourth, they 
preferred AG's federalism to the NCNC preference for a 
unitary system.209 They were also attracted to the Action 
Group, because of its soft-spot for socialist 
intellectuals, whom it used in its "summer school" 
programmes. The AG used the "summer school" to teach 
party aims, activities and strategies. Between 1952 and 
1960 the Action Group repeatedly made known its
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preference for free enterprise and welfarism. To Awolowo 
these included, free education, health services, full 
employment and unemployment relief, as well as support 
and encouragement of peasant farmers.210
Ideological questions in the north are better 
understood by explaining attitude of the NPC to
opposition parties, such as the Northern Elements Peoples 
Party (NEPU) and other minorities. The NPC leadership 
under Ahmadu Bello, did not mince words in its stiff 
opposition to communism and radicalism.211 This explains 
his attitude towards socialists and radicals in the
Northern Region during the period. Examples of radicalism 
include opposition to the Native Authority system in any 
form. An example of socialist ideology includes NEPU's 
declared principle of resuscitating the role of the
"Talakawa" in politics. In fact, the North's Native 
Authority was the NPC and vice versa. Thus opposition to 
the NA system meant opposition to the NPC. Aminu Kano 
perceptively summed up the situation thus: "We interpret
democracy in its more traditional, radical sense, and 
that is the rule of the common people, the poor, the 
illiterate, while our opponents (the NPC) interpret it in 
its modern Tory sense, and that is the rule of the
enlightened and prosperous minority in the supposed
interest of the common people" . 212
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Aminu Kano's position, according to Dudley, 
"provided the middle-class led opposition with a radical, 
revolutionary ideology which drew its inspiration from 
Marxian concepts".213 Unlike marxists in the south, NEPU 
under Kano, aimed at restructuring the fabric of northern 
society, and propagated the need for wider political and 
economic opportunities based upon meritocracy rather than 
ascription.214 Dudley described NEPU's ideology as "the 
building up of the economy on socialist lines, which the 
party interprets to mean the conversion of villages into 
co-operatives and the gradual nationalization of some 
assets".2*7' The NPC, like the NCNC, did not tolerate 
socialism and any opposition to aristocracy, preached by 
NEPU and other minority groups in the north.216 As it was 
in the south, there was no place for the marxists in the 
north. Unlike the southern parties however, the NPC did 
not accept radicals into its fold even if they were 
willing to shed their "red garments".217
(6.7) CONCLUSION:
In the meantime, London was also concerned about 
other matters such as economic, constitutional and the 
socio-political development of the country. While many 
studies have focused on these aspects, I should point out 
that they were accompanied by anti-communist measures. By
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the late 1950s, Britain with the assistance of leading 
Nigerian politicians, had been able to stall the growth 
of communism in Nigeria. She also established practical 
policies on socio-political and economic development as 
well. What remained was how to sustain these policies in 
a post-independence Nigeria. The next chapter focus on 
these measures as a prelude to eventual transfer of power 
on October 1st 1960.
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
ON THE EVE OF THE TRANSFER OF POWER - 
ATTEMPTS AT A SUSTAINABLE ANTI-COMMUNISM
(7.1) INTRODUCTION:
Between 1958 and 1960, British officials pursued policies 
aimed at sustaining various anti-communist measures 
implemented since the 1940s. Inasmuch as they were 
concerned with the exodus of British personnel from 
Nigeria, efforts were geared to drafting a Technical Co­
operation Scheme, a Defence Agreement, ensuring the 
maintenance of economic links, Nigeria's membership of 
the Commonwealth, and her adherence to a non-neutralist 
foreign policy after independence. These measures were 
initiated as part of an effort at maintaining and 
sustaining Western powers' position in Nigeria after 
independence.
The background to this was the Soviet Union's new 
perception of Africa in 1958 and afterwards as well as 
the need for Britain to show her Allies that she was not 
leaving a stone untouched. The Soviets' new vision was
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based upon economic and technical aid to newly 
independent African nations in order to encourage their 
support in world affairs.1 By late 1958 therefore, 
British officials had concretized measures to be taken in 
terms of Britain's future relationships with emerging 
African states. Britain during this period was interested 
in retaining the sympathy and support of newly 
independent states of Africa as well as preventing them 
from being subverted by Soviet influence.2
By the beginning of 1959 the Cabinet African 
(Official) Committee was confronted with analysing 
various reports and memoranda concerning the future of 
British relationships with her colonies. Of note were the 
Colonial Office memorandum on "Future Constitutional 
Development in the Colonies"; the Foreign Office's 
"Africa: The Next Ten Years"; and NATO's " Report on
Communist Penetration in Africa".3 The Committee met on 
January 6th 1959 to consider the CO memorandum about 
"Future Constitutional Development in the Colonies". 
While the members agreed that constitutional development 
in Nigeria had prepared her for independence within the 
Commonwealth, they noted that "all the governments in 
Nigeria have publicly condemned international communism 
as a threat to their own freedom".4
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At another meeting the Committee noted that, "None 
of the leaders of the majority parties have sympathy with 
communism and none of them, except perhaps in his heart 
of hearts Dr. Azikiwe, advocates a purely 'neutralist' 
policy".^ The assurance of a non-neutralist policy in 
world affairs, membership of the Sterling Area and the 
Commonwealth, was to be complemented by a Technical Co­
operation Scheme and a Defence Agreement. The essence of 
all these was to deny the USSR any advantage in post­
independence Nigeria.
(7.2) NON-NEUTRALIST POLICY:
In 1959 officials were concerned about Nigeria's 
future role as an ally.6 Colonial officials maintained 
that so long as Balewa and his peers remained at the helm 
of Nigerian affairs there was nothing to worry about. 
They were satisfied with the outcome of the December 1959 
elections which gave the NPC a slight majority in the 
parliament thereby making it a senior partner in the 
coalition with the NCNC.
Earlier in March, Northern self-government had been 
granted, the Eastern and Western regions having been 
self-governing since 1957. Balewa's success in the 
December 12th 1959 elections, seems to have increased the
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confidence of British officials. They noted that Balewa 
had displayed remarkable wisdom and statesmanship in his 
capacity as a Minister, Leader of Government Business, 
and later as Prime Minister.8
The policy of non-neutralism was predicated upon
Nigeria's alignment with the Western powers in world
affairs. Britain could not allow Nigeria to become non-
aligned in world politics because of her strategic
location, size and potential. The Cabinet Committee
concluded at one of its meetings that;
Neutralist policies were not at 
present in favour in Nigeria; 
instead there was a strong pro- 
Commonwealth and anti-Communist 
feeling and it was unlikely that 
a substantial change in this out­
look would occur, provided that 
the policies of the West were not 
such as to be completely un­
acceptable to Nigerian opinion.9
While the British had some reservations about 
Azikiwe,10 they were confident about the support and 
solidarity of other leading nationalists. These men 
included regional premiers, ministers and senior party- 
men who were committed to the prevention of communist 
infiltration.
Part of the enthusiasm for non-neutralism as part of
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Nigeria's post-independence foreign policy was the result 
of NATO's Report of 1959 which suggested that colonial 
powers, as members of NATO, should ensure the support of 
their old colonies against the Eastern bloc.11 It however 
added that "it would be counter-productive to attempt to 
prevent Soviet contacts by force, it would be better to 
convince the Africans that the new colonialist was the 
U.S.S.R. and let them experience the fact at first 
hand" .12
Furthermore, Britain recognized the fact that 
economic, commercial, cultural and emotional bonds with 
her old colonies was to remain intact. An editorial in 
The Times (London) summed up the situation as "a game of 
diplomatic iu-i itsu which the contestant using the least 
force will win" . 13
(7.3) BALEWA AND NON-NEUTRALIST POLICY :
It is notable that the Prime Minister, Abubakar 
Tafawa Balewa, was more emphatic about non-neutrality 
than other politicians. He was the champion of non­
neutrality in Anglophone Africa. In his reported 
conversation with Kwame Nkrumah in February 1959, Balewa 
emphatically voiced his admiration of the West and the 
need for non-neutrality among Africans as a way of
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consolidating the long relationship with Britain.1" He 
not only pledged mutual support in the defence field with 
the United Kingdom, but also, showed no wish to adopt a 
neutralist line in foreign affairs after independence.lb 
As he reported, "I told him categorically that we were 
going to stand by the West and that we could be full 
partners in the British Commonwealth of Nations,that we 
disliked neutrality and did not believe in it".16
While Nigeria's membership of the Commonwealth could 
be seen as a fait accompli. the government took steps 
toward delaying the opening of a Russian Embassy in 
Nigeria.1 The politics of delaying the opening of the 
USSR's Embassy in Nigeria began in January 1960 when the 
Foreign Office outlined strict measures that should be 
followed before permission would be granted to any 
country wishing to open an embassy in Nigeria.18 
Subsequently accreditation and opening of an embassy was 
based upon a Foreign Office memorandum. This, perhaps, 
was responsible for the USSR's late application for 
opening an embassy which was only made after October 1960 
in the hope that the new regime would grant permission 
more easily.
They were wrong. Balewa sought the advice of the 
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs
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about the steps to be taken. As he wrote, "the Russians 
were being insistent about opening an embassy, and I put 
them off by saying that it was a question of applying in 
the usual way".19 Balewa had taken the line that 
applications would be dealt with in the following order 
of priority: Commonwealth countries; countries already 
having offices in Lagos; and new applications according 
to their merits.20
In a conversation with Balewa, the Secretary of 
State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs noted that the 
government had taken the necessary steps to stall the 
USSR's application.21 This explains why the USSR had no 
embassy in Nigeria until 1961. Nigeria on the other hand, 
was represented in the USSR by the British Embassy until 
1962 when she opened her first mission in Moscow, the 
first in the Eastern bloc.
On the eve of independence, Sir James Robertson 
relinquished the offices of internal affairs, police, 
finance and economic development to Balewa and his 
ministers. Subsequently, the office of the Governor- 
General was given to Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe. As part of the 
training process, Robertson had allowed Balewa to read 
foreign and diplomatic papers, as well as those on 
defense. 2~ According to Robertson, this prepared Balewa
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for the task of handling foreign and defense matters.
Adequate machinery and personnel were also set up at 
the External Affairs Department in Lagos, and Nigeria's 
office at the United Nations in New York. The 
administrators at both offices had been trained in the 
United Kingdom and the United States as well as in other 
British Embassies. They were men whom senior officials 
could vouch for when it came to security and the 
continuity of non-neutralist policy in foreign affairs.
Beginning in 1957, Reginald Barrett, a Briton in 
charge of the Nigerian Liaison Office in Washington, was 
asked to train six mid-career Nigerians who later became 
Assistant Secretaries in the External Affairs Department 
on completion of their training. About forty in all were 
selected to undergo training in Washington and other 
British embassies. They were tutored in international 
relations, protocol and diplomatic procedures by 
officials of the British Embassy and the United States' 
Department of State. These men also offered a course on 
"Issues in International Relations" at the Johns Hopkins 
School of Advanced International Studies.24
One of the most important figures in the External 
Affairs Department during this period was L.O.V. Anionwu,
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who first acted as a liaison officer for Balewa's
government in London. In his recommendation on July 4th
I960, the Director of the Imperial Defence College,
London, Sir Robert Scott, suggested to the Foreign Office
that Anionwu would be a. reliable candidate for the
position of a Permanent Under-Secretary of Defence and
External Affairs in independent Nigeria. Anionwu had
taken a series of courses on diplomacy, protocol and
international politics, and had imbibed the spirit of
anti-communism while in the Imperial Defence College. Sir
Robert Scott remarked that Anionwu was:
... very friendly ... African 
department could, I am sure, 
speak to him with complete 
freedom about Foreign Office 
thinking on Nigeria ... it 
would be a very good investment 
and well worth the trouble.25
It was not surprising, therefore, that Anionwu became an 
adviser and Under-Secretary to Balewa on Defense and. 
Foreign Affairs on the eve of independence.
On the other hand, both Ifeagwu and Aig-Imoukhuede 
were posted to the Nigerian Permanent Mission in the 
United Nations in 1959 to study western diplomatic 
protocol. Ifeagwu had earlier served with the U.K. 
Consulate General in Washington for three years, before 
being appointed to the United Nations. Aig-Imoukhuede had
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worked at both the Nigerian Daily Times and Sunday Times 
between 1955 and 1957. Between 1957 and 1958, he was the 
editor of Federal Nigeria, a publication of the Ministry 
of Research and Information. His success there, as the 
government's image maker was, perhaps, responsible for 
his being recommended for the UN job, by Kola Balogun, 
the Minister for Research and Information.
Suffice it to say that the Nigerian Foreign Service 
was built on pro-Western ideological premises. The 
Robertson/Balewa's government was careful in its 
appointment and secondment of personnel to the nascent 
External Affairs Department. In fact, appointments or 
secondment into the External Affairs Department (later 
Ministry of External and Commonwealth Affairs) since the 
1950s were based upon the ideological orientation of the 
individuals. This became glaring from 1957 onwards, when 
non-career diplomats were seconded from the civil service 
to the External Affairs Department.
It should not be surprising therefore, that, men 
like Nwokedi, Simeon Adebo, N.A. Martins, Anionwu, 
Osakwe, Ogbu, G.M. Garba and Iyalla (all civil servants); 
and Mohammadu Ngileruma, Baba Gana, Abdul Maliki, J.T. 
Yesufu, Bello Malabu, Ignatius Durlong and Sanni 
Kontagora (all party stalwarts), were appointed into
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various positions in the Foreign Service. These were the 
men who executed Balewa's non-neutralist policies.
(7.4) ANGLO-NIGERIAN DEFENCE PACT:
Perhaps, one of the ways by which Britain satisfied 
her Western Allies was the consummation and realisation 
of a defence pact with her colonies. In the case of 
Nigeria (as in other parts of the empire), the idea of a 
defence pact did not just emerge in 1958. If viewed from 
a Cold War perspective, as it should be, the idea was 
aimed at consolidating the gains of the Western Allies 
generally in defence and strategy against the Soviet led 
Eastern bloc. It should not be surprising therefore that 
the Soviet Union was the first to criticise the idea on 
the floor of the United Nations when it was first signed 
with Ceylon in 1947.
Gupta and John Kent have argued that defence
strategy had been part of British Cold War tactics since
1947.26 As early as 1951, senior Colonial Office
officials had identified two major roles for the colonies
in defence matters. And as Trafford Smith noted, colonies
played their part in defence in two ways:
(1) "By raising and maintaining forces from their local 
manpower. These forces have the primary role of 
safeguarding internal security in their territories,
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thereby preserving the usefulness of the territories as 
bases and sources of manpower, raw materials, etc; and,
(2) By maintaining or increasing their contribution to 
the pool of economic resources available for the 
Commonwealth war effort".27
This view, thus, juxtapose my position that the thrust of 
Anglo-Nigerian defence pact was the need to sustain 
Britain's influence in Nigeria after independence.
As spelt out in the policy paper, "Defence Policy 
and Global Strategy" in March 1952, Britain's obligation 
was based on her role in Europe, NATO, the Commonwealth 
and the will to remain a leading power. Africa was not 
left out of the overall defence strategy. Lord Salisbury 
noted in July 1954 that, "Britain was to continue to play 
an eminent role in checking the spread of communism; she 
was to preserve security and develop stable government in 
colonial territories".28
Two short-term steps were taken towards realising 
this. First was the encouragement of defence co-operation 
conferences with other colonial powers, South Africa and 
the United States. Two conferences were held in Nairobi 
and Dakar in August 1951 and March 1954 respectively. 
Second, based upon the Ministry of Defence Official 
Committee's recommendation on August 15th 1955, the
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Cabinet approved the appointment of a military adviser in 
East and West Africa, if administering officers and local 
politicians finally approved of it.
As to long-term measures, Sir Harold Parker 
(Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Defence, 1948-1956) 
noted that:
We should hope that the West African 
territories on achieving independence would
agree to undertake some external d e f e n c e
commitment, on the lines of the p r e s e n t
commitment to provide a Brigade for use in a
major war, as part of the obligations arising
from Commonwealth membership.32
Officials in the colonies were directed to seek the views 
of local politicians as soon as the opportunity arose. In 
Nigeria, Britain used the opportunity of the 
constitutional conferences in late 1957 and 1958 to seek 
the views of politicians as to the desirability of a 
defence pact after independence.
Contrary to general opinion, Nigerians were not 
coerced into signing the Defence Pact with the United 
Kingdom in I960.31 First, the final decision about the 
pact rested upon Parliaments' approval and the signature 
of the Prime Minister after independence. This line was 
adopted after the USSR's criticism of a similar pact with 
Ceylon earlier in 1947.22 Secondly, available evidence
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suggests that Nigerian politicians viewed it as part of 
the good-will and cooperation between the two countries. 
In fact, Nigerian politicians believed that, it would 
ensure the territorial integrity of the nascent nation 
and help defend her from external aggression. 22
Towards the end of 1958, the Prime Minister, Federal 
Ministers and the three Regional Premiers agreed to enter 
into a defence agreement with Britain after independence. 
Azikiwe had earlier taken the view that it would be in 
the interests of Nigeria and Great Britain to sign a 
defence agreement whereby the UK would have "full 
facilities to use Kano and Lagos airfields for the 
transport of troops and supplies in peace or war time; to 
use the harbours of Lagos and Port Harcourt and the 
communications thence with Kano". 4 Amongst the reasons 
for these was that any loss of airfield facilities at 
Kano would have a serious effect on Britain's ability to 
safeguard her interests in the Indian Ocean in the post­
independence period.22 In addition Nigeria could not at 
the time afford the huge cost of training her military 
personnel and the buying of military equipment.
The United Kingdom's Defence Pact with Nigeria, like 
those with Ceylon, Malaya and the Gold Coast, should be 
seen as part of a general desire to sustain anti­
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communism and maintain Western interests in peace and 
war. It was, in part, a political move to prevent the 
subversive influence of the USSR. As the Foreign Office 
noted:
we have certain requirements in Africa 
which need to be examined... They partly 
derived from considerations of internal 
security and partly from considerations 
of global strategic policy.22
This involved the presence in Kenya of element of 
Britain's strategic reserves; aircraft staging rights in 
Nigeria, Gambia, Sierra Leone and Kenya; and rights to 
overfly territories between the staging points. In return 
for the use of Nigerian airfields, harbours and ports, 
Britain agreed to train Nigerian army and naval personnel 
in the United Kingdom.2' While a significant proportion 
of the cost was to be paid by Nigeria, Her Majesty's 
Government nonetheless assisted in defraying part of it. 
The Nigerian Parliament passed the bill by a vote of 149 
to 39 on November 19th I960.30 Official signing of the 
treaty between the two governments did not take place 
until January 5th 1961.
Nigerian youth were, however, not happy with the 
defence pact. It presented Marxists with an opportunity 
to revive their idea that the whole process of 
decolonization and the transfer of power was aimed at
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creating a neo-colonial dependency. As Claude Phillips 
noted: "From the beginning of independence, Nigeria has
faced a bewildering array of internal pressures 
attempting to establish, alter, or repudiate the foreign 
policy of the country". He concluded that: "the
articulate challenges against the government were by no 
means limited to parliament". According to him, "Non­
governmental groups such as political parties, labor 
unions, university student unions, youth groups, 
newspapers, and others joined the radical politicians in 
condemning Government actions and policies". 59
Under the leadership of a Soviet trained pharmacist, 
Otegbeye, the Nigerian Youth Congress, the Zikist 
National Vanguard and the National University Students' 
Union staged several protests in Lagos and other parts of 
the country.40 They identified five obnoxious aspects of 
the pact. These were:
(1) "If a British soldier kills a Nigerian he cannot be 
tried in the courts of Nigeria, but can be acquitted on 
the strength of a mere exonerating statement by a British 
superior;
(2) The British soldiers have an unlimited right to 
carry guns wherever they go in Nigeria. Yet no Nigerian 
can carry arms without permission from the Governor- 
General ;
(3) Nigeria guarantees to the British soldiers full 
exemption from passport and visa formalities;
(4) The British soldiers are entitled to complete fiscal 
immunities, full exemption from exchange regulations, and
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absolute freedom from customs duties and inspection at 
ports of entry; and,
(5) All vehicles of the British servicemen are exempted 
from all licensing and insurance regulations".41
Because of the many serious disturbances that followed, 
Balewa's government had no option other than to abrogate 
the defence pact in January 1962. We should note however 
that Nigerian military continued to receive training in 
the United Kingdom despite the abrogation.
(7.5) OTHER ISSUES :
There are other areas that should be considered as 
part of Britain's effort at sustaining anti-communism in 
Nigeria on the eve of independence. Linking the economy 
with the Sterling Area,4" and Nigerian membership of the 
Commonwealth were significant. The colonial economy, 
unsurprisingly, was closely linked with Britain and the 
Sterling Area. It was principally based on the production 
and export of primary produce, the price of which 
depended on world trade. There was an increase in the 
volume of exports of primary produce from Nigeria to 
Western countries particularly Britain during the period. 
Whether or not this led to development or under­
development is another debate.43 What is of interest here 
is that, the economy was linked with the Sterling Area as
360
part of the efforts towards cementing financial 
relationship between Britain and her colonies.4*
In official circles, preference for the Sterling 
Area was linked with the future of the Commonwealth.48 As 
early as 1953, Sir Norman Brook, Secretary to the Cabinet 
(1947-1962), wrote a memorandum, which later became a 
Cabinet paper: "The Future of Commonwealth Membership".
Brook argued that, Britain should aim to keep the 
colonies in category [a] (particularly those which could 
expect independence in the next ten or twenty years) in 
the Commonwealth after independence. His argument was 
that through this Britain would maintain the political 
cohesion of the Sterling Area.46 This idea was supported 
by senior Colonial Office officials such as Sir Hilton 
Poynton (Deputy Under-Secretary of State, 1948 - August 
1959) . In a minute, he stressed that Britain should 
strengthen moves towards the political cohesion of the 
Sterling Area and the Commonwealth.4 He raised three 
questions and provided answers to them. These were:-
(1) "Will the territories in category [a] be willing to 
remain in the Sterling Area when independent?;
(2) Could their continued membership of the Sterling Area 
be made a condition of their membership of the 
Commonwealth?; and,
(3) Would their continued membership of the Sterling 
Area, whether within or without the Commonwealth, be a
source of strength?".48
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As to question one, Poynton noted that much depended upon 
the success of the Sterling Area in international trade. 
"Decisions", according to Poynton, "will be taken on 
their own judgment of self-interest, though one naturally 
hopes that judgment will lead them to remain within the 
Sterling Area".49
In his answer to the second question he argued that 
"we could not make continued membership of the Sterling 
Area a condition of full membership of the Commonwealth, 
partly because Canada is already outside the Sterling 
Area but inside the Commonwealth".22 He concluded that, 
"the crucial point is really not membership of the 
Commonwealth but membership of the Sterling Area".
This was, perhaps, why the Cabinet Africa Official
Committee in its meeting in January 1959 concluded that:
The Sterling area would suffer 
a moderate loss of dollar exchange 
if Nigeria were to leave it; 
departure from the Commonwealth, 
without leaving the Sterling area, 
would have little or no effect on 
the latter.52
Officials were however confident that Nigeria would 
remain in the Commonwealth after independence. Their 
assurance was based on Nigerian politicians' preference 
for membership of the Commonwealth which they believed
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would strengthen their relationship with the United 
Kingdom.22 Much, however, depended upon whether or not 
ex-masters and ex-servants remained "always as friends".
I should add that a key factor in the future 
relationship between Nigeria and the United Kingdom, was 
the extent of the latter's economic aid for development 
after independence.54 In 1959 for instance, the Foreign 
Office stated that Russia's tactics in Africa had changed 
considerably. There was now more Soviet economic aid to 
newly independent African states such as Guinea, Ghana 
and Egypt. As the FO memorandum stated, "their technique 
is at present to represent themselves as an alternative 
source of economic and technical help".55
The Cabinet Africa (Official) Committee deliberated
upon the FO' s memorandum on January 21st 1959. As it
relates to Nigeria, members concluded that:
It would be of the highest value if, in 
agreement with Nigerian leaders, 
arrangements could be made before independence for
the introduction at that time of a technical
co-operation scheme similar in form, but larger
in size, than that which had been introduced for
Ghana.56
The Committee suggested that the CO should circulate a 
memorandum discussing the means of encouraging economic 
development in Nigeria, with a view to the possible
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formulation of a technical co-operation scheme. 2
The Cabinet Africa (Official) Committee met on 
February 20th 1959 to discuss the CO memorandum on 
technical co-operation scheme for Nigeria. At the 
meeting, C.G. Eastwood (Assistant Under-Secretary of 
State, 1955 - 1965) presented the CO memorandum which set 
out the possible lines on which a scheme of technical co­
operation with Nigeria after independence might be 
developed.2" The memorandum proposed a bilateral scheme 
(which was heavily weighted towards UK assistance at the 
outset) rather than an international or Commonwealth 
multilateral plan.59
The Colonial Office was of the view that "the scheme 
would need to be on a generous scale so that our effort 
compared reasonably favourably with those of other 
countries..."20 The Cabinet Committee concluded that the 
United Kingdom was bound to make a contribution to 
Nigerian development, and that, the need for a technical 
assistance scheme should be acceptable in principle.61 
The Treasury was, however, asked to determine how much 
could be used in this way.6" Like the Defence Agreement, 
Nigerian leaders accepted the offer of a Technical Co­
operation Scheme after independence. This was the genesis 
of Nigeria/UK bilateral co-operation in education,
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agriculture, science and technology after independence.
(7.6) CONCLUSION:
By late 1959 one can arguably say that Britain, with 
the assistance of leading politicians, had shaped the 
world outlook of most Nigerians towards the West. No 
doubt the ideological orientation of the Nigerian ruling 
elite was pro-Western: the principle of "free enterprise" 
and "open door" loomed-large in Nigerian economic and 
developmental programmes. A "nurtured-capitalism" had 
been established. What remained was its consolidation 
after independence.22 Upon successful completion of the 
general elections of December 1959, the Secretary of 
State for the Colonies introduced the Nigerian
Independence Bill to the House of Commons which was 
unanimously passed. At this point in late 1959 and early 
1960, the British could not afford to risk what they had 
striven hard to build - the confidence and respect of 
Nigerian politicians - by refusing or delaying
independence. On October 1st 1960, power was eventually 
transferred to Nigerian politicians with the hope that
Britain and Nigeria would remain as allies.
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
EXPLANATIONS FOR THE SUCCESS OF ANTI­
COMMUNISM
(8.1) INTRODUCTION:
We are frequently warned about the danger 
and horrors of communism, of which we are 
fully aware and against which we are 
armed.
(Sir Ahmadu Bello, 1962; p.236).
Theoretically, a Nigerian Communist 
Party may have the right to exist and 
disseminate its beliefs; but practically, 
it is a problem which needs a political 
solution: whether a party which believes 
in the use of violence and bloodshed to 
attain and maintain power should be 
to exercise and enjoy such a fundamental
right in a democratic society.
(Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, 1979, p.56).
We are opposing Communism not 
of any gain but because we are convinced that
Communism is not in the good interest of societies.
(H.P. Adebola, 1954).
The quotations above highlights the level of 
seriousness with which leading nationalists were prepared
allayed
human
because
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to ensure the success of anti-communism in Nigeria. 
Having imbibed ideas of western capitalism they pursued, 
in collaboration with British officials, policies aimed 
at purging the colonial state of communist elements, as 
well as curtailing the spread of communist literature. 
This chapter concludes the study by highlighting reasons 
for the success of British anti-communism in Nigeria 
during the terminal colonial era.
(8.2) PLAUSIBLE REASONS:
While I have highlighted at different points in this 
study the attractiveness and unattractivess of Communism 
as an ideology, this section focus upon identifiable 
local reasons for the success of British anti-communism 
in Nigeria. Unlike Malaya, where Britain engaged in 
military action to suppress communism1, efforts in 
Nigeria were geared towards administrative reforms, 
improved security and intelligence, constitutional 
change, summer school training, counter-propaganda and 
collaboration.2
But first a summary of the CPGB fact-finding 
missions to Nigeria in 1950s would be a good explanation 
of the failure of Communism in Nigeria during the period. 
For instance, Idise Dafe's (formerly of Eze's Labour
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Champion) "Report on visit to Nigeria" is an acceptance 
of the failure of the Marxists in Nigeria." As part of an 
effort to see whether Communism has gained some ground in 
Nigeria, Idise Dafe was sent in 1951 to tour the country 
and assess efforts being made by CPGB members that had 
returned to Nigeria since the late 1940s and the early 
1950s. Dafe, it should be noted was a recipient of Eze's 
Labour Champion and the Daily Worker (London) training 
arrangement, who joined the CPGB upon arrival in England 
early in 1950.
Dafe's "Report" was not only pessimistic but a true 
reflection of the ineffectiveness and episodic nature of 
the several Marxist organisations in Nigeria during the 
period. He identified among others, a leadership crisis, 
incoherence and stiff government measures, as reasons for 
the failure of Communism in Nigeria.4 He lamented that: 
"Our Nigerian comrades do return to our fatherland and 
that is all we hear of them".5
In 1956 Palme Dutt also admitted the failure of 
communism in Nigeria despite various attempts since the 
late 1940s to form a united communist front. He added as 
a factor for its failure the fact that "there was 
considerable disagreement in estimating the political 
forces... and any differences of estimation in our press
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and other organs of the international Communist movement 
are quickly taken advantage of by the enemies of 
Communism in Nigeria".6
Another plausible explanation for the success of 
anti-communism lies in the religious beliefs of the 
people. By late 1930s, the dominant religions in Nigeria 
were Christianity, Islam and traditional religions. 
While Islam permeated lives in the Northern Region, large 
numbers of Muslims could be found in the south, 
particularly in the Western Region during the same 
period. Christianity was also important in the south. One 
remarkable aspect of both religions is that, they are 
both foreign (non-indigenous) to the peoples of present 
day Nigeria. And within a single family, even in the 
North, one could find a Muslim, Christian and 
practitioners of traditional religion. The three 
religions however belief in the existence of God. 7
The Marxian idea that religion is the opiate of the 
masses had a strong hold on many communists. This is 
partly why communism was viewed by most nationalists, 
particularly the northern leaders, as being against their 
beliefs and aspirations. As a US official noted in 
February, 1953, 'Northern political leaders are in
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complete opposition to the anti-government activities or 
communism taking place in the south of Nigeria'.
In fact Sir Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna of Sokoto, 
and the first premier of Northern Region, saw himself not 
only as a political leader but also as the spiritual 
leader of the North, whose duty it was to spread Islam to 
all parts of the country/ Similarly, Nnamdi Azikiwe and 
Michael Okpara, the Eastern Region leaders, Obafemi 
Awolowo and Samuel Akintola, the Western Region Leaders, 
did not hide their hatred of communism.10
Since communism was opposed to religion, it was 
bound to fail in Nigeria, either during the colonial or 
the post-colonial era, as many people were religious. 
Melady is therefore right to have concluded that "the 
Nigerian people, firm in religious traditions, whether 
muslim or Christian, do not offer a fertile market for 
the communists".11
Earlier evidence of antagonism towards communism in 
Nigeria is to be found in Reverend Father A. Foley's 
lecture titled, "Catholic and Communism" published in the 
Daily Comet of October 30th, 1948. While noting the
importance of press freedom and the influx of communist 
literature into Nigeria during the late 1940s, he went on
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to highlight the role of the press in Russia to his 
readers.1" He noted that, freedom of speech and the press 
were a sham in Russia, where 'one is not free to select 
a job for himself or establish a profitable business'.1" 
This view is supported by a nationalist, labour and 
Muslim leader, H.P. Adebola, when he stated that: "I,
personally, as a Muslim detest what Communist Russia has 
been doing to the Muslims in Asia".14
Furthermore Foley told his readers that communism
had no room for religion and morality. He advised all
Catholics, and Christians generally, to dread it. He
admonished his readers to:
... insure that the helping hand so 
warmly stretched forth does not slip 
unnoticed to their throats and stifle in their
infancy hard won freedoms of democracy or perhaps
extinguish for generations legitimate
aspirations for i n d e p e n d e n c e  ,
nationalism and
self-determination. 15
To Reverend Foley and his peers, independence became 
legitimate, only if nationalists and labour unionists 
were prepared to do away with communism. The Nigerian 
Catholic Herald, a weekly publication of the St. Paul 
Catholic Press of Ebute Metta, Lagos, and an organ of 
Nigeria's National Catholic Church, also contained in its 
issue of October 29th 1948, an editorial, which concluded
383
that, 'communism thrives when and where the social order 
is disrupted'.10
Another explanation for the success of anti­
communism was the role of the newspapers and their 
editorial comments. Despite various press reports of 
Cominform interest in Nigeria, which were often reprinted 
by Eze's Labour Champion (established in February 1950) 
and Ikoku's Nigerian Socialist Review (established in 
1952), the press generally was not in favour of communism 
as an alternative to British colonialism. Moreover both 
the Labour Champion and the Nigerian Socialist Review, 
enjoyed a few readers limited to Marxists in the south.
Most leading and highly circulated newspapers were 
pro-government and anti-communist in their editorials. In 
fact the Zikist Movement leadership was shocked to the 
core when the West African Pilot, hitherto known for its 
anti-British sentiments, began to attack communist 
elements in an editorial which rasped that "no greater 
treachery can be inflicted by anybody upon the cause of 
Nigerian freedom than to import communism into this 
country".17 The editorial further described the 
communists as "a clique of muddled brained individuals 
who talk glibly on the principal ideology of which they 
have not even the foggiest idea".lo
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Some of the newspapers also published negative 
reports about communist states in Europe in order to 
dissuade Nigerians from imbibing communist ideas. An 
example was an editorial published by J. V. Clinton in 
the Nigerian Eastern Mail. Willard Quincy Stanton, the 
United States Consul General in Lagos reported that the 
'paper has a circulation of about 2,500 and is frequently 
moderate in tone as well as friendly to American 
interests'.17 Clinton was not however, totally in support 
of the West. Writing in an editorial of November 25th, 
1950, he told his readers not to be partisan in the Cold 
War between the Eastern and Western blocs.2J
As he noted, "as a West African nationalist, and 
even one who dislikes communism, we cannot be 
wholehearted partisan in the quarrel between the 
Communist World and the Western capitalist World".21 
This, to him, was the only righteous path to 
self-government and independence in Nigeria, and indeed, 
other parts of British West Africa. It seems to me that 
followers of this idea were limited to the so called 
2,500 readers if we assume that they all support the 
editorial.
In fact CPGB research about main newspapers and 
their political/ideological interests in Nigeria during
385
the period show that there were more newspapers in 
support of government than the Marxists. As at May 1952, 
thirteen of these were identified. These were:
(1) "West African Pilot - Reformist and bourgeois 
nationalism, owned by Zik".
(2) "Nigerian Tribune - Conservative bourgeois 
intellectualism".
(3) "The People - Conservative bourgeois bussinessmen".
(4) "Daily Service - Conservative bourgeois 
intellectualism".
(5) "Eastern States Express - Conservative bourgeois 
intellectualism".
(6) "Eastern Guardian, Southern Defender and Nigerian 
Spokesman - controlled by West African Pilot".
(7) "Peoples Voice - Bourgeois reformism".
(8) "Daily Success - bourgeois nationalism. Owned by a 
limited liability trading company".
(9) "The Citizen and 22 weeklies and periodicals - 
imperialist and owned by the Gaskiya Corporation (a 
newspaper corporation maintained by funds supplied by the 
Nigerian Government and the Colonial Development Fund).
(10) "Daily Times - imperialist and owned by the London 
Daily Mirror."
(11) "Nigerian Review - imperialist and owned by the 
Public Relations Department of the Nigerian 
Government" .22
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The choice of a post-colonial leader for Nigeria was 
also instrumental in the success of anti-communism. After 
the December 1959 elections, and the success of NPC/NCNC 
coalition this was not difficult."7 Sir James Robertson, 
the Governor-General on the eve of the transfer of power 
came straight to the point when he wrote that, "when a 
Prime Minister had to be appointed in 1959, the choice 
was not difficult. Balewa was the choice".24
Lawal has identified three factors which explain 
this. Firstly, Balewa was pro-British to the core; 
secondly, he was more accommodating than Ahmadu Bello; 
and thirdly he believed in the north first, then 
Nigeria.25 While I agree on the first two points, 
available evidence seems to disprove the third point. As 
Clark's biography of Tafawa Balewa has shown, he was 
interested above all in the unity of Nigeria.26 Unlike 
Ahmadu Bello he was prepared to come to the Central 
Legislature in Lagos to take part in the decolonization 
process and indeed in combating communism, real or 
unreal.
The success of anti-communism in Nigeria was also 
due to the Marxists' inability to actualise their goal of 
revolutionary take-over since 1948. They were also unable 
to penetrate the minds of a greater number of the people.
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Their organisation could not match the rapidity with 
which the colonial administration responded to a "Call 
for Revolution". They noted in their memoirs that they 
lacked the mass support to actualise their dream - 
revolution. "7
In fact, former members of the CPGB upon returning 
to Nigeria had to abandon the "revolution" as well. This, 
perhaps, might have been influenced by Government's 
desire to deal with known communists or their 
sympathizers. These groups might have realised that 
colonial administration had succeeded in its various 
anti-communist measures prior to their arrival. For 
instance, Akpata warned 'fellow travellers', who had 
returned to West Africa before him, not to engage in "a 
romantic revolution". Marika Sherwood notes that in one 
of his letters to Nkrumah in 1948 Akpata warned that "... 
mass enthusiasm can never be a substitute for a strong 
and disciplined mass organization".27 Nwabufo Uweicha, 
another former CPGB member, noted that the revolution had 
to be postponed till after independence because, to 
engage in a revolution would prolong independence in the 
colonies .29
Lastly, Britain enjoyed the support of Bello, 
Balewa, Azikiwe and Awolowo, undoubtedly the
personalities around whom devolution revolved during the 
period. Leading labour leaders such as Adio-Moses, Esua, 
Porbeni, Egwuwonike, Adebola, Borha, Cole etc, also 
contributed to the success of anti-communism in Nigeria. 
Also organisations such as the British TUC, ICFTU, MRM, 
the British Council etc played important roles in the 
process. It was with the support of these men and 
organisations that the Colonial State was able to 
effectively combat communist penetration into Nigeria. 
The colonial state thus instituted a system that 
prevented any communist from partaking in the governance 
of Nigeria in a post-independence period.30
(8.3) CONCLUSION:
In the final analysis, British anti-communism in 
Nigeria not only kept pace with the decolonisation 
process, it partly created a class of political leaders 
who, at independence, were unwilling to embark on any 
radical programme. Anti-communism as a theme in Britain's 
transfer of power in Nigeria should be seen as a way of 
drawing more collaborators within her fold. The idea was 
to isolate the extremists and help consolidate the 
position of the moderate Nigerian politicians.
This implied, in official circles, the simultaneous
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cultivation of individual liberal nationalist leaders and 
the repression of the marxists. These was followed by 
constitutional reforms, development planning and anti­
communist measures. Once this was successful, Britain 
willingly transferred power in Nigeria.
This study analyses British policies against 
communists and her efforts to ensure sustainable anti­
communism in late colonial and post-independence Nigeria. 
It established that there was evidence of subversive 
activities by the Communist International/Cominform and 
its satellites in Africa, Asia and Europe. In West Africa 
there was the presence of communist literature and 
notable Marxists in labour and nationalist movements. 
There is evidence of the Soviet Union's interests in 
Nigeria, as well as financial support from communist 
satellites in Eastern Europe to labour unions in Nigeria. 
The communists also sponsored Nigerians to study in 
various degree courses in the Eastern bloc. These were 
used to justify anti-communist policies during the period 
under review.
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